The social philosophies of Josiah Royce and Borden Parker Bowne by Pritchard, Francis White
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1935
The social philosophies of Josiah
Royce and Borden Parker Bowne
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/5902
Boston University
-~=::-~1=1==-======~--=-- ·==--==---=-=-:-===-=-=---==-·-··--==-=---=--==-=-=--==========IF==== 
., . 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Thesis 
THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES OF 
JOSIAH ROYCE AND BORDEN £~KER BOWNE 
by 
Francis \Vhite Pritchard 
(A.B., DePauw University, 1933) 
.. · 
·'_..-: ·· 
submitted in partia1fulfilment of the 
requirements , for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
1935 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE 
I. 
II. 
INTRODUCTION. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 8 
A. What is social philosopby? • • • • • • • • • 8 
B. Aims of the present study. • • • • • • • • • 11 
c. Scope of the study. • • • • • • • • • • • • 11 
D. The sources and the method of procedure. • • 12 
JOSIAH ROYCE: THE MAN AND HIS GENERAL 
PlliLOSOPHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 
A. Royce, the ma.n. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 
1. Biographical sketch. • • • • • • • • • • 13 
2. Philosophical background. • • • • • • • • 16 
3. Philosophical influence. • • • • • • • • 18 
B. Royce's philosophy of absolutism. 
1. Definition of absolutism •• 
• • • • • 19 
• • • • • • • 19 
2. Personalistic absolutism. • • • • • • •• 21 
3. The Absolute and the individual. • • • • 23 
a. Distinctness of the individual. ••• 23 
b. Worth of the individual •• • • • • •• 24 
c. Freedom of the individual ••• • • • • 25 
c. His philosophy of loyalty •••••• 
• • •• 26 
2 
I 
II 
il 
li 
I 
I 
!I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
il 
il 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
r 
lj 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
!I 
I! 
I' ,I
;I 
I 
! 
1. Kotive of The Philoaopby of Loyalty. • • 2 6 
2. Relation to previoua ethical thought. • • 2? -
~. Definition of 1oyalty. • •••••• • • 27 
4. Choosing the cause. • • • • • • • • • • • 28 
5. Loyalty as the fulfilment of the mora l la~ 30 
6. Training for loyalty. • • • • • • • • • • 34 
7. The metaphysics of loyalty ••••• • • • 36 
III. JOSIAH ROYCE: HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. • • • • • 38 
A. Absolutism as a basis for social philosophy. 38 
1. Absolutism and soci~l friction. • • • • • 38 
2. Absolutism a s social organicism ••• . • . -. 39 
3. Absolutism and Christianity. • • • • • • 42 
B. The significance of the philosophy of 
loyalty. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 46 
1 . Its a pplic a tion to s ome American problems. 46 
a. The family ••• • • • • • • • • • • • 
b. Class conflict. • • • • • • • • • • • 
c. Provincialism. • • • • • • • • • • • 
2. Loyalty and social cohesion. • • • • • • 
3. Loyalty and social division. • • • • • • 
o. Religion and the community. • • • • • • • • 
1~ Salvation through the community. • • • • 
2. The community as a person . • • • • • • • 
3. God and the beloved communi t y. • • • • • 
46 
49 
51 
52 
53 
62 
62 
66 
6? 
4. Criticisms of t his view of Christianity •• . 69 l! I 
I 
II 
4 
I 
D. Royce's attitude on current social problems. 73 I 
'I l. The social order. • • • • • • • • • • • • 73 I! 
2. His political outlook. 74 • • • • • • • • • II j, 
3. War. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 75 ,, 
'I II 
IV. BORDEN PARKER BOVINE: THE MAN AND HIS GENERAL II 
PHILOSOPHY. 78 II • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
,I 
A. Bowne, the man. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 78 ,I 
l. Biographical sketch. 78 II • • • • • • • • • • 11 II 
2. Philosophical background. • • • • • • • • 82 I! 
3. Philosophical i nfluence. • • • • 
" 
• • • • 85 !i 
B. Bowne's philosophy of personalism. • • • • • 88 I 
I I 
1. Definition of personalism. • • • • • • • 88 I 
2. Personalism and the individual. • • • • • 91 I 
3. Doctrine of t he divine immanence. • • • • 92 
c. His t heory of ethics. • • • • • • • • • • • 94 
1. The perfectionist school of ethics. • • • 94 
2. Bowne's writi ngs in this field. • • • • • 94 
3. Relation to previous ethical t hought. • • 95 
a. Three moral ideas. • • • • • • • • • • 96 
b. Reconciliation of intuitionism and 
utilitarianism. • • • • • • • • • • 96 I. 
100 4. Ethical empiricism. • • • • • • • • • • • 
5. Religion and ethics. • • • • • • • • • • 104 
i 
5 
6. The motive for altruism. • ••••••• 105 
?. Personalistic ethics •••• • • • • • • • 106 
D. His emphasis on the significance of freedom . 10? 
1. Disadvantages of the ethical approach. • 10? 
2 . Relation to earlier freedomist writers •• 108 
3. Definition of freedom. . • • • • • • • • 109 
4. The testimony of c ommon sense. • • • . • 110 
5. Chief objections to freedom. • . • • . • 111 
. 
a. Impossibility of comprehending f ree 
action . . • • • • • . • • . . • . • 111 
b. Freedom implies pure lawlessness. • . 112 
c. Freedom conflicts with law of causa ti on.ll3 
6. Specula tive significance of freedom. • • 114 
a . Problem of truth and error. • • • • • 114 
b. Reas on implies freedom. . . . . . . . 116 
c. Freedom essential in search for causes. 118 
?. Freedom and individual responsibility. • 120 
8 . Freedom and relig ion •• • • • • • • • • • 122 
9. Freedom and ethics. • • • . . . • • • • • 122 
V. BORDEN PARKER BOVINE : HI S SOCIAL P HILOSOPHY . • 124 
A. Personalism as a basis for social philosop~ 124 
1 . Bristol's social-personalism ••••• • • 124 
2. Personalism as organic pluralism ••• . . 129 
3 . Personalism and Christianity ••••• • • 132 
========~====================================================~·--==~====== 
li 
a. Objections to personalism ••••••• 132 
b. Pragmatic basis of religious belief •• 134 
c. Personalism and the historic beliefs •• 137 
B. Bowne's conception of the kingdom of God. • 141 
1. The function of relig ion in social pro-
cess •••••••••••••••••• 141 
a. Source of motivation. • ••••••• 141 
b. Source of optimism. • • • • • • • • • 142 
c. Social dangers of relig ion. • • • • • 143 
2. The church. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 144 
3. The goal of social process. • • • • • • • 146 
a. Subjective and objective. • • • • • • 146 
b. Individual and social. • • • • • • • • 147 
c. His attitude on current social problems. • • 149 
1. The family. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 149 
2. The punishment of crime. • • • • • • • • 150 
3. War. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 151 
4. The rights of women. • • • • • • • • • • 154 
5. The social order. • • • • • • • • • • • • 155 
6. His interest in spcial justice. • • • • • 157 
VI. COMPARISON OF THE SOCI~  PHILOSOPHIES OF JOSIAH 
ROYCE AND BORDEN PARKER BOWNE. • • • • • .. . 160 
A. Human freedom in Royce and Bowne. • • • • • 160 
B. Comparison of organicism and organic 
il 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
! 
II II ;I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
pluralism. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 162 
c. Bristolts social-personalism as a synthesis 
of the social philosophies of Royce and 
Bowne. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 163 
D. The contributions of Royce and Bowne to 
social philosophy ••••••••••••• 166 
sm.WARY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 110 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 17 7 
j: 
,. ,, 
II II 
I! 
II 
I' 
ij 
II 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
!I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
li 
11 
I( 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
li 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. iVhat is social philosophy? 
Practically all of the greatest philosophers have 
d ealt with the field of social philosophy. In spite of the 
wide - spread interest in the problems of the field, however, 
the term, social philosophy, has seldom been clearly de-
fine.d, and its meaning remains vague and ambiguous . It was 
used by Hobbes in the seventeenth century, but then it seems 
to have been abandoned for a time. Today its uses are many . 
Leighton , for example, writes that "no sharp distinction 
can be drawn between ethics and social philosophy."! He 
insists that both fields are concerned essentially with t he 
same task. 
The central problem of social philosophy is the cen-
tral problem of ethics--namely, what is the ethical 
criterion of the social order? What human values 
are to constitute the bases of our judgment of the 
social order?2 
Hobhous e describes the task of social philosophy as 
follows: 
1 Leighton, ISO, ?. (The abbreviations which are used 
2 throughout are expiained in the bibliography, pp. Ibid., 10. 
8 
The fundrunental defect of the metaphysical treatment 
of society • • • has been • • • that in analyzing 
the actual constitution of society it has seemed at 
the same time to determine what is and to lay down 
what ought to be. • • • Grave confusions arise when 
issues of fact are coloured by judgment of value; 
but, when the facts are completely and accurately 
sta ted, it is re asonable to essay their valuation~ 
and this is the proper tasK of soc ial philosophy. 
Baldwin's Dietionary of Philosophy and Psychology de-
fines social philosophy as the "study of the social sciences 
considered as a department of philosophy; that is, as con-
tributing data to the synthesis of knowledge whi ch philosophy 
attempts to make. 114 
Each of these writers accurately suggests some phase 
of our sub,j ect, but none of the descriptions seems adequate 
in itself. Pe~haps the one offered by Baldwin is the most 
inclusive of the t hree, although it is much weakened by its 
explana tory claus e. Philosophy might be defined in terms 
of its relations to the sciences . It criticizes the pre-
suppositions of all the sciences; it attempts to unify the 
results of the sciences and to add to those results points 
of view tha t come from other f ields of knowledge ; it endeav-
ors to arrive at a unit ary whole as a result of that process. 
Then what philosophy in general does for all the sciences 
social philosophy -does for the social sciences. 
Baldwin defines socia l sciences as "the group of science 
3 Hobhouse , "Social Science and Ph ilosophy , 11 656. 
4 Baldwin, DPP , II, 538 . 
g 
10 
which deal wi t h social aggregation." 5 Among the social sci-
ences are sociology, ethi c s , s oc ial psychology, political 
science, economics, anthropology , ethnology, and criminology. 
Social philosophy considers the presuppositions of these 
sciences. observes their interrelations, and adds points of 
view that are not revealed by any of them. 
With an increasing specializa Gion and a growing com-
plexity of our social problems there may be little question 
of t he need of such a study . The need is graphically set 
forth in an aritcle by Glenn Frank, in which he declares: 
Our hope must be pinned to a new sort of philosopher 
who knows enough about t h e essential special contri-
butions of the sciences to enable him to play ring-
master to the specialists , bringing t hem into a con-
tact that makes each fertilize the social mind of 
the other, and ~elding th~m into a fi ghting frater-
nity for the co~non g ood. · 
From this point of view of their relation to the social 
sciences, then , we define social phi losophy as a criticism 
of t he presuppositions of all the social sciences , a reflec-
tive integra tion a nd correlation of t he results of the social 
sciences, and a relation of these r esults to the whole of 
experience. 7 
From a wider point of view, social philosophy is a 
philosophical critique of social process including evaluation 
and metaphysical interpretation . 
5 Baldwin, DPP, II, 539. ~Frank, "The Market Value of Philosophers," 634. 
su ~ested b E . s. Bri 
B. Aims of the present study. 
This thesis is a study of t he social philosophies of 
Josiah Royce and Borden Parker Bowne. Its primary aim is 
to describe, , J evalua.'!;e;· ~ ' and :: compa.r e the social philosophies 
of these two men. 
c. Scope of the study. 
Since neither Royce nor Bowne set forth his social 
philosophy systemati cal ly, it will be necessary first to 
describe some of t he .phases of their philosophies ~ in , general 
which must form the bases of their respect ive social philos-
ophies. Certain biographical facts may also serve to illu-
minate the study. 
The thesis will include an examination of the distinc-
tive philosophical systems of the two men as bases for s o-
cial philosophies and a description of their ais~inctive 
concepts and emphases which have.significance for our sub-
ject. 
\Vhat ~oyce and Bowne had to say about current issues 
and particular soci al problems may be interesting, but it 
is really pertinent here only in so far as it is a logical 
expression of their social philosophies. Otherwise it may 
be a matter of pers ona l interest, but it is not of direct 
concern for the pr esent purpose . The value of a social 
1~ 
philosophy is no~ependent on the way it was applied to 
specif ic situa tions by its author. 
Final ly , there will be a comparison of the social 
ph ilosophies of Royce and Bowne and the presentation of a 
synthesis of certain insights from the thought of both men. 
D. The sources and the method of "procedure. 
Th is study deals with a field in which little previous 
work has been d one . Few of t h e secondary sources are di -
rectly pertinent. Therefore it has been necessary to rely 
chief ly on t he primary sources. find ing additional light 
only in scattered writings of other men. The memorial 
volumes in honor of Royce and Bowne , and numerous book 
reviews have been useful. 
Since both Royce and Bowne were prolific writers, of 
course no claim is made to a mastery of all of their viTi t-
ings , but an attempt has been made to become familiar with 
the ones which have a more direct bearing on the present 
problem. 
12 
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CHAPTER II 
JOSIAH ROYCE: THE MAN AND HIS GE1TERAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. Royce, the man. 
1. Biographical sketch. 
Josiah Royce was born in a mining town in the Sierra 
Nevada, California, in 1855. His earliest school was the 
one which his mother held in his own home. Hi a family's 
adherence to religious customs was unusually strict, and 
the frequent Bible readings left an indelible impression 
on his mind . As a boy he was cheerful but timid and not 
very active. His older sisters taught him his early les-
sons in philosophy. 
i[hen in 1866 he began to attend a large San 'Francisco 
grammar school, Royc e received a striking initiation into 
the ways of community life at the hands of comrades who 
were anxious to make sport of the quaint boy from the coun-
try who could not play their games. 
For f our years he attended the Un i versity of Califor-
nia, graduating in 1875. Thereafter he studied in Germany 
and t hen returned to Johns Hopkins University, where he 
ea rned his doctor 1 s degree. He taught for four years in 
the University of .JCalifornia and then went to Harvard 
13 
University. There he taught from 1882 until his death i n 
1916. 1 
The first b ook published by Royce was composed of ma-
terials which he had used in teaching English composition 
in the University of California and was ca lled A Primer of 
Logical Analysis. It appeared in print in 1881 . During 
his fi r st year in Harvard he had delivered a series of lee-
14 
I 
tures on the relations of philosophy and relig ion, and these ! 
formed the basis of The Religious Asuect of PhilosophY, : 
whi ch was published t hr ee years later . The Spirit of Mod-
ern Phi l osophy, appearing in 1892, described the trend s in 
philosophical t hought since the seventeenth century and set 
forth Royce' s e~~ential metaphysical views. These views 
received a more complete statement in The Conception of God 
' 
' 
' 
1 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and their most complete s tatement in The World and t he In- l 
I 
dividual, and Royce held them essentially as they are stated II 
I 
there throughout the rest of his life . i 
A new emphasis in Royce's t hought appears in The Phi l-
osophy of Loyalty (1908 ) and is r estated in Sources of Re-
ligious Insight and again with renewed force in The Problem 
of Christianity, which was published only three years before 
his death. This new element was a distinctive emphasis on 
1 Royce, HGC , 122-128. 
the significance of the com1nuni ty. He regarded it as his 
greatest contribution to idealism. 2 Still, t here does not 
appear to be any particular event in his life which led to 
this interest. Looking at hi s life in retrospect, he fel t 
rather that his whole life--the years in the Sierra Nevada, 
the clashes with the boys in the San Francisco school, the 
studies in Germany--had been preparing the way for it.3 
Royce w~s a teacher of unusual ability. His students 
praised him for his custom of challenging the best efforts 
of the young philosophers whose ability and background in 
the fi eld made them capable of superior work . At the same 
time he exercised great patience in dealing with the novices. 
Hie style of writi~g changed considerably during his 
years as a teacher. \Vhen he taught composition and in the 
years i :mmediately thereafter, his style was unusually logi-
cal and simple. As he grew older, he became accustomed to 
using more involved sentences. Still, he was always knO\m 
for his clarity of expression as well as of thought. 
Other phases of his life, including the fact that he 
was a man of deep religious experience and also that he 
actively endorsed the allied cause in the World War long 
before the United States entered the conflict, are important 
for the present study, but they will appear at later points 
~ Royce, "Extracts From a Letter to Mi ss Calkins," 6?. 
Royce, HGC, 129-130. 
! 
I 
in the thesis. 
2. Philosophical background. 
A reviewer of The Spirit of Modern Philosophy wrote 
t ha t Royce might more accurately be classed as a follower 
of Schopenhauer than of Hegel, and Royce later expressed 
the opinion that the reviewer was correct.4 Nevertheless, 
16 
most of his followers as well as his critics have not agreed 
with his decision.5 It is true that Royce did emphasize 
the significance of will--John Dewey wrote an article on 
"Voluntarism in the Roycean Philosopby"--but he did so in 
common with James ;:· and nearly all the other Harvard philos-
ophers, and he used the term in a quite different sense than 
that employed by Schopenhauer. Moreover, we may find none 
of Schopenhauer's pessimism or asceticism in Royce. In 
spite of his own protest we recognize Royce not only as a 
post-Kantian idealist but also as an Hegelian. 
His intellectual biography displays the influence of a 
different series of teachers in each place that he studied. 
During his years in the University of California he was 
deeply affected by Joseph LeConte an~ Rowland Sill and came 
under the literary influence of JOhn Stuart Mill and Herbert 
4 Royce, POC, I, xii; cf. SGE, iii. 
5 Howison, "Josiah Royce: The Significance of His Work in 
Philosophy," 9-10. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 391; Knudson, POP, 3 • 
Spencer. During the course of his study in Germany he, 
like Bowne, came strongly under the influence of Lotze. It 
was then, too, that he paid much attention to the writings 
of Schopenhauer, Kant, and the Romantic Schoo1. 6 At Johns 
Hopkins he heard .Tames in Psychology, Peirce in logic, and 
Morris on the history of philosophy and on Hegel. 7 In his 
Phi Beta Kappa oration at Harvard, as at other times, Royce 
freely acknowledged that much of his success was due to his 
early recognition by William .Tames. In the preface of his 
17 
Philosophy of Loyalty he expressed a doubt as to "whether 
any poor book of mine would ever have been written,--least 
of all the present one," if he had not studied under .Ta.."D.es.8 
It was especially in his later years that Royce took notice 
of t he work of Charles Peirce. The studies in Peirce shaped 
Royce's theory of knowledge and stimula ted his interest in 
logic. 
One other important influende on Royce's thought was 
his profound knowledge of the history of philosophy. His 
. students write especially of the power in debate which this 
knowledge gave him. Richard Cabot wrote, "No other teacher 
of philosophy in my time has carried into his seminaries so 
full and lifing a consciousness of the historic stream of 
6 Royce, HGC, 128-130. 
7 Howison, "Josiah Royce: The Significance of His Work in 
Philosophy," 5-6. 
8 Royce, POL, x. 
philosophic thought." 9 
3. Philosophical influence. 
_Royce's influence · on American philosophy' may be sug-
gested by his relations with the American Philosophical As-
sociation. In 1903 he was the president of the Association. 
Twelve years later the As sociation joined with a number of 
his colleagues and former students in recognizing the rich 
contributions which he had made to philosophy. The occasion 
was his sixtieth birthday. Two sessions of the annual meet-
ing in that year were "devoted to papers dealing more or 
less directly with various phases and doctrines of Professor 
Royce's philosophy."lO The papers were published as the 
third number in volume twenty-five of the Philosophical Re-
view and re-published under the title, Papers in Honor of 
Josiah Royce on His Sixtieth Birthday . In the distinguished 
list of contributors were Creighton, Howison, Dewey, Bake-
well , Henderson, Calkins, G. P. Adams, B. w. Bacon, • H. 
Sheldon, Spaulding, Cohen, Lloyd , Lews, Loewenberg, Singer, 
Cabot, H. H. Horne, and Hocking . 
Royce's most outstanding follower was Miss Mary !hiton 
Calkins. She took over the main tenets of his system, 
i 0cabot, "Josiah Royce as a Teacher," 240. Creighton, PHJR, 1. 
l 
revised it at certain points, and carried its application 
farther than he had done. Her work as a self-psychologist 
is particularly noteworthy. 
So frequently is Royce quoted at the present day in 
philosop~ical writings that further evidence of his contin-
urlng influence would be superfluous. 
B. Royce 's philosophy of absolutism. 
1. Definition of absolutism . 
In the most complete exposition of his metaphysics, 
The World and the Individual, Royce deals with the major 
problems of ontology, epistemology, and cosmology. The sys-
tem there elaborated is known as absolute idealism or abso-
lutism. What are the main points in this system as held by 
Royce? They are most concisely swmnarized by H. H. Horne, 
who tells us that the terms which Royce uses most are "Be-
ing, Knowledge, Nature, Man, and the Moral Order,"ll and 
then proceeds to state what ap~ear to him to be the three 
motives animating Royce's idealism. The first of these 
motives is 
no radical reconstruction of the actual, as illus-
trated by Fichte, but the conservative interpreta-
tion of the actual in large terms of rationality by 
ll Horne, "Royce ' s Idealism as a. Philosophy of Education," 
247. 
19 
; 
I 
I 
I . 
' I 
I 
I 
means of dialectic~ as illustrated by Hegel, though 
Royce's in~erpretation of experience, will, and nature 
differ from Hegel's. 
20 
It ia clear that Royce's primary interest was in interpre~ing I' ~I 
I tfue;_ experiences of men and communi ties as he belleved th~y 
occurred, and his speculations never lost their contact with 
those experiences. This gave his system a considerable 
flexibility, and as his succeeding works appeared, . they 
demonstrated that his thought was being modified or expanded 
to meet new facts emphasized by other schools of philosophy 
and insufficiently recognized in his earlier works. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Royce' sl The second motive set forth by Horne as animating 
idealism is 
no concession to naturalistic or realistic types of 
philosophy, aposteosizing scientific method and con-
clusions, but, by supplementing the categor y of 
"Description" with that of "Appreciation" tbeL··pre-
servation of the interests of morality and relig ion. 
"The World of Description" is "the realm of Being as our 
more abstractly theoretical consciousness defines it," while 
"the ' orld of Appreciation" is "the wor ld as otherwise inter-
preted"--the world of life. 12 The appreciative conscious-
ness is "more explicitly volitional." The World of Descrip-
tion is implied in the idea of invariable natural laws; the 
World of Appreciation is implied in our social consciousness . 
12 Royce, WAI, II, 26. 
I 
The 'two concepts are reconciled in a third, "our Interpre-
tation of Nature." Royce maintains tha t "all speaial physi-
21 
cal laws are only relatively invariable, and tha t .~ur deepest 
relations to Nature are social." 13 It is in the World of 
Appreciation that he f inds room for the claims of ethics and 
theism. 
The third motive of Royce's idealism is 
as opposed to dualism and pluralism, the unity of 
t he world. "The whole of experience," whi ch Royce 
presents is not an aggregate of interrelated centers 
of finite experience but an integrated total unity, 
embracing time, in which finite centers have their 
place. 14 
This is the distinctive and char acteristic thing in absolut-
ism. It insists on "the wholeness of reality, on its organic 
unity, on what it calls the 'concrete universal' or 'notion,'"l 5 
and it rules out anything "other"to the Absolute. This whole !• 
I ' 
is spirit, a rational unity, including • 11 the facts of 
finite existence--the finite individual in. the infinite In-
dividual, a necessary "union of the One with the ]!lany. ul6 
2. Personalistic absolutism. 
As might be expected, a central point of contention 
among absolutists is t he question of how we shall think of 
13 Royce, WAI, II, 46. 
14 Horne, "Royce's Ideal ism as a Philosophy of Education, rr 
15 Knudson, POP, 30. 
16 Royce·, . WAI, I, 4?3. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
24?1 
j 
I 
the Absolute. It is not clear just how Hegel, himself, con-
ceived the term. McTaggart found t.he logical outcome of 
Hegel's thought in an atheistic monadism. F. H. Bradley, 
whose influence Royce acknowledged, and Bosanquet thought 
of the Absolute as something more than a. •.•system of differ-
entiations"--as an individual, a "concrete whole of exper-
ience." Still they deny personality to this individual, 
and Bradley even accuses personalists of intellectual dis-
honesty. But what .does the denial mean? The· Absolute is 
said to be super-personal, but no definite content has been 
given to tha t description. The protests against a person-
alistic view of the Absolute are chiefly stated in negative 
I 
terms, and when an approach is made to the question of what 
it is that is more than personal, the result is likely to 
be agnosticism.l7 
Accordingly, most absolutists today think of the Abso-
lute as being personal, and it is to this vi ew that Royce 
adheres. For him reality is organic unity, and that unity 
is a conscious person. This still leaves many questions to 
be answered about the nature of the personality, as we shall 
hereafter have occasion to notice. Is the Absolute to be 
identified with the universe of persons and thingsi If so, 
Royce is not a theist but a pantheist. In some of his later 
1? Knudson, POP, 31-32. 
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writings Royce seems almost to identify the Absolute with 
the "Beloved Community" and so to become a humanist. 
3. The Abs olute and the individual. 
a. Distinctness of the individual. 
23 
The primary concern of absolutism is the inclusive uni-
ty of the Abs olute. It is important to observe the bearing 
of this fact on the meaning of the individual. The center 
of attention becomes not the finite individual but the unity 
of which the individual is a part. The imperative question 
then becomes, how can there be distinct individuals in the 
one unity of consci ousness? Royce , himself, attempted to 
deal with this problem. Bennett refers to the shift from 
the point of view set forth in The Religious Aspect of Phil-
osophy to the absolute voluntarism of The World and the In-
dividual and suggests that "the change was due largely to 
the fact that personal idealists were pleading for the value 
and the initiative of the finite self." He insists further 
that the permanent metaphysical contribution of The Philos-
ophy of Loyalty is in "the central truth that you do not 
make the individual great by making his universe small.nl8 
That may well be true, but if the universe is really so all-
inclusive--regardless of whether the totality is large or 
18 Bennett, "Josiah Royce," 844. 
~~· . .._ _,':"· 
.:-:::~';);. ;··-........ -... 
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or small--we still have no clue which may lead us to find a 
place for distinct individuals. Royce defines the individ-
ual as "an expression of the divine will, 1119 but this scarce-
ly seems like a guarantee of genuine indivtduality. 
b. Worth of the individual. 
Along with t his breaking down of the metaphysical dis-
tinctness of individuals comes a lessening of the unique 
worth of the individual. H. H. Horne believes that t he ab-
solutist "puts infinite and partly accessible meaning into 
educationa l process es" because he v;i.ews man in cooperation 
"with the absolut e purpose in br i ng ing hi mself nearer t he 
goal of his being. 1120 This may sound like an exhalted mis-
sion, and it may sound i mpressive enough to refer t o the 
i ndivi dual as an "expression of the divine will," but when 
we cons i der tha t the divine wil l is infinit e and t hen remem-
ber the minuteness of t his particular expression, the indi-
.vi dual may long to be something more t han merely an expres-
sion. He may wish t o be a personality with an otherness 
from the Absolute which is explicitly denied by absolutism. 
{The individual) is a part of the Absolute, and ll. 
his e~periences are incorporated and transfigu~ed i 
in the one universal experience so t hat they enter 
completely into the eternal harmony without any 
19 Royce, WAI, I, 469. 
20 Horne, "Royce's Idealism as a Philosophy of Education," 
249. 
discordant or resisting element in them. Tr~r oth-
erness is thus denied the finite individual. 
25 
The worth of the individual fades into illision as its meta-
physical dist inctness pass es away. 
c. Freedom of the individual. 
Royce t eaches t hat the individual has a "relatively 
free will.n22 He writes that you are the expression not 
only of the divine will but also of your own will "precise-
ly in so far as you find yourself acting wi th a definite 
intent, and gaining through your act a definite empi rical 
expression. 1123 But he does not make it clear how even this 
relative freedom can be reconciled with the all-inclusive-
ness of the Absolute. Both the finite will and its content 
are expressions of the divine will, a nd how, then, can they 
be opposed to the divine will? Mi s s Calkins recognizes the 
difficulty and asks, "How can a human s elf be f ree to oppose 
the will of Him by whose selective attention all that exists 
has its being?"25 She expresses t he opi ni on tha t Royce has 
presented "a masterly psychol6gical analysis of t hat viola -
tion of moral loyalty ~ hich he cal ls sin" but has neglected 
the exposition of the metapmrsical problem involved. - The 
~~ 
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in Royce's Ph ilosophy for Chris-
truth is that absolutism provides no place for eyen a rela-
tive freedom of the will . 
c. His philosophy of loyalty. 
1. Mo tive of The PhilosophY of Loyalty . 
The Phi loso·phy of Loyalty is a series of lectures de-
livered for t he Lowell Institute in 1908. It represents 
Royce's chief contribution to eth ics. He recognizes the 
26 
tendency to questi on all the old systems--social, political, 
economic, relig ious, and moral--and r·eels that the question-
ing of the moral system is the most fundrunental and the most 
serious problem. It is to this concre t e s i tuation that he 
addresses himself . He is seeking to answer an imperati v~ 
need for ne 1 ethical standards to replace the ol one~ which 
have crumbled. He believes with Antigone in a law which is 
eternal, and he offers the philosophy of loyalty as an in-
dication of how that law may be a t least partly discovered. 
"One of the main purposes of these lectures i s to simplify 
our conceptions of duty and the go od . 1125 "In loyalty , when 
loyalty is properly de f ined , is the ful f ilment of t he vhole 
moral law. 1126 
25 
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~.Relation to previous et1ical thought . 
The theory of ethics which Royce sets forth is classi-
fied as idealistic. He recognizes in it the influence of 
Kant a nd of Nietzsche. \ ' i th the ancient Stoics he sees 11 the 
rational will in contrast with all externals as the central 
factor in ethics. 27 The significant thing is not the cal-
culation of consequences but the loyal will of the individ-
ual. 
No ethical doctrine can be right which negleate in-
dividuals, and ••• their duty to centralize their 
lives, and so their moral universe, about their own 
purposes •••• The first principle of a true indi-
vidualism in ethics i s indeed that moral autonomy 
of any r at i onal Derson ••• whi ch Kant so beauti-
fully defended.2~ 
3. Definition of Loyalty. 
Loyalty is "the willing and practical and thorough-
going devotion of a person to a cause.u 29 Royce points out 
that there are at least three important parts to this def-
inition. The loyal person must have a cause, and the cause 
must be social. It cannot be one s own pleasure , but must 
be regarded by the parson as something outside of hims~lf.30 
It "is a possible object of loyalty only in case it is such 
27 Brightman, 1~ , 21, 295. 28 Royce , POL, 78-79. 
29 Ibid., 16-17. 
30 Ibid., 19. 
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as to join many persons into the unity of a single li f e." 
The cause must be a community. In a later work Royce de-
fines loyalty as "the thoroughgoing and loving devotion of 
an individual to a communi ty." 31 Moreover, he regards it 
as something more than a thing or an aggregate of persons; 
it is "intensely persona1.n 32 
A second part of the definition is the specification 
28 
t hat the devotion must be will ing and thoroughgoing. Loyal-
ty is a matter of the individual will. The loyal person 
chooses his cause "or, at all events, approves it. tt 
And the third part of the definition is that the de-
votion must be practical. It can never result in mere emo-
tion but must find its expression in ''some sustained and 
practical way , by acting steadily in the service of his 
cause . 1133 The loyal person devotes his powers unreservedly 
to his cause. Instances of such loyalty are seen in the 
lives of patriots, of religious martyrs , and of the ship 
captain who drowns with his ship rather than fail in his 
duty. 
4. Choosing the causes. 
\Vhat shall be our guide in selecting our cause? we 
~~ Royce , POC , xxxvii. Cf . HGC, 45. 
Royce , POL , 52-53. 33 Ibid., 17. 
have one requirement: the cause must be social, uniting a 
number of persons in loyalty. An individual may have many 
causes. He finds them in the range of his daily experien-
ces. But these causes must form a system. They must not 
conflict. If they do seem to conflict, then a choice must 
be made between them. The decision may be wrong, but at 
29 
least the individual may be decisive and a ct on his choice, 
and tha t is all that the loyal spirit requires.34 One cause 
must be supreme and the others form a system about it with 
conflict reduced to a minimum, so that the aim of my loyalty 
will be "an united harmonious devotion, not to various con-
flicting causes, but to one system of causes, and so to one 
cause. 1135 Within this sy stem there is room for growth. New 
causes may be acquired and fitted into the system of old 
ones, and thus the loyalty and the loyal individual -Dow. 
These causes are suggested in the social situation in which 
I find myself and chosen according to my own temperament 
and interests. "All stable social relations may give rise 
to causes that may call forth layalty." 36 Such are friend-
ships joining together groups of persons , the family, and 
the state conceived not as a collection of citizens but as 
a unity. 
34 Royce, POL, 196. 
35 Ibid., 133. 36 Ibid., 108. 
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The final test of a cause is the effect which it will 
have on universal loyalty. Will it tend to increase or to 
decrease the total of hrunan loyalty? Does it conflict, or 
is it harmonious with the loyalty of all mankind? In other 
words, does it r epresent a "loyalty to loyalty"? My cause 
is good in so far as it furthers the loyalty of others; it 
is evil in so far as it "lives by overthrowing the loyal-
ties of others, • • • because it involves disloyalty to the 
30 1 
v ery cause of loyalty itself.n37 The principle here involved 
is stated as follows: 
In so far as it lies in y our power , so choose your 
cause and so serve it • • • as to secure thereby 
the greatest possible increase of loyalty amongst 
men. 1viore briefly: In choosing and in serving the 
cause to whi ch you are to be loyal, be, in any case, 
loyal to loyalty.38 
5. Loyalty as the fulfilment of the moral law. 
Royce believed that one great practical lesson which 
should stand out from his study is tha t "in loyalty, when 
loyalty is properly defined. is the fulfilment of the whole 
moral la.w." 39 "All t he commonplace virtues, in so far as 
they _are indeed defensible and effective, are special forms 
of loyalty to loyalty.n40 
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t hat of reconciling a deep conflic t in the consciousness of 
the individual . All men face the necessity of reconciling 
the i nner and the outer world . My duty is defined only by 
my will , but my wi ll is formal and meaningless without the 
content which I get fr om my environ.rnent . It gives me only 
the means of expres sing my wi l l; ·,hence cones my will? "By 
birth I a1n ~mly a mere eddy in the turbulent stream of in-
herited human passion. 1141 My will is trai ned by my envi on-
ment, but the environmen t does not deter, ine whethe r my Y:rill 
is to be trained for good or for ill. Thus the lives of 
some are s pent in the apparently endles s play of the inner 
and the outer . Loyalty provides a way to end the ~onflict 
and to bring the life into unity . It meets the individual's 
"need of a life- task tha t is at once volunt ary and to his 
mind .worthy . "42 It raises the individual to h is highest 
power by the very act of turning away from himself and de -
voting himself to a ca use . 
The loyal t y of an 1ndividual to a cause provides him 
with a conscience . It gives h i m a life- plan, and in so do-
ing it makes it possible for him to measure a ll of h is i m-
pulses by his plan . 
Royc e believes tha t t he princi ple of loyalty to loyalty 
41 R po- ~5 .. :42 ~ oyce, .L , v • . , Ibid ~ , 59 . 
' , 
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provides the means of freeing oneself from moral doubts , for 
"moral d oubts arise in the loyal mind when there is an ap-
parent conflict bet ~en loyalties." 43 From time to time in 
the discussion it may occur to the reader that the treatment 
suffers from formalism or over - simplifi cation, and this is 
one of the occasions . Moral doubts arise in t he m1nd of 
the loyal no~ only because of an apparent conflict in loyal-
ties but also because there is some question as to just what 
is t he loyal thing to do under the circumstances- -which ac-
t ion will best serve our cause , and this p~oblem may not be 
solved merely by a determination to be loyal to loyalty . 
:Ne ither does the admonition to be decisive seem enough. The 
individual ' ants to know whether he is acting in the right 
dir ection, to tell hi just to assume that he is ~&ing right 
and g o ahead loyally may turn out to be a very dangerous 
policy . Perhaps ve should n ot ask an ethical theory to free 
men from moral doubts, but it is futile to attempt to reduce 
the facts to such simple terms the facts to such simple 
terms t ha t a theory comes to claim more than it can actually 
bear . 
Bu t R oy ce refers to loyal t y as the fulfil~ent of t he 
moral law chiefly because in it he believes he finds included 
43 Royce, POL, 180 • 
. , ~ i: 
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all of t he common virtues . Truth represents loyalty to the 
personal tie which binds men together . "Business fidelity 
is an act of loyalty to that general confidence of man in 
man upon which t he whole fabric of business· rests. n 44 "Jus -
tice means , in general, fidelity to human ties in so far as 
they are ties . u45 Benevolence is the phase of loyalty which 
is concerned with the effect of the individual on the inner 
life of h ls neighbor. The most important part of tha t inner 
life is loyalty; so the individual ' s own loyal ty to loyalty 
is t he highest type of benevolence . 
Here again we seem to meet a considerable degree of 
formalism . Justice and benevolence are empty and meaning-
les s apart from a particular content , and when the given 
situation arises , it may well be questioned whether the 
primary issue involved is one of loyalty . 
The principle of loyalty to loyalty also dictates the 
moral ideal for the individual, answering the question as 
to ~vhat is the chief end of the moral law . It de_nands of 
the individual that he develop himself to the fullest extent 
of his powers in order that he may be a bett er servant of 
his ca use . "The loyal man cultivates himself , and is careful 
of his property rights t just in order to furnish to his 
44 
45 Royce , POL , 141 . Ibid ., 144 . 
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cause an effective instrument. 1146 Whatever in himself or 
in his private fortunes may prove to be an obstacle to the 
cause is to be forgotten or destroyed . Loyalty to universal 
loyalty is thus the supreme end of the moral law. 
5 . Training for loyalty. 
In order to shew tha t t l is ideal of loyalty is practi-
cal and to point out how it should be made to work , oyce 
discusses at considerable length the problem of how it is 
possible to train for loyalty . This training begins in the 
child with the products of childhood fancy , but loyalty may 
be mis directed . Therefore it should not be developed until 
the individual is capable of applying it discriminately- -
until he is able to judge what are worthy causes and worthy 
methods of serving those causes . Also , "one must have 
learned de c isiveness and fidelity through an elaborate gen-
eral preparation of the will . 1147 Therefore , the full devel -
opment of loyalty cannot come until maturity even though it 
may begin in childhood. 
A study of history and our daily social experience 
indicates that there are at least three chief st e ps in the 
development of loyalty in maturity . We may learn loyalty 
46 Royce, POL, 161 . 47 Ibid ., 258. 
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from leaders. These need not be Lne ou.tstanding people in 
the fields in which we are intere sted . · we may l earn from 
our opponents as the loyalty of soldiers in battle is strengt 
ened by observing the conduct of loyal enemies . 1'!le may 
learn from the humble people about us who live loyal ly in 
life's by- · ays . We may regard countle ss such people as our 
l eaders in serving the cause of univ ers a l loyalty, and our 
a tt ent ion should b€ deliberately fixed upon them . 
A second step in tr a ining f or loyal ty in maturity is 
called t h e idealization of our causes . Je mus t learn "to 
s ee in them whatever most serves to link t hem to the cause 
of univ ersal loyaity." 48 Ar t may perform a great function 
i n t his process. One of t he most i mportant t a sks of relig-
ion is t hat of "linking our causes, what ever they are, to 
a world which see·ms to us to be superhuman . n 49 
The t hird step in training for loyalty in maturity 
comes in the pain, sacrifice , strain, and labor experienced 
in the actua l service of the cause. These things reveal 
t he d eepest meaning of loyalty. Grief may seem to be over -
whelming; defeat may seem c ert a in, but if one turns his 
attention from his suffering to his cause , he will realize 
tha t h is cause is only transfigured by the sorrow which he 
48 Royce, POL , 288 . 
49 Ibid. , 290. 
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must endure and tha t i t w·ill eYentually tri u.."llph. Tha t some-
t hing about t he cause which from t he beg inning seemed " super-
per s onal, unearthly a s we l l a s ear thly," becomes g lorifi ed 
t hr ough s uffering .fiO 
These are the t h ing s whic h t rain ~e n in the loyal li f e : 
our persona l friends ' rho inspire us to the servic e 
of our own ca ' Ses, t 1e h os ts of t he loyal ·rhom \'!e 
know so little, but who c onstitute t he invisible 
churc h of tho s e rvho liv'e in the spirit, the griefs 
t hat tea ch us the g lory of wha t our human vision has 
lost from its f i eld , the imag ination tha t throws 
ov er all the rang e of human life its ideal izing 
light , the labors t hat l eave us breathle gs , the 
crushing defeats tha t test our devotion. 1 
6. The metaphYsics of loyalty . 
It wil l be remembered that absolutism affirms the unity 
of all experience and all being . All finite s elve s are con-
ceived a s fr agments of the i nfinite self . It may ea sily be 
seen h ow t he phi losophy of loyalty fits into t his sy stem. 
Believing t hat the unity of experience is essent i a lly g ood 
and t ha t in it "a ll our i d ea s poss ess their real f u l f ilment 
a nd s uccess , " 52 it s ees t he gr eat caus e of loyalty to loy-
alty a nd the many l esser c auses whic h the ind ivi dua l may 
c ho os e a s partaking of t h e n a t ure of t he Absolu te. Thus in 
s erving his ca use the indivi dua l i s t aking i nto his o~n life 
59 
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3? 
somewha t of the bsolut e. In t ne li ght of this i nsight 
oyce offers a ne def ini t i on of loya lty . "Loyalty i s t he 
will to ~anifest, so far a s i s possible, the ~ t ernal, t hat 
is . t~e c onsc i ous a nd superh1.an unity of li fe , in the form 
of t he a c ts of a n individt a l S lf. 53 Stated in les s meta-
:ph:-Is ic a l ter :ns , "~o a ltv is t he Wi ll b e :B e lieve in s omet hing 
eternal, a nd to ex··.1ress t r.a t belief i n the practica l 1· f e 
of a huna n he i ng . u54 
11 l ife, however dark and fr~gmentary, is · either a 
blind striving for conscious unity with the univer -
s a l life of which it ia a fr agmentt or else , like 
~he life of t he lo; a l, is a deliberate effort t o 
expr ess such a striving in the form of a s ervice of 
a superh~aan caus e. nd all lesser loyalties and 
all serving of i mper f e c t or of evil dauses, are but 
fragmentary forms of t he s ervice of t he caus e of 
uni versal loyalty . 5~ 
53 oyc et POL , 35? . 
54 Loc. cit. 55 Ibid.t 3?5 . 
CHAPTER III 
JOSIAH ROYCE: HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. Absolutism as a basis for social philosophy. 
1. Absolutism and social friction. 
During the World War it became the fashion to blame 
the war upon certain German philosophers, and especially 
upon ~ichte and Hegel. The point of the charge was appar-
ently that absolutism was thought to lead inevitably to 
social friction. The absolutist believes in a world of 
eternal values and in absolute truth. From this belief it 
was said to be an easy step to the belief that the individ-
ual is the sole representative of that absolute truth and 
that he should use any means available to sure its adoption 
by the world. 
It is natural that . this belief could not survive the 
years after the war. It is true that some semblance of a 
basis for it may be found in the chauvinism and egotism 
which characterizes the writings of a few idealists, but 
these defects may be attributed to their humanity rather 
than to their idealism. Idealism at its best whether abso-
lutistic or pluralistic is impressed with the immensity of 
the eternal truth and the powerle s sness of any finite being 
3 8 
to comprehend it. Thus it should and commonly has led to 
true intellectual modesty. 
It is ••• a matter of plain history that genuine 
intellectual modesty among philosophers, and a broad 
and tolerant humanism, and an eagerness to learn 
from experience, first made thiir a ppearance with 
the dawn of absolute idealism. 
2. Absolutism as social organicism. 2 
Prim.'1. tive man is a social being. His dependence on 
the social group is so constant that it would hardly occur 
to him to question it. The individual counts for little. 
He is lost in the group. But the earliest social philoso-
phy is likely to discover the individual and to assert his 
claims against t he group. This was the function of the 
prophets of Israel as also of Zoroaster, Buddah, and Con-
fucius. This early social philosophy is known as moral or 
social atomism. It develops wheneyer the analytic method 
is applied exclusively. In relig ion it is compatible with 
atheism or deism, in socio-economic t heory with capitalism, 
and in metaphysics with materialsm. 
39 
But atomi sm fails to take into a ccount all of the facts. 
1 Bakewell, "Novum Itinerarium Mentis In Deum," 28-29. 
2 The terms, "atomism," "6rganicism," and "organic plural-
ism"herein used are from unpublished lectures in social 
philosophy del i vered by E. s. Brightman at Boston Univer-
sity School of Theology in the spring semester, 1935. 
Organicism is similarly used by Vfu itehead. 
It does not recognize the de pendence of the individual on 
the group and the properties of groups which individuals do 
not have. It t her efore l eads to a reaction in organicism. 
This is t he t heory that society is a whole. 
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Metaphysical absolutism is expressed in social organi-
cism. The distinctive t hing in absolutism is its insistence 
on the wholeness of reality. The distinctive t hing in organ-
icism is its insistence on t he wholeness of society. A met-
aphysics which affirms the unity of r .eality could hardly 
deny the unity of society. 
Royce himself did not express his social philosophy i n 
this term, but mahy of his concepts fit remarkably well into 
it. Consider his ethics, which is summed up in the virtue 
of loyalty . Loyalty is the virtue which uni tes the individ-
ual wi th society. The ideal for t he individual is self-per-
fection but only in order that in perfecting himself he may 
have a better instrument for the service of his cause. "The 
loyal man cultivates himself, and is care~ul of his property 
rights, just in order to furni sh to his cause an effective 
instrument.n3 Anything in the i ndividual which does not 
contribute to this aim is to be forgotten or ~estroyed. And 
3 Royce, POL, 161. 
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the highest cause is that which takes in all of society and 
sees itself as uniting all mankind--loyalty to loyalty. 
Royce's view of the community as a person is an ex-
tremely organicistic view of socie~y. He sees society not 
only as acting like an organism but as actually being a 
person. 
In view of these considerations we may refer to Royce's 
social philosophy as organicism. The most fundamental crit-
icism of 9rganicism is that it fails to take into account 
the aualities of individuals which groups lack. There are 
no groups apart from individuals. Carried to its ultimate 
an organic view of society crushes the individual. This 
has been its result when a pplied in politico-social theory 
as fascism. Fascism rega rds the individual as having no 
value apart from the state. All of his desires must be 
subordinated to the will of the s t ate. Men are bred for 
the state; they must live for the state and be ready f o die 
for the state. The individual receives his life and his 
living from the state, and he can make no claims against 
it on the bases of conscience, desire, or personal welfare. 
This result is not inconsistent with what we have ob-
served to be the relation of the Absolute and the individual. 
In absolutism there is no adequa te placefor the distinctness 
nor the freedom o·f the individual. With these must go the 
worth of the individual. The individual tends to become lost 
I 
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in the Absolute, and this view may readily be transferred 
to that which loses him in society--especially when we es-
tablish such an intimate connection (as Royce does} between 
t he Absolute and society as to almost make them identical. 
3. Absolutism and Christianity. 
Both Royce and Bowne regarded Christianity as a great 
source of social motivation. It is therefore imperative 
that we ask whether Christianity is consistent with the 
metaphysical systems which they affirmed. 
Royce himself was a deeply religious man. He believed 
in something eternal and that that something should express · 
itself in the practical life of the individual. It will be 
remembered that his final definition of loyalty was "the 
Wi ll to Believe in something eternal, and to express that 
belief in the practical life of a human being.4 His col~ 
league, Professor Palmer, wrote of him: 
. Loyalty to this sovereign Person made him one of 
the most unshakably religious men I have ever known • 
• • • Personally he fairly lived wi th the Eternal, 
the affairs of time being still counted worth while 
because in them, too, can be seen "bright shoots of 
everlastingness. 11 5 
Royce stated explicitly that he was a theist,6 When 
4 Royce, POL, 357, ~Palmer, "In Dedication: Josiah Royce," 8-9. 
Royce, SMP, 347. 
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he came to write The Problem of Christianity, he aaid that 
in t hat . work he should approach Christianity provisionally, 
at least, 
not as the one true faith to be taught, and not as 
an outworn tradition to be treated with an enlight-
ened indif ference, but as a central, as an intensely 
interesting, life-problem of humanity, to be a ppre-
ciated, to be interpreted, to be thoughtfully re-
viewed, with the seriousne ss and with the striying 
for reasonableness and for tP,oroughness which we 
owe to every life-problem ~herewith hwnan destiny 
is inseparably interwoven. 
Perhaps he would have classed Bowne among those who r egard 
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Christianity as "the one true faith to be taught," but t here 
was probably not much di fference in their attitudes toward 
it. Both of them regarded its d~ctrines critically, and we 
should hardly expect to find in Bowne's writings a stronger 
statement for the Christi an relig ion than Royce's affirma-
tion that it is, 11 thus far at least, man's most impressive 
vision of salvation, and his principal· glimpse of the home-
land of the spiri t." 8 
l[iss Calkins defends Royce's system a s a foundation 
for Christian theism by a ttempt ing to show that it is in 
essential agreement with the historic Christian doctrines 
as defined in the Westminster Catechism. That document de-
fines God as "a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable 
7 Royce, POC , I, 12-13. 
8 Ibid., I, 11. 
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in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness 
and truth." Royce teaches similarly that God is the self-
conscious Absolute.9 "This Self infinitely and reflectively 
transcends our consciousness, and therefore, since it in-
cludes . us, it is at the very least a person. 10 The Christian 
thinks of a God who is like-minded with himself, and Royce 
insists on this idea of the Absolute. God actually exper-
iences my j oy and sorrow, pain and pleasure, for I am a part 
of God, . according to Royce's view. "In truth, all that 
exists, including my own feeling and thought and p~rcept, 
exists , only by virtue bf being experienced by the Absolute 
Self.nll It is also clear in his earlier works, at least, 
that Royce thinks of the Absolute as an actual person who 
knows and cares for finite persons, and that he is not us-
ing the word, ~erson, merely as a figure of speech. In his 
later works that is not so clear, as we shall observe below. 
Miss Calkins believes that Royce's thought concerning 
the relation of man to God is even more clearly in accord 
with Christian thought. 
In conformity with the profoundest Christian concep-
tions he holds {a) that God shares every human ex-
perience, and tha t the life which man shares with 
God is essentially good, not evil; (b) that every 
hwn~n being is an expression of God's individuating 
will; (c) that the hlli~an self has a relative freedom; 
that he may and actually does, act in opposition to 
i0Royce, ' AI, II, 336. Royce, SMP, 380 
ll Calkins, "The Foundation in Royce's Philosophy for Chris-
tia n Theism 11 5?. 
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the divine will and that his sin must be a toned for; 
~d) f~t the human self is an essentially social be-
lng. 
Yet in all this there is a fundamental differenc e be-
t ween absolutism and Christian theism. It is true tha t in 
Christianity "God shares every human experience, and that 
the life which man shares with God is essentially good," 
but the sharing is of a different sort than tha t conceived 
by absolutism. In t he former God shares men's experiences 
in sympathy as a father s hares the experiences of h is son: 
in the latter the Absolute shares the experiences of the 
finite selves beca use the experiences and the selves are 
both expressions of the Absolute as a ma.n' s thoughts a re a 
part of himself. 
Christian :. theism does not affirm in the same way that 
absolutism does that 11 every human being is an expression of 
God's individuating will." It does recognize finite persons 
as being created by God, but that very creation implies a 
distinctness from God which absolutism must deny. It does 
teach tha t men may express God's will in their lives, but 
it never reduces men to the role of . expressions of the di-
vine will. This sepa ration between man and God is an impor-
tant part of theism. 
45 
I 
l::? Calkins, "The Foundation Royce's Philosophy for Christia n II 
Theism," 61. I 
l 
I 
Without it worship, responsibility, and contrition 
would have no rational basis. Religion, it is true, 
seeks union with God, but it is a union of will, of 
fellowship, a union that presupposes rather than 
excludes metaphysical otherness. It is, therefore, 
a prime concern of every sound philosophy of relig-
ion to guard the distinct individuali~y, the freedom 
and independence of the finite soul.l 
we have already noticed that such distinctness and freedom 
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on t he part of the finite person are incompatible with abso-
lutism. Christian theism finds in God a kind of creativity 
and in "finite spirits an individual and 'real' character, 
which absolute idealism finds it difficult to assimilate. 
Absolutism by its very nature leans toward pantheism."l4 
Thus, while absolutism has many views in common with 
Christian theism and has given it powerful support, we must 
conclude that the two sys::tems of thought are s~pa~ated by 
certain significant barriers. 
B. The significance of the philosophy of loyalty 
for social philosophy. 
1. Its application to some American problems. 
a. The family. 
The family affords us the most immediate opportunity 
for the exercise of loyalty. The American frunily has 
i~ Knudson, POP, 33. 
Ibid., 37. 
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undergone profound changes within the last few generations. 
It may be well that the patriarchal type of family is being 
modified, but when the changes threaten to undermine the 
family as an institution, we are in danger of losing one of 
the most precious things in our national life. Family ties 
are opportunities for loyalty , and when they are deliberate-
ly chosen, they represent choices of causes. Royce reviews 
this situation and then suggests the attitude which he be-
lieves must be taken toward the problem. 
In order to strengthen the family ties, we must "get 
before ourselves and our public a new, a transformed con-
ception of what loyalty is."15 Divorce is not categorically 
condemned, but it is to be remembered that ties of loyalty 
once freely accepted may be broken only in case that further 
loyalty to them would mean disloyalty to the cause of uni-
versal loyalty. "Disloyalty is moral suicide. • • • The 
moral personality that once was loyal, and • •• then blind-
ly sought freedom, is, to human vision, dead. 1116 Thus loy-
alty to the family ties is not to be regarded merely as ad-
herence to custom but as the maintenance of the richest 
possession of the individual, and it is not to be broken by 
the mere desire for individual freedom. "Train our people 
15 Royce , POL, 223. 16 Ibid ., 225. 
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to know the essential preciousness of loyalty. In that way 
only can you hope to restore to the family ••• its true 
digni ty.nl? 
Again t he reader may be impelled to charge Royce with 
formalism. Throughout the discussion we may feel that the 
real roots of family discord are hardly touched. There are 
doubtless rnany cases in which a greater loyalty would save 
the situation. It might enable the family to live until 
some temporary maladjustments are remedied, but to offer 
this as a universal prescription is hardly satisfactory. 
The discussion of t his problem may leave us feeling that we 
have been told somewhat about what has happened but have 
been left with a satisfactory explanation of neither the 
cause nor the remedy for what happened. In a specific in-
stance of the dissolution of a family we may say that the 
loyalty has ceased, but we have not even suggested the count-
less causes that entered into the loss of loyalty, and we 
surely have not pointed out how to remove those causes. 
When the affection, community of interests, and other bases 
of family life have been destroyed, the family is dead, and 
the admonition to be loyal may mean only a command to main-
tain the hollow forms of a relationship which h~s ceased to 
be. In such cases a diligent search may reveal to one of 
1? Royce, POL, 2?8. 
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the parties concerned some wider loyalty which seems to him 
to justify the breaking of t his more immediate one. The 
problem of family relations--like most of our other problems--
is not to be solved by so simple a device. 
b. Class conflict. 
Labor unione, political parties, and other organizations 
cultiva te an exclusive type of loyalty which may lead men 
to develop attitudes and actions hostile t o society as a 
whole. As a result many social critics come to condemn loy-
alty in general. What is needed is not less loyalty but 
more and especially more loyalty to universal loyalty. To 
illustra te t his we need only observe the working of i ndivid-
ualism in t he case of "the r~cent history of corporate mis-
deeds and of the unwise mismanag ement of corporations in 
this country. 1118 The conception of true loyalty must be 
clarified, so that people may know that loyalty need not re-
sult in .hostility to another man's loyalty. 
Loyalty is f or all men, kings and laborers alike; 
and whenever we learn to recogniz e tha t fact, loy-
alty will no longer excuse treason to the country 
for the sake of fidelity to corrupt leaders or to 
mischievous ag itations.l9 
What we have to say concerning Royce's treatment of 
cla ss conflict is similar to what has already been said 
18 Royce, POL, 230. 19 Ibid., 232. 
5 
concerning his treatment of family relations. Once more we I 
must bring the charge of formalism. The analysis does not 
reach the roots of the problem. It suggests a general rem-
edy which may not be too helpful in specific situations. In 
actual instances of class conflict can it be demonstrated 
that the welfare of a particular labor union is identical 
with the welfare of the employers involved? There is doubt-
less a broad general ground where the interests of the two 
groups stand together, but in many cases the remedy of abol-
ishing the conflict by refusing to acknowledge that there is 
any real conflict may be of little worth. Where real con-
flict does seem to exist the admonition to be loyal to loy-
alty may mean to the laborer that he should act in accord-
ance with the interests of the largest number of people. 
Since there are more laborers involved than capitalists, 
that would mean to insist on the demands of labor, but it 
is hardly likely that the capitalists would accept that in-
terpretation, and the introduction of the ide~ of loyalty 
has not dissolved t he problem. 
-7e w·ould ._n6t '· deny the worth of all general formulas. 
They have their rightful place in social philosophy as else-
where. We shall have occasion to notice that Bowne did not 
use them enough. c. M. Bakewell insists that 
the concrete ills which threaten us, spring from 
the fact tha t men have lost their belief in Truth, 
in eternal principles of morality, and in a sniritual 
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order that transcends, even if it includes, the 
world of sense.20 
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Neither should we deny the value of loyalty. It is an ex-
cellent principle when the limitations of its effectiveness 
are recognized. Still,. it is necessary to be on guard a-
gainst formulas which attempt to reduce the facts to simpler 
terms than will bear them. 
c. Provincialism. 
The thirteen colonies which came together to form the 
United States represented such small provinces that they 
might demand the direct loyalty of each of their citizens. 
As the nation has grown, however, it has r eached a condition 
in which the individual may no longer feel any personal re-
lati on to the country or its government. The laws and move-
mente of the government come to appear more like the order-
ed movements of great na tural forces, and whether desirable 
or undesirable they may be accepted without a call for ~.ny 
reaction on the part of the individual. To use the phrase 
of Hegel, we have developed a world of the "self-estranged 
social mind," in which there is hardly room for loyalty. 
'~tress is laid upon the inevitable conflicts between corpo~ -
rate and political dignities,--conflicts which characterize 
20 Balcewell, "Novum. Itinerarium 1Jtentis in Deum.," 35. 
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the imperial stage of civilization in question. 1121 
In the United Stat.es we have lacked some of the factors 
which have helped produce loyalty in other countries. There 
has been no king to unite the loyalty of the nation in him-
self. our Civil War was of a quite different ct~racter than 
the French Revolution. There has been no struggle of the 
people to gain their rights from either royalty or a land 
nobility. Thus Nmerica presents peculiar problems to the 
one who would develop a spirit of loyalty. 
For the solution of t his problem Royce looks to the de-
velopment of 11 a constantly enriched and diversified provin-
cial consciousness." Without t his a "further centralizR.tion 
of power in the na tional government ••• can only increase 
the estrangement of our national spirit from its own life.n?.? 
Our nation is too vast to expect a vital loyalty without ob-
taining it through the loyalty of the people to smaller dis-
tricts within the country. "To the increase of a wise pro-
vincialism in our country. I myself look for the best gen-
eral social means of training our people in loyalty to loy-
alty. n?.3 
?.. Loyalty and social cohesion. 
I 
Loyalty is, as Royce insists, a force for social cohesion 1 
?1 Royce, POL, 240. 
~?. Ibid., 248 -
23 -toc. cit. , (The italics are his~ I 
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By definition, a cause must unite a number of personsin its 
devotion. "Loyalty can never completely express itself in 
the search for individual happiness.n?4 It "tends to unite 
the many fellow-servants in one service.u25 That high loy-
alty which becomes "true chivalry and which loves the honor 
and the loyalty of the stranger or even of the foe, tends • 
• • to lead men towards a conception of the brotherhood of 
all the loyal.n26 
Regardless of the kind of unity which results from the 
competition in loyalty which may characterize the conduct 
of foes, it may well be recognized that social cohesion is 
of the very essence of loyalty, and few things will unite 
men so intimately as the kind of active service of a cause 
which is a part of Royce's conception of loyalty. 
3. Loyalty and social division. 
It should now be noticed that loyalty may be divisive 
as well as cohesive. Royce points out at considerable length 1 
that even enemies may come to respect each other's loyalty, 
to strengthen their own loyalties by observing this loyalty 
in others, and even to come to feel a community of spirit 
with each other because of their loyalty. 
24 Royce, HGC, 45. 
~~ Roy:ee. ·~_ POL, 20. 
. Royce, POC, I, 7?.. 
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Kindred clans learn to respect and, ere long, to 
share one another's loyalty. The result is an eth-
ical motive that renders the alliance and, on acca~ ­
sion, the union of various clans and nationalit~es 
not only a possibility, but a conscious ideal.2 
There may be instances where this has been true, but 
b4 
if it is hoped to stretch the truth to cover very many cases, 
as unquestionably Royce does, the claim is too extravagant. 
Even in the cases in which it has appeared to be true the 
resulting union of clans may be brought about by other fac-
tors in the interest of expediency not because of, but rath- 1
1 
er in spite of the loyalty of the members to their own clans. I 
The history of family feuds does not indicate that intense 
family loyalty leads to amicable relationships with other 
families manifesting a similar loyalty. And the same thing 
is true of relations between na t ions. A heightened loyalty 
on the part of the German people leads, it is true, to a 
heightened loyalty on the part of the French and the nglish, 
but instead of leading to a desire for cooperation and friend-
ly relations the sp irit leads to larger appropriations for 
armaments and preparations for war. The valor of the German 
boys in defending their fatherland during the World War led 
onLy to increasing bitterness, and the war ended when the 
Central Powers were exhausted--not when the nations had come 
to love each other's loyalty. 
?.? ~oyce, Poe, I, 71. 
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In fact, this sort of animosity may almost be said to 
be woven into the very nature of loyalty. Loyalty to one 
group may feed· on animosity to other groups. The relation-
ship is not an inevitable one, for one's loyalty to his fam-
ily may not lead to a hatred or even suspicion of other faro-
ilies, but when the loyalty is to larger groups the case is 
more difficult. Loyalty to a social class or to a nation 
may readily glorify exclusiveness and seem to make hatred 
of other classes and nations a virtue. Even here the rela-
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tionship is not i nevitab l e, for some of the greatest patriots 
have Lab0red to "observe good faith and justice towards all 
nations" and have thought of their own nation as taking its 
place in a universal brotherhood, but the motive for this 
wider magnanimity was not loyalty to the nation or respect 
for t h e loyalty of others but some new motive such as a be-
lief in the brotherhood of man resulting from a belief in 
the fatherhood of God or a recognition that war is likely 
to be destructive of our civilization and that therefore 
we should cultivate good r elations with others in order to 
avoid war . 
War may be regarded as a radical evidence of social 
divisiveness. Therefore, a study of the relationship of 
war and loyalty may well illustrate the fact that loyalty 
may lead to social division as well as to cohesion. 
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Royce mentions the fact tha t the title of his book on 
eth ics was suggested by the title of a current -book, The 
Philosonhy of rfar. Steinmetz, the author of the book de-
fended the thesis tha t war affords such an excellent oppor-
tunity for the development of loyalty that "if war were al-
togeth er abolished, one of the greatest goods of civilization 
would thereby be hopelessly lost.u28 Royce repudiated this 
position and expressed it as his purpose to break up the 
traditional connection between war and loyalty. "Enlightened 
-e4- loyalty take s no delight. in great armies or in great 
navies for their own sake. 11 ?.9 It may regard them as at best 
~ tran~'1ent necessities for t he s ervice of universal loyalty • 
.....__., 
Still, when he proceeds to give a preliminary list of "in-
stances of loyalty," the first one which he mentions is "the 
devotion of a pa triot to his country, when this devotion 
leads h im actua lly to live and perhaps to die for his coun-
try,n30 and he refers to the Japanese who had recently "won 
much admiration from all of us by the absolute loyalty to 
their own national cause which they displayed during their 
late war .n 31 In a letter written to 1H ss Calkins in 1916 
Royce seeks to clarify certain ideas set forth in the book 
2 8 Royce, 29 Ibid 30 • ' 
31 Ibid., Ibid., 
POL, 13. 
214. 
17. 
71-72. 
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in which he set forth the idea of loyalty to the co munity 
as the summation of Christianity. He mentions ·~ the loyal 
words of Enjolras in Les M: iserables, who is made to say, ' Ma 
mere, c' est la r~publique.' "As I write you these words, 
Frenchmen are writing the meaning of these words in their 
blood, about Verdun." Then he continues, 
The individual patriot who leaves his h6me behind 
and steadfastly serving presses on in ardent quest 
of the moment when his life can be fulfilled by his 
death for his country, is all the more richly and 
deeply an individual that he is also a community of 
interpretation, whose life has its unity in its 
restless search for death on behalfcof ~the great 
good cause,--its ever-living Logos in its fluent 
quest for the goal.32 
These statements might perhaps be discredited as part 
of the jingoism of a militaristic age, were it not for the 
57 
fact that they are consistent with so many phases of the 
philosophy of loyalty. Royce recognizes the need for methods 
of developing loyalty as one of the great demands of the day. 
In seeking to discover such methods it seems inevitable that 
he should eventually discover that one of the most effective 
methods of 4eveloping loyalty is war. \Vhat could be more 
effective than "that fascinating and blood-thirsty form of 
humane but furious ecstasy, which is called the war-spirit"?33 1 
If he had not reached that conclusion before the war began, 
~~Royce, "Extracts From a Letter to Miss Calkins," 67-68. 
Royce, HGC, 44-45. 
it is almost inevitable tha t he should have discovered it 
a fter. I t is t herefore worth-while to notice S.b . length the 
words written by Royce in 1916, when as an extremely inter-
ested observer of the World War, he h imself came to that 
concl usion. He wrote that for many, and a pparently he in-
eluded himself runong the many, although war had appeared to 
be horrible, it now 
seems to them no longer a s great an evil as it used 
to seem: for in each of the warring peoples the war 
has brought about a new consciousness of unity, a 
new willingness to surrender private good to the 
welfare of the community, a new sense of the sacred-
ness of duty, a new readiness of sacrifice. 
Such converts to the doctrine t hat war is good 
ascribe their sudden conversion to the wonder and 
reverence which have been aroused in them by the 
sight of France regenerated through the very dangers 
which the invader has brought with him, awakened to 
a new sense that the value of life lies not in what 
individuals get out of it, but in what the exertions 
and perils of war call out and illustrate, namely, 
the supreme and super-individual value of loyalty.34 
Other phases of the philosophy of loyalty may tend to 
lead to war. One of the t hree great processes in the task 
of training for loyalty is that of idealizing the cause. 
"We need to idealize our causes: that is, to see in them 
whatever most serves to link them to the cause of un iversal 
l.oyal ty. u 35 The various pha ses of exp erience may contribute 
5 8 
to this function. "Art supports loyalty whenever it asso-ciate 
34 Royce, HGC, ca. 45. 
35 8 Royce, POL, 2 8. 
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our cause with beautiful objects.n 36 It may glorify our 
cause in beautiful monuments and paintings. Religion makes 
its contribution "by linking our causes, whatever they are, 
to a world which seems to us to be superhurilan."3? 
In all of this there is nothing to exclude a flavor of 
deceptive propaganda, and to show that all of these means 
may be used to strengthen our loyalty to causes that are 
conflicting and socially divisive we need only remember how 
effectively they were used during the World War. The cause 
was linked to the cause of universal loyalty by - the asser-
tion that our nation entered the war in the service of man-
kind--to save mankind from future war ("a war to end war 11 ) 
and to prepare the way for the spread among all men of the 
blessings of freedom and democracy ("making the world safe 
for democracy") bysaving them from the oppression of the 
German tyrant. Art was used freely in making the cause more 
vivid and in linking it to the beautiful--with paintings 
of the goddess of liberty, suffering humanity, and bleeding 
Belgium. Religion is used to the maximum in every war both 
to build up the morale of the m~n in the trenches and to 
strengthen the loyalty of the people at home with the con-
fidence that "there is a just God who presides over the 
36 
37 Royce, POL, 288. Ibid., 290-291. 
I' 
destinies of Nations," and who at the moment is fighting on 
our side. The process of idealizing the cause may serve a 
divisive cause about as well as a cohesive one. 
We may notice one other phase of the philosophy of loy-
alty as elaborated by Royce which may readily serve the 
cause of war . How shall we know whether we have chosen a 
good cause? The answer is that we cannot know. "We are 
fallible, but we can be decisive and faithful; and this is 
loyalty.u 38 But this very decisiveness has led to endless 
conflict. The inquisitors chose their cause decisively, 
and many of the~ followed it faithfully, but the more de-
cisive and faithful they were the more damage they did to 
mankind. Royce recognizes, of course, that the judgment 
may be wrong, but finds in this no reason for caution. 
I may serve my cause i ll . .I may conceive it er-
roneously. I may lose it in the thicket of this 
world of transient experience, My every human deed 
may involve a blunder. My mortal life may seem one 
long series of failures. But I know that my cause 
liveth. My true life is hid with the cause and be-
longs to the eternal.39 
This spirit of loyalty a pplied to patrio~ism may lead 
to the allegiance which cries , "My country, right or wrong . " 
When a crisis such as war arises, it would not question the 
decision of Congress but would rush to arms t6 defend the 
38 Royce, POL, 196. (The italics are his .) 
3g Ibid., 348. 
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fatherland, regarding the conflict perhaps as inevitable 
and hoping with Royce to "utilize even conflict • • • so as 
to further the cause of loyalty to loyalty." 40 
The heart of nearly all of the objections which have 
been raised against the philosophy of loyalty is that its 
loyalty is treated as a formal abstraction--Royce's protests 
to the contrary notwithstanding. "He empties loyalty of 
its highest significance by treating it as an end in itself 
irrespective of the object which calls forth loyalty.n 41 
The concept of loyalty to loyalty is intended to define its 
content definitely enough, but we have seen in the treat-
ment of loyalty and social divisiveness how readily it may 
be distorted to s erve evil as well as good ends. "Loyalty 
in the abstract may lead, no one can tell whither, to mili-
tant i mperialism as well as to Christian self-sacrifice.n42 
If we are seeking the welfare of society, we must regard a 
half-hearted servant of a social end as a greater asset than 
one who loyally serves an anti-social end. Loyalty becomes 
an excellent virtue when prouerly directed, but an ethical 
system must deal with the values chosen as well as the in-
tention or will of the ethical subject.43 
40 Royce, POL, 158-159. 41 Brown, "The Problem of Christianity," 85. 4~ Loc. cit. 
43 Cf. Brightman, ML, 1?.1-124. 
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c. Religion and the community. 
1. Salvation through the community. 
The attitude with which Royce approaches Christianity 
has been discussed above. Now it remains to develop more 
specifically his interpretation of Christianity. The inter-
pretation which he gives the historic doctrines is refresh-
ingly di f ferent. "No one better than Royce has given an 
interpretation of the traditional doctrines of Christianity 
in t b erms of the significance which the community has for 
the individual. 1144 He sees these doctrines developing out 
of man's social experience, and thus far he is in harmony 
with Durkheim, Ames, King, and Campbe11. 45 But this is no t 
t he whole meaning of religion. "Religion is viewed not onl y 
as a practica l solution of a social problem, not only as a 
'doctrine of life,' but as a 'doctrine of the real world' 
as well. 1146 In his view of the world he believed the treat-
ment to be "in essential harmony with the bases of the phil-
osophical idealism set forth in various earlier volumesn--
particularly in The World and the Individual.47 In The 
44 Adams, "The Interpretation of Relig ion in Royce and Durk-
heim,11 71. 
45 Cf. ibid., and Calkin§, GMG, ?.10. 
46 Adams, 11 The Interpr e tation of Religion in Royce a nd Durk-
heim," ?0. 47 Royce, POC, I, x. 
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Problem of Christianity he begins by waiving the theologi-
cal and metaphysical auestions involved and stating his 
determination to deal with the facts in an empirical manner. 
Royce chooses three "leading and ess-ential" doctrine~ 
of Christianity. They are 11 (1) The Idea of the 'Co1ll!1lunity• 
(historically represented by the Church); (P) The Idea of 
the 'Lost State of the Natural Man': (3) The Idea of 'Atone-
ment.•n48 The first of these ideas is described more fully 
as follows: 
The salvation of the individual man is determined 
by some sort of membershi~ in a spiritual community, 
--a religious community and, in i t s ;:. inm6§<t nature, 
a divine community, in whose life the Christian 
virtues are to reach their highest expression and 
the spirit ~~ the Master is to obtain its earthly 
fulfilment. 
The idea of the "Lost State" i is ~ described as the belief 
that "the individual human being is by nature subject to some 
overwhelming moral burden from which, if una ided, he cannot 
escape. 11 50 The only means of escape from t his burden is 
provided by the divine plan of atonement. Only through this 
atonement may the individual enter "into a saving union with 
t he divine spiritual community," and it alone "reveals the 
fu~~ meaning of what the Master meant by the Kingdom of Hea-
ven.n51 
48 
49 Royce, POC, I, xxxvi. 
50 Ibid., I, 39. Ibid., I, 41. 51 Ibid., I, 278-279. 
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The individual facea a dilemma. He finds rising within 
himself a growing self-consciousness which leads to some 
form of moral conflict with his fellow-men. But as our civ-
ilization advances we find ourselves increasingly bound to-
gether by social ties so that no man may live and develop 
even into the highest form of self-consciousness apart from 
the community. He eventually becomes a traitor to the be-
loved community; having once affirmed his loyalty to the 
community, he commits some voluntary act which is false to 
the cause.52 How shall he meet the dilemma and find atone-
ment for the treason? This is t he moral burden of the indi-
vidual and the situation which demands salvation~ The indi-
vidual is not capable of saving himself. "The function of 
teligion is to furnish such a salvation. It can come about 
only through a s piritual transformation inspired by the 
love for a community.n53 
This, Royce believes, has been the essential he art of 
Christian doctrine almost from the beg inning. 
It is useless, I think, for the most eager de f ender 
and expounder of primative Christianity in its purity 
to ignore the fact that, whatever else the Christian 
relig ion involves, some sort of faith or doctrine 
regarding the office and the meaning of the Church 
was an es s ential part of the earliest Christianity 
that existed after the founder had passed from earth.54 
52 
53 Royce, Adams, 
heim, 11 
54 R 
POC, I, 278-279. 
"The Interpretation of Religion in Royce and Durk-
71-72. 
. oyce, POC, I, 51-52 • 
64 
65 
Thus the real founder of Christianity was not so much Jesus 
Christ as the Pauline ~ommunity. The teachings of Jesus, 
especially that of lGve, were incomPlete until they were 
set forth by the Pauline eommunity. "The detached individ-
ual is an essentially lost being. That ethical truth lies 
at the basis of the Pauline doctrine of original sin.n 55 
Such an individual hates the restraints of co1rununity life 
and meets what Paul describes as the struggle with "the law." 
Paul points out that t he road to salvation is through Christ 
Jesus. "But for Paul the being whom he called Christ Jesus 
was in essence the spirit of the universal cornmunity.u56 
The true Church, the community of all the faithful, 
had its seed in t he Pauline co~nunity, but its fulfillment 
is still a hope of the future. It is an "ideal challenge 
to the faithful" rather than an existing institution . "'Cre-
ate me, '--this is the word tha t the Church, viewed as an 
idea, addresses to mankind." 5? Its triumph is a hope of 
the faithful. Paul thought of t he triumph as something ca t-
astrophic and miraculous. His view of the method of the 
coming could not survive. 
But this triumph of humanity, this hope of all the 
faithful, this salvation of a community through an 
universally significant human transformation, with-
out which no sa lvation of an individual man would 
be possible, this idea ••• became the most essential 
55 Royce, HGC, 46. ~~ Ibid., 48. 
Royce, POC, I, 54. 
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and characteristic idea of the Christian Church.58 
?.. The community as a person. 
"The problem of what sort of personality the community, 
especially the church, possesses (was) ••• bequeathed to 
us chiefly by the outreaching mind of Professor Royce.u59 
Royce affirms that the church is more than a collection of 
individuals. It is an actual person. It has a personality 
which is more than and different from the personalities of 
its members. "a genuinely and loyally united community 
which lives a coherent life, is, in a perfectly literal 
sense, a person. Such a person, for Paul, the Church of 
Christ was. 11 60 Royce not only affirms this view; he reit-
erates it and regards it as one of his most distinct con-
tributions to idealism. 61 
There are two chief reasons given for this belief. 
The first of these is that it behaves like a person. Royce 
describes some of its characteristics as follows: 
A co~nunity grows or decays, is healthy or diseased, 
is young or aged, much as any individual •••• It 
has a mind of its own,--a mind whose psychology is 
not the same as the psychology of an individual hu-
man being. The social mind displays its psycholog-
ical traits in its characteristic products,-~in 
languages, in customs, in religions,--products which 
an individual human mind, or even a collection of 
~g Royce, HGC, 35. 
Buckham, PRT, 3?.6. 
Royce, Extracts from 
Ibid. 68. Cf. POL 
60 
61 a Letter to Miss Calkins," 67. 310: POC I 66-68: ?.6. 
66 
such minds, when they are not .somehow organized 
into a genuine cormnunity, cannot produce.6?. 
The other reason for believing that the community is 
a person is that the individual members think of it and 
act towards it as though ': i t were a person--though one with 
a life of infinitely greater value than their own. A•::!llem':' 
ber may "love his community as if it were a person, may be . 
devoted to it as if it were his friend or father, may serve 
it, may live and die for it.n63 
Buckham suggests that this problem of the sort of per-
sonality which the community possesses is an tmportant one 
for theology,64 and Singer suggests that the importance of 
loyalty as a virtue de pends on the sort of dignity which we 
ascribe to group minds. If the group mind is really worth 
dying for, loyalty "may be the last word of virtue.n65 But 
if we become convinced "that at their very best there is 
something primative, sometimes amoeboid, sometimes tigerish 
about such minds," then it may be an open question whether 
we owe any more to the group mind than it owes to us. 
6? 
63 
64 
65 
3. God and the beloved community. 
In The Problem of Christianity we hear little about 
Royce, POC, I, 6?.. 
Ibid., 67. 
Buckham, PRT, 3?.6. 
Singer, "Love and Loyalty," 231. 
God as ~he Absolute. The more prominent term is the "Be-
loved Community." At times this is apparently identified 
with the spirit of Ohrist, and more than once b-oth terms 
seem to be identified with God. "This essentially social 
universe, this community" is real and is "in fact, the sole 
and supr eme reality,--the Absolute." 66 In the opinion of 
William Adams Brown, "The church, the beloved community, 
the company of the loyal is itself God, the only God a ppar-
ently for which Professor Toyce has room in his re-defini-
tion of Christianity."6? It would be superflous to argue 
that such a conception of God is not the one held by either 
first century or t wentieth century Christianity. Is state-
ments such as the one which we quoted Royce appears to have 
abandoned the ism itself in favor of humanism. They grow 
even more radical when we remember that the church is as yet 
only an ideal--a hope of the loyal. Can it be that God is 
only the spirit of the community which is to be created in 
the fulness of time through the efforts of the company of 
the loyal? It is hardly believable tha t this is really 
wha t Royce means. His meaning is probably more accurately 
stated when he writes, "The world is the process of the spir-
it.1168 "The divine life is expressed in the form of a 
66 
67 Royce, POC, II, 296. Brown, "The Problem of Christianity," 84. 
68 Royce, FOG, II, 373. 
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community."69 This was the decision of Miss Calkins, and 
Royce a pproved the article in which she set forth the de-
cision.?O God is not to be identified with the beloved 
co~nunity, but his life is expressed in it. 
such a God is intimately related to the affairs of 
daily life. He "makes a difference in the lives of men, 
inspiring them to loyalty, devotion, and s.elf-aacrifice. u?l 
4. Criticisms of this view of Christianity. 
Royce enumerates three ideas which he tells us are to 
69 
be regarded "as the essential ideas of Christianity.n72 Yet 
he gives us no hint as to the method by which he has select-
ed these and omitted a large number of others which might 
have been included (the doctrines of the trinity, the father-
hood of God, the inspired book, i rmnortality, the virgin birth, 
for example ). Whether or not we agree that the three doc-
trines which he chose are the most essential ones in the 
Christian religion, we may observe that they have not always 
been recognized as such and are not universally so recog-
nized today, and therefore we might expect him to give us 
1 some basis on which the selection was made . Otherwise it 
may appear that the selection was arbitrarily made in order 
69 Royde, Boo., II, 388. 
70 Royce, "Extracts From a Let ter to Miss Calkins," 65. 
?1 Bakewell, "Novum Itinerarium Mentis in Deum," 33. 
72 Royce , POC, I, 45 . (The italics are mine .) 
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to see the facts fit into the preconceived pattern of the 
speculator. 
It is not neces sary for the truth of Royce's doctrines 
that they be identical with the ones held by the early church. 
It t herefore appears to be a mistake to try to forc e them 
upon Paul and John when the available facts offer so little 
basis for the imposition.73 If Paul was preaching a gospel 
concerning the mission of the 6hurch, he himself did not 
know it. His message was an intensely personal one growing 11 
I 
out of his own personal experience--not with the church par- I 
ticularly but with what he regarded as an historical p erson-
ality, Jes-us Christ,--and if the church ha.d a considerable 
signifi cance for Paul, it ga ined that significance from its 
association with Christ and his gospel. 
Paul expresses his sense of salvation in terms of 
mystical union with a very definite historical in-
dividual •••• Nor did he lose his own individual-
ity in this mystic union with the Spirit of God in 
Christ. He be~ieved that he was working out his 
own salvation. 4 
Royce underrates the significance of Jesus in the his-
tory of Christianity. Jesus was something more than the 
initial urge which created the first community and thus pre-
pared the way for the development of the doctrine of the 
community. His early followers, were moved by their love for 
73 Royce, POC, I, 51-52. 74 Bacon, "Royce's Interpretation of Christianity," 101. 
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him, and so were his later ones. Throughout the centuries 
the heart of the Christian message has been a personality, 
and the Christians who pledged their allegiance to him were 
not thinking of him as the personification of the spirit of 
the community. 
The idea of the community as a person appears as an 
unnecessary fiction. The s~atemen~ of Buckham and Singer 
do not mean that Royce's theory of the relation of the in-
dividual to the co1mnunity breaks down if it can be shown 
'll 
that the community is not a person. In support of this view 
we have the fact that great numbers of people have labored 
and sacrificed for their communities who would never have 
thought of ascribing personality to the community. The men 
who gave their lives, as they thought, for their fatherland 
d1d not do so because they believed the fatherland was a 
person. They knew that it was the land of their fathers 
and of their sweethearts and that it might be the land of 
their sons. ~n other words, the personalities who combine 
to form the community may provide adequate reason for being 
loyal to it. 
The social mind is a useful concept for students of 
social psychology, but those who use it should remember 
that it is nothing apart from the individual minds which 
compose it. By referring to the group mind or the social 
mind we mean merely tha t when individuals are together, 
II 
they think somewhat differently tha n when t hey A-re al one. \ 
There is a nutual stimulation which makes all of the minds 
concerned different than they are when they are isolated . 
The culture complexes which Royce attributes to t he social 
mind are evidence of the cooperation of individual minds. 
Languages are not often developed by single individuals, 
but no word of a l a nguage is invented or discovered except 
by individuals. The total language represents the contri-
bution of many minds working together. The same is true of 
of customs and religions. 
The concept, social mind, may be legitimately used only 
when it is remembered that apart from individual minds there 
is no soeial mind . 
The Roycean idea of the relat ion of God to the c hurch 
is not the idea of historical Christianity. Ev en if Royce 
did not mean to make God compeltely identical with the be-
loved community, he made the relation between them .more in-
timate than the church itself has done. ~Vhen Christians 
have spoken of the Holy Spirit as dwelling in the church, 
they were t hinking in ethi cal and volitional terms. The 
church mig ht represent God so long as its members preached 
the truth and acted in accordance with God's will , but t his 
did not imply tha t the church was an expression of God's 
spirit in a metaphysical sense. 
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In spite of these criticisms, we .should not fail to 
appreciate the great service which Royce has rendered theol-
ogy in pointing out the social nature of religion. Chris-
tian thought has not often been in danger of loosing sight 
of the individual phase of relig ious experience, but its 
es s entially community nature and the necessity of the exis-
tence of the Christian community for individual salvation 
may be forgotten--especially by Protestantism. This view 
of Christian doctrines in the light of community experience 
is a vital contribution to modern theism. 
D. Royce's attitude on current social problems. 
1. The social order. 
In considering Royce's social attitudes it should be 
remembered that what he had to say about any particular 
social problem is really pertinent only in so far as it is 
a logical expression of his social philosophy. Beyond that 
it may be a matter of interest but is not of direct concern 
for our present purpose. Notice also that while an idea 
may gain prestige or be discredited by tracing it to its 
source, that process neither proves nor disproves the idea. 
In other words, the validity of Royce's social philosophy 
does not depend on the way he applied it to current problems. 
Nevertheless, a brief discussion of his attitude on a few 
issues of his day may be illtuninating. 
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Royce apparently accepted the social system of his day !1 
without questioning its fundamental tenets. He classed 
Y~rl W.arx as a sincere lover of humanity, 75 but thought of 
Socialism as an unnecessary revolutionary social tendency. 
He referred to labor-unions as "symptoms of social discon-
tent."?6 He did cite the "recent history of corporate mis-
deeds and of the unwise mismanagement of corporations in 
this country"?? as evidence of the abuses naturally atten-
dant on individualism, but he was thinking of an ethical 
rather than an edonomic individualism, and his remedy was 
a. spirit of loyalty and no change in the social order. 
2. His political outlook. 
Royc e wrote t ha t among the various social functions of 
a. nation or community, the political ones, "at any rate, as 
they have been conceived and carried out up to t he present 
time, are ethically amongst the least important. 11 ?8 He 
thought that the great community of the future s hould be 
international in character, but his internationalism demand-
ed that room be reserved for national differences and tha t 
the values of patriotism be not lost. 79 Wi thin his nationalis, 
75 Royce, POL, 4. 
?6 Ibid., 24.3. 
I ?? Ibid., 239- 231 . ?8 Royce, HGC, 54-55. I' 79 Ibid., 50-51. 
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he also reserved a place for provincialism, believing that 
in a nation as vast as ours a genuine patriotism can only 
come through the mediation of provincial loyalties and that 
there could be no internationalism worthy of the name which 
did not jealously guard the loyalties of nations. 
3. War 
Royce disapproved of war and advocated certain inter-
national businesses, particularly an international insurance, 
which he believed would effectively abolish the hazard of 
w~r . 80 ,~rre have -pointed out how the philosophy of loyalty 
may be used in time of war, but how the philosophy of abso-
lutism can be harmonized with the war spirit remains a mys-
tery. Of course it is true tha t other phases of the Absolute 
war a gainst each other--the cat against the mouse and the 
lion against the tiger. 
Yet when the World War came, Royce was among the most 
log~:al supporters . He had studied in Germany and had "long 
loved and studied German civilizat ion, 1181 but he was strongly 
convinced by the reports tha t he heard that Germany's crimes 
were such tha t they couldnot go unpunished. 
80 Royce, HGC, 66; POL, 13. 81 Royce, HGC, 12. 
He felt tha t 
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from the beg inning of t he war Germany had"deliberately and 
openly assumed" the attitude tha t 11 the State is t he supreme 
moral authority, and tha t there is no moral authority on 
earth which ranks superior to the will of the state.u82 He 
could not be indifferent to such outrages ag:::dnst humanity . 
"It is as i mmoral to make light of grave wrongs as it is 
irrat ionally to cry out with lust of vengeance . n83 I·.~ore-
over, when t he Lusitania sank, it carried with it some of 
his own students, and in commemoration of that event he de-
.... livered an address in Tremont Temple, Boston, which carried 
the entire audience by its very earnestness. 11At least I 
know--s ome of whose pupils were amongst t he victims of the 
Lusitania- -tha t they were my dead . And the mark of Cain 
lasts while Cain lives.n84 In a letter to L. P . Jacks he 
declared , "I do not love the words of hate •••• It is 
not hate, but longing and sorr ow for stricken hwnanity, 
which is with me , as I am sure it js with you, the ruling 
sentiment . u85 Nearly t wo years before ~-\..'Ilerica' s entrance 
into the war he said, "Let us d o what we can to bring about 
at least a rupture of all di plomatic relations between our 
own republic and those foes of mankind." 86 Near the conclusion 
82 Royce, HGC , 4 . 83 Ibid., 7. 84 
85 Ibid., 10. 
86 Ibid., 20. Ibid., 13. 
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of his autobiographical a.ketch given in Philadelphia at the 
time of the sessions of the American Phil osophi cal As socia-
tion in his honor he said, "Certainly unless the enemies of 
mankind are duly rebuked by the results of this v.rar , I, for 
one, do not wish to survive t he crisis.« 87 
The same intellectual impulse which carried him over 
such vast scholastic fields sent him just as eager-
ly into the common affairs of the day. His belief 
in the crimes of Germany , the land of his spiritual 
birth, pursued him day and night and had consider-
able i nfluence in bring ing about his death. When 
the qui et scholar stepped on t he public pl atform to 
speak of the war , his moral passion swayed the en-
tire audienc e and much of the world outside.88 
87 Royce, HGC, 132. 
88 Palmer , "In Dedication: Josiah Royce," 8. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BORDEN PARKER BOWNE: 
THE MAN AND HIS GENERAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. Bowne, the man. 
1. Biographical sketch. 
Borden Parker Bowne was born January 14, 1847, at 
Leonardville, New Jersey. His ancestry is traceable to 
an English Puritan couple, William and Ann Bowne, who 
landed in Salem, Massachusetts in 1631 and thirty years 
later removed to Monmouth County, New JersJY• His parents 
were not wealthy but were people of sound morality and 
rich relig ious experience. 
After attending Pennington Seminary Bowne entered New 
York University in 1867 and graduated four years later. 
Some of his fellow students at the university refer to a 
certain aloofness in his attitude, but t hey were also im-
pressed by his intellectual strength. Some of his exper-
iences indicate that at that time he was sincerely concerned 
with public questions. He was one of the enthusiastic lis-
teners at the Cooper Union, and there he heard flamboyant 
orators dealing with the issues of the Civil War and post-
war period. In 1872 he entered the New York East Conference 
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of the Methodist Episcopal Church and received an appoint-
ment to preach in a small church. At the end of his first 
year in the ministry he took advantage of an opportunity to 
study abroad. He studied in Paris, Halle, and Gtittingen 
and returned to the United States in 1875. 
Already Bowne had written numerous articles which re-
!lect~the fundamental ideas which were to appear in his la-
ter books, and while he was in Germany he published his 
first book, The Ph ilosophy of Herbert Spencer, based on a 
series of articles which appeared in the New Englander of 
1872. Because of the genuine merit of these early works as 
well as the ability which he displayed as a student Bowne's 
professors in Germany--particularly Ulrici--were astonished 
79 
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that his services were not in demand in the American univer- 1: 
sities. Nevertheless, on his return to America he was un-
able to secure a position in a university; so he worked for 
a year on the editorial staff of the Independent. 
In the following year (1876) the opportunity which he 
had sought was presented to him. Dr. William F. Warren in-
vited him to accept a position in the department of philos-
ophy at Boston University. Bowne came to Boston University 
in the seventh year after ita incorporation and taught there 
(with an interruption of only one year) until his death in 
1910. For a number of years he served as dean of the Grad-
uate School. 
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Bowne's outlook on certain current social problems was 
profoundly altered by his trip around the world in 1905 and 
1906. He crossed the Pacific and pas s ed through ~apan, 
China, India, and Europe. Never before had he realized how 
the Asiatic natives lived. He returned to America with a 
greater respect for the abilities of the people he had seen 
and a deeper sympathy with ~heir distressing problems. 
Bowne died suddenly on April 1, 1910.1 
Brightman lists four sources of Bowne's power, each of 
which we shall notice briefly. 2 "First of all, his thought 
and its expression were always clear." Having himself a 
mind of extraordinary lucidity, he impatiently attacked all 
forms of obscurity. He had little patience for those writ-
era who veiled a poverty of thought in profound language. 
Such authors were the objects of his unsparing sarcasm. He 
said, "A hogshead of soap-bubble punctured, sinks into a 
teaspoonful of soap, and that is all there was ever in it.n3 
"Secondly, Bowne's mind had a remarkable grasp on the 
systematic whole of his philosophy at every point." He saw 
each issue in the light of his entire philosophical back-
ground. It was· partly because of this remarkable -grasp of 
his system and partly becaus·e of his extraordinary powers 
1 Most of the facts mentioned in this biographical sketch 
are found in McConnell, BPB, passim. 2 Brightman, "Sources.of Bowne's Power,u 370-371. 
3 Personalist, !(October 1920), 66. 
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of expression that he was able to dictate his book on ~- ! 
sonalism to a stenographer in six settings of approximately 
two hours each.4 
"Thirdly, his skill in polemic was a source of power." 
Bowne was not a part of the dominant schools of philosophy 
in his day. His differences with them were fundamental and 
irreconcilable. It was natural, therefore, that much of his 
work was that of attacking other points of view. He had a 
capable hand for that task. His first book was a criticism 
of the first principles of Herbert Spencer 1 s philosophy. At 
the time of his death he was engaged in writing a book which 
was a criticism of that same philosophy. In spite of the 
almost incredible prestige which Spencer's system carried 
in that day, even the articles of 18?2 exposed its fundamen-
tal inconsistencies and demonstrated that its acceptance 
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required, as Bowne said, a faith "beyond anything in Israel." ji 
II 
He was intolerant of every form of pretentiousness 
and bigotry, whether it shielded itself under the 
magical name of modern science or under the cloak 
of religion, and the fierceness of his polemical 
onslaughts, in no way mitigated by a withering sar-
casm, made him an opponent much to be dreaded.5 
The fourth source of Bowne's power was "the fact that 
he was a man of deep and sincere religious experience." 
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This~ave him an authority in discussing matters pertaining I 
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to religion that never attaches to one who approaches re-
ligion as its external critic." His mother was a woman of 
a mystical type of piety, and he probably had a considerable 
strain of mysticism in himself, but it was always controlled 
by "his sense of propriety and his determination to subject 
all his experience to the test of reason."6 It was inevi-
table that his philosophy should have been relig ious. For 
him all life was religious, and philosophy was merely an 
attempt to make life intelligible. Some of his most influ-
ential work was in the field of theology. Buckham feels 
that his Studies in Christianity and his Immanence of God 
"place him among those who have done most to emancipate and 
broaden American theology,"7 .and Knudson refers to him as 
the first creative thinker in the history of American Meth-
odism. Bowne's relig iousness is suggested in the inscrip-
tion on his tomb. There Mrs. Bowne described him as "a man 
of God through the unstained crystal of whose soul divine 
truths shone in radiant clearness on the world."8 
2. Philosophical background. 
This religiousness which has just been discussed might 
be listed as the first influence on Bowne 1 s philosophy. He 
6 McConnell, BP.B, 40. ~ Buckham, "A Group of American Idealists," 31. 
Knudson, "Bowne as Teacher and Author," 13. 
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approached philosophy from a religious point of view because 
of his own religious nature. But what other men influenced 
his thinking? 
It has been noted tha t Herbert Spencer was a dominant 
figure in the field of philosophy when Bowne commenced his 
work. The controversial atmosphere in which he wrote influ-
enced both the manner and the content of his writing.It gave 
to his style a caustic or ac~id quality which it might not 
otherwise have had• and it set before him many of the prob-
lema with which he had to deal. 
Among his teachers the two under whom he studied in 
Germany influenced him most profoundly--Ulrici and Lotze. 
He never acknowledged his indebtedness to Ulrici except in 
a brief note in the introduction to the Studies in Theism, 
but the influence of Lotze was definitely acknowledged. In 
the preface to the Metaphysics, which Bowne dedicated "in 
grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and former 
teacher, Hermann Lotze," be wrote: 
There is nothing unheard of in the results reached. 
Leibnitz furnishes the starting-point, Herbart sup-
plies the method, and the conclusions reached are 
essentially those of Lotze. I have reached them, 
for the most part, by strictly independent reflection; 
but, as far as their character is concerned, there 
would be8no great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzian. 
I 8 Bowne, MET, vii. 
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In general Bowne, like Royce, may be classed as a _post-
Kantian idealist. He built on the foundations laid by Leib-
nitz, Kant, Hegel, Green, and Lotze. More specifically, 
his system is known as personalism, the name which he gave 
to it in 1905, when he published his book with that title. 
Bowne's personalism was something more than a new name for 
an old system. Knudson believes that Bowne's most signif-
icant contribution to personalism was in the fact that, 
while Lotze thought that in personality we have a sample of 
what reality is, it remained for Bowne to make that insight 
the organizing principle of his system. He took the concep-
tion, "grounded it in the Kantian epistemology, developed 
its implications in a comprehensive way, and made it the 
center and constitutive principle of a complete metaphysical 
system."9 For him personalism becomes not merely a set of 
conclusions but a method in which all metaphysics is organ-
ized around the one principle of the self-sufficiency of 
per~onality. He defined his own position as follows: 
9 
It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am a 
theistic idealist, a personalist, a transcendental 
empiricist, an idealistic realist, and realistic 
idealist; but all these phrases need to be interpre~­
ed. They cannot well be made out from the diction-
ary. Neither can I well be called a disciple of any 
one. I largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend 
him. I hold half of Kant's system, but sharply 
Knudson, POP, 85-86. 
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dissent from the rest. There is a strong smack of 
Berkley's philosophy, with a complete rejection of 
his theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, fae 
first of the clan in any thoroughgoing sense." 
3. Philosophical influence. 
It is not surprising that during his life Bowne's 
greatest influence was within the Methodist Episcopal 
Church. He was a life-long member of that church and an 
ordained elder in the New York East Conference. He taught 
throughout most of his life in a Methodist university.ll 
Many of his students were from Boston University School of 
Theology, and in l arge numbers they became his devoted fol-
lowers. Still, it is by no means true that his followers 
were confined to t hat church. Great numbers outside the 
Methodist communion read his writings and were convinced 
by them. During his trip around the world he found many 
followers throughou t t he Orient.12 
It has been noted that Bowne found himself directly 
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il 10 From a letter addressed to Mrs. Bowne during the year ,!
1 
before Dr. Bowne's death and printed inK. M. E., "An 
intimate portrait 6£ Bowne,." 10. 
11 Of' course ·he had opportunities to teach elsewhere. He d 
was invited to teach in Johns Hopkins and Yale; and Pres- j 
ident Harper of the University of Chicago "held out every 
inducement to secure Bowne for a professorship, offering I 
a salary of seven thousand dollars, a sum which in those 
days seemed almost incredible wealth for a teacher." \ (McConnell, BPB, 91.) 
12 Coe, "Borden Parker Bowne," 521. Cf'. also McConnell, )I 
BPB, 250-256. 
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opposed to the dominant schools of philosophy in his day. 
He was opposed on the one hand to the empirical, natural-
istic thinkers such as Herbert Spencer, and on the other 
hand he was irreconcilably opposed to the school of specu-
lative idealists. Yet, as Coe points out, he had the satis-
faction during his lifetime of seeing both of those groups 
swerve toward some of his essential convicti.ona.l3 
His habit in general was to emphasize differences 
rather than agreements in his consid,ration of contemporary 
philosophers, and he made few attempts to receive recogni-
tion from them. For example, he did not join the American 
Philosophical Society. Nevertheless, he was widely recog-
nized. He was chairman of the Philosophical Conference at 
the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences. William James 
praised him highly.14 Josiah Royce felt that he and Bowne 
were coming closer to agreement in their later years and 
wrote, "! always prized him much. • • • I ought to have come 
closer to him before he left us."l5 Joseph Cook was accus-
tomed to refer to Bowne as "the greatest philosophic teacher 
of his age."16 J. Cook Wilson, who was long regarded as 
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"by far the most influential philosophical teacher at II Oxford," !! 
13 Coe, "Borden Parker Bowne," 521-523. 
14 James, VRE, 502n. 
15 From a letter to Brightman, July 16, 1913. 
Knudson, POP, 32n. 
16 Knudson, "Bowne as Teacher and Author," 13. 
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declared that Bowne was "the most important (to my mind) of 
the modern American philosophers.n17 The statement of James 
Iverach is worthy of notice because he was held to be the 
ioremost European authority on American philosophy. He 
wrote: 
He (Bowne} is ot ·~ all one of the foremost ol' American 
thinkers of my time. I have known Royce and James, 
and I have r~ad for many years the Philosophical 
Review, and from it have learned much of present 
tendencies i~ philosophy in the States, but in my 
judgment Bowne is the equal of any other thinker in 
his knowledge of the history of philos~phy, in the 
keenness of his inte l lectual grasp, and in the 
clearness oi" : his exposition. Hie contribution to 
theism is of ! the highest value.l8 
There can b~ no a uubt that since his deatb ·Bowne is 
i 
less frequently quoted in the journals of his church, and 
fewer of his books are being sold, but it is also true that 
his principles have received wider attention, and t here is 
I 
reason to believe that this tendency will continue, although 
I 
his system may never be popular. 
I 
The Yay-June~ 1922, issue of the Methodist Review was a 
: 
:Borden Parker Bo.Jme memorial number. In it was a laudatory 
article by Hocki~g in which he worte: 
As a swnmary •account of the curve of metaphysical 
speculation since Kant, there is no more powerful 
and convincing chapter in American metaphysical 
writing than 1ra-at of Bowne on "the failure of 1m-
personalism." 
17 From a letter written April, 1914. Quoted in Knudson, 
POP, 63n. 
18 Iverach, "A British Estimate of Dr. Bowne," 33. 
19 Hocking "The Metaphysics of Borden P. Bowne " 374. 
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Other signs of his influence may be seen in the publi-
cation since 1920 of a quarterly review called ~he Person-
alist, the Bowne memorial volume edited by Emil c. w11m, 20 
an address on Bowne before the Sixth International Congress 
of Philosophy (1926), 21 the exposition of Bowne's thought 
in Uberweg's 'Geschichte der Philosophie' (1928), and the 
biography by Bishop Francis J. McConnell, which was publish-
ed in 1929. 
"It is certain," in the judgment of Brightman, "that 
Bowne's work has been receiving more serious and critical 
attention than during his lifetime."22 
B. Bowne's philosophy of personalism. 
1. Definition of personalism. 
Bowne's doctrine of personalism is, according to Knud-
son; "ther profoundest metaphysical insight of the modern 
world." 23 Knudson finds this system to be one of several 
types of personalism. The type represented by William 
Stern is pantheistic and "makes personalism about equivalent 
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to a universal teleology." Pluralistic or finitistic per- I! 
sonalism appears i n a number of forms. There are _the atheist~~ 
q 
II 
20 Wi lm, SPT. 21 Brightman, "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne." 
~~ Brightman, "Bowne as a Philosopher." 
Knudson, unpublished lectures in systematic theology, de-
livered at Bowton University School of Theology, October, 
1934. 
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personalism of McTaggart, which we have had occasion to men-
tion above, "the relativistic personalism of Renouvier, and 
the purely finalistic personalism of Howison. 1124 Renouvier 
assigned "the world to a single primary creative act" in · 
order to escape pantheism.25 Opposed to these pluralistic 
forms is the absolutistic personalism of Royce, Calkins, 
and others. The personalism which Bowne represents aims to 
preserve the truth in poth the pluralistic and the absolut-
istic forms. 
In the broader sense personalism includes the systems 
which have been designated as monadology, spiritualism, neo-
criticism, and personal idealism. A common element in the 
thought of these schools is the insistence that "immediate-
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ness of self-consciousness is the starting-point of philos- '1 II 
ophy. o26 In this sense personalism is defined as •the theory !i 
that to be is to be a self or a member of a self."27 
Just how the self is to be conceived is a mooted ques-
tion among personalists. All would probably agree that it 
ia "a. unitary, self-identifying, conscious agent.•28 Moat 
personalists since Lotze would insist that there is no agent 
24 Knudson, POP, 86. 
25 Flewelling, "Personalism," 771. 
26 Loc. cit. 
27 Brightman, "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," 161 
28 Loc. cit. 
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apart from consciousness--that is, that if the self should 
pass into "a state of complete unconsciousness and complete 
passivity," it would cease to be. 29 Erightman and others 
hold that the self should be identified with "consciousness 
itself,--identical, organic, individua1,"30 but the majority 
would probably agree with Lotze that there is "no conscious-
ness without a subject, no thought without a thinker, no 
activity without a.n a.gent.n 31 Many use the terms "self" and 
"person" synonymously, but some make the distinction that 
"a self capable of the realization of values may be called 
a person."32 
' 
This thesis is not so much concerned with personalism 
in the broader sense as with the particular form represented 
by Bowne--the form which Knudson designates as "typical." 
Its fundamental declaration is that "the universe is im-
material, conscious, and personal in its ultimate constitu-
tion.1133 Flewelling defines it as follows: 
Personalism ••• asserts a system of selves related 
through a supreme personality. It conceives of the 
supreme person as existing in and through the concrete 
continuous exercise of his personal!4Y• thinking, 
willing, and sustaining all t hings. 
It should be noticed that personalism as conceived by 
Bowne is not merely a set of conclusions. It is also a 
Knudson, POP, 74. 
Brightman, "Personal1sm and the Influence of Bowne," 161 • 
Knudson, POP, 74. 
Brightman, "Personalism 161. 
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Flewelling, "Personalism," 771. 
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method which he applied to all metaphysics and which also 
'!.I 
underlies his ethics, a method dictated by the insight that !j 
the self-sufficiency of personality is the illuminating 
principle for both fields of thought. Thus Knudson offers 
the following as his final definition: 
Personalism (is) ••• ~nat form of idealism which 
gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and 
monistic aspects of experience and which finds in 
the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of 
personality the key to the nature of reality and 
the solution of the ultimate problems of philosopny.35 
2. Personalism and the individual. 
There is hardly a more fund~nental tenet in all Bowne's 
philosophy than the insistence on the metaphysical reality 
and distinctness of individuals. This may well be illus-
trated by the fact that in his theory of t hought he recog-
nizes the "fallacy of the universal" as the universal fal-
lacy. At times he referred to it as the "fallacy of the 
class term," By this he meant that men fail to remember 
that they have made no change in an object when they have 
applied to it some class term. Objects are just as distinct 
after they have been called "persons," "being, n "matter, 11 
or "substance" as they were before. In its essence this is 
an attack on those who are guilty of "overlooking the truth 
of metaphYsical individualism and ••• mistaking class 
35 ( The italics are his.) Cf. Coe, 
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terms for things or the classifying processes of our thought 
for the processes of reality."36 Thus in his epistemology 
as in his metaphysics and his ethics Bowne was insisting on 
the· reality and distinctness of individuals. 
With this came a powerful de!"ense of the freedom of 
the individual, which will merit our discussion as a sepa-
rate point. 
When such provision has been made for the individual's 
metaphysical distinctness and relative freedom, we have a 
more adequate ground for believing in his unique worth. 
This was one of the most significant motives of Bowne's 
~ Bowne had a seer's knowledge of man as bearing the 
divine image. The more he probed into the mystery 
of selfhood, the more he aaw that man is a true mic-
rocosm, that his spiritual capacities are inherently 
infinite and their limitations are all from without, 
that these limitations have only a temporary signif-
icance and may conceivably be progressively overcome, 
that self-realization means nothing leg~ than the 
infinitation of the human personality. 
3. Doctrine of the divine immanence. 
In his book, The Immanence of God, Bowne elaborates a 
thesis which ii fundamental for his philosophy and especially J 
i' I 
I 36 Knudson, POP, 188-189. 
37 Wilson, "Bowne, a ~uickening Spirit," 376-377. 
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II 
for his religion. The personalist agrees closely with the 
pantheist in his view of matter. Bowne defends the position 
that God's action in the world is not to be sought in the 
rare miracle so much as in the usual processes of life. The 
material world is the instrument by which the infinite Per-
son communicates with finite persons and by which finite 
persons communicate with each other. Natural law is a fig-
ure of speech by which we refer to "uniformity, administered 
by freedom for the attail'l..ment of rational ends. "38 God is 
not identical with the material world, but he speaks through 
it; he is immanent in it. 
He is also immanent in history. The purposiveness of 
3 
history indicates the hand of God not merely in the so-called 
miraculous, but especially in the ordered processes of his · 
tory. Thus we come to an intimate view of God. He is not 
only a transcendent Being--distant and aweful--, but he is 
immanent in nature and in history, "closer to us than breath-
ing, nearer th~,n hands and feet." 
The natural roots in the supernatural, and the super-
natural in turn manifests itself in ordinary, every-
day facts and forms of our living experience. This 
is the divine immanence which has become such a lead-
ing feature of modern thought and upon which Chris-
tianity, according to the too sang~~ne view of Pro-
fessor Bowne, has always insisted. 
~g Bowne, "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," 697. 
Wilson, "The Late Professor Borden Parker Bowne," 423. 
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c. His theory of ethics. 
1. The perfectionist school of ethics. 
In genera~Bowne may be said to belong to the ethical 
school of perfectionists, following in the Aristotelian tra-
dition. He was considerably influenced by Schleiermacher 
and in numerous points reveals the effects of Lotze's teach-
ings. Perfectionism finds the greatest good in a life in 
which all the normal powers have come to a harmonious ex-
pression and teaches "that reason dictates not merely indi-
vidual but also social development, and the extension of 
life by participation in the values of social institutions."4 
2. Bowne's writings in this field. 
The Principles of Ethics is believed by some scholars 
to be Bowne•s most valuable work. 41 McConnell feels that 
here Bowne made "some of his most distinctive contributions." 2 
Although the book was not written until 1892, the author 
had outlined it and set forth its essential points of view 
in 1869 and 1870, when he was a student in New York Univer-
sity.43 In 1873 he viTote an article on intuitionism and 
40 Brightman, ML, 187. 
41 Knudson, "The Published Works of Borden P. Bowne," 306, 
and McConnell, ~owne and the Social Questions," 130. 4~ McConnell, BPB, 163. 
4 Ibid., 308. 
utilitarianism which foreshadowed a large part of the book 
of t wenty years later.44 
According to Bowne the Principles is "an introduction 
to fundamental moral ideas and principles, rather than a 
detailed discussion of specific duties and virtues."45 The 
burden of the book is summarized by Knudson as follows: 
He exposes with relentless rigor the inadequacy of 
the ethical theories of the past, insists on the 
necessity of uniting the intuitive and experience 
schools, and finds the aim of conduct not in ab-
stract virtue but in fullness and richness of life.46 
3. Relation to ~revious ethical thought. 
Bowne classified much of the ethical treatises of the 
past as "unprofitable works of darkness." He said that if 
it happened that all the writings of the British moralists 
were burned, they would not be missed. fBrightman writes 
that he wogld be tempted to enlarge the scope of the bon-
fire.47) Therefore, he finds it necessary to start out 
95 
with a long discussion which he feels to be largely fruitless 
except in accomplishing the necessary task of clearing the 
field of fallacious barren theories. 
4& Bowne, "Moral Intuition vs. Utilitarianism." 
45 Knudson, "Bowne as Teacher and Author," 10. Also in 
46 Knudson, "The Published Works of Borden P. Bowne," 306. 
47 Bowne, POE, iii. ~ Brightman, ML , 21-22. 
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a. Three moral ideas. 
Following Schleiermacher, Bowne believed that three 
moral ideas were essential in expressing the complete moral 
consciousness of the race: the good, duty, andYvirtue. 48 
To distinguish between the good and virtue he pointed out 
that the ideal contains two elements, "a conception of what 
man ought· to be and one of what he ought to do." Back of 
the deed is the doer, and the doer is not to be judged by 
particular acts but by the abiding principle of his life--
his character. 49 It may be noted that the three essential 
ideas of Schleiermacher and Bowne are not identical with 
96 
three three basic concepts of Brightman, namely, law, value, 
and obligation. Value corresponds to the good, and obliga-
tion corresponds with duty, but the remaining concepts do 
not correspond. Brightman insiste t that virtue is merely "a 
constant realization of the good;" it is a product of the 
other concepts and therefore does not warrant a place beside 
them. Law takes the place of virtue in the new trinity be-
cause it is essential to any science.50 
b. Reconciliation of intuitionism and utilitarianism. 
48 Bowne, POE, 20. 
49 Ibid., 122-123. 
50 Brightman, ML, 13-14. 
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It was more than ten years after the publication of 
The Principles of Ethics that Bowne published his Personal-
ism and gave that name to his philosophical system. Never-
theless, his ethical theory is personalistic throughout. He 
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thought that ethics should not be divorced from metaphysica,51 ; 
' 
and his whole theory of ethics was shaped by his theory of 
metaphysics. This does not appear so clearly in specific 
discussions as it does in the fundamental assumptions on 
which his ethics is grounded. In dealing with practical 
problems human values were always recognized to be primary, 
and in personality was found the solution of the theoretical 
disputes which he found in the ethical thought of his time. 
It was because of t his that he was able to regard himself as 
a reconciling agent in ethical theory. 
The chief division in ethical thought was between the 
intuitionalist and utilitarian schools. Bowne recognized 
that when these contentionsare taken into the laboratory 
of human life, they become absurd. The truth presented by 
both schools is good but is incomplete in itself. The in-
tuitionalists did well in emphasizing the necessity of good 
will, but a good will which wills nothing is meaningless. 
In any given situation what the good will calls for is only 
~~ Bowne, POE, 1?-18, and THE, 299-302. 
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discoverable by a serious calculation of consequences. 
"Either we must look beyond form to contents, or ethics 
shrivels into a perfectly barren doctrine of good inten-
tions.•52 
9 8 
But the utilitarian view is equally incapable of stand-
ing alone. A·rllllere calculation of consequences may lose all 
of its moral character in a non-moral prudence and shrewd-
ness. 
\Vhen we abstract the good will from the natural ob-
jects set for its exercise in our c onstitution and 
the nature of things, the moral life is carried on 
in a vacuum, and loses all real substance and value. 
And when we abstract conduct from the personality 
in which it origilnates and which it expresses, we 
have a base o53sordid, externalism which is its own condemnation. -
Thus we have two elements in any ethical act--formal 
rightness and material rightness, and they are expressed in 
the duty ethics and the goods ethics, respectively. Formal 
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rightness demands a good will, and material rightness demands l 
11
1 
a consideration of the values to be attained. The former 
nis ethically the more important, as it involves the good 
will; but material rightness is only less important, as 
without it our action is out of harmony with the universe."54 
We should add that formal rightness is not only important; 
52 Bowne, POE, 34. 53 Ibid., iv-v. 
54 Ibid., 40. 
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it is essential. 
Bowne seems at times to imply that there is an oblige.-
tion to be materially right. This is incredible since one 
cannot be required to know things that he is incapable of 
9 9 !I 
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finding out. I! Nevertheless, there is an obligation to desire IJ 
!, 
and strive for material rightness. In Brightman's system 
of moral laws this obligation finds expression in the Law 
of Consequences,55 and Brightman agrees with Bowne in empha-
sizing that the subjective as well as the objective conse-
quences must be taken into account.56 Bowne writes that 
the most important consequences "are to be found, not in 
the external world, but in the reaction of the personality 
upon itself."57 
The duty ethics also has two constituent elements: the 
human ideal and the law of social interaction. For our 
social relations good will, which is expressed in the love 
of neighbor or benevolent will in the field of social action, 
is the central and ultimate law, but the individual is also 
bound by the moral ideal in his self-regarding activities 
and thoughts. 58 The law of love or good will in our social 
interaction is the only strictly un1versal law, but even 
this is empty without some ideal for humanity. 
g~ - Brightman, ML, 142-155. 
57 Ibi_d., 150. 
58 Bowne, POE, 37. Ibid., 113. 
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that we shall regard otaers as ourselves. "It will not get 
ahead by pulling others back, 59 but the ideal of humanity is 
needed to show whi'ch way is ahead and which way is back. 
Individual development, the~ assumes two directions--inward 
and outward. It must "satisfy at once the demand for out-
ward fortune and happiness, and for inward worth and peace.60 
This conclusion is not original with Bowne. In fact, it 
goes back as far as Aristotle, but the emphasis which it 
receives at Bowne's hands is still worthy of note. 
In the "Preface" of The Princi·ples of Ethics Bowne 
writes t hat the work has beside the critical discussion two 
leading thoughts. The first of these, 11 the necessity of 
uniting the intuitive and the experience school of ethics," 
we have noticed. "The other is that the aim of conduct is · 
not abstract virtue, but fullness and richness of life."61 
It is to this thought that we now turn. 
4. Ethical empiricism. 
No other tendency in Bowne's ethics is so consistent 
as the tendency to turn from abstract theories and face the 
empirical situation. Coe, in an article on "The Empirical 
Factor in Bowne's Thinking," refers to The Principles of 
59 Bowne, POE, 174. 60 Ibid., 174. 
61 Ibid., iv. 
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Ethics with the statement that in it Bowne "does not intend 
to deduce the moral life from a theory, but theo~y from 
moral life.N62 And that statement is certainly not lacking 
~:, su:::::::~c:::;: t::em::::t 1:::t:::e n:: :::1:r:;r:::::on• ~~ 
down general principles of conduct, but by forming codes of 
concrete duties,n63 and from that statement the author pro-
ceeds to insist that ethical theory must grow out of the 
facts of the moral life. The last sentence in the "Conclu-
sion" is: "The abstract ethics of the closet must be re-
placed by the eth ics of life, if we would not see ethics 
lose itself in barren contentions and tedious verbal dis-
putes.54 Between these two sentences the same affirmation 
is made again and again almost to the point of monot~ny. 
"Ethical theory has been a product of the closet rather than 
of life.n65 "Life itself is the field of morals, and the 
realization of ideal life the aim. • • • Ethics must find 
its fruitful field in these homely duties and relations."66 
"The best division of labor between individuals and society 
must be l earned from reflection upon esperience, rather than 
any apriori theories of righta.n67 The forma and degree in 
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which good will should manifest itself "have largely to be 
gathered from life rather than from any apriori speculation."6 
"The great need in ethical theory is to renounce abstractions, 
as virtue, pleasure, happiness, and come into contact with 
reality. "69 
Such quotations might be multiplied almost indefinite-
ly--from this work as well as from others. 70 The essential 
value of such a contention is obvious enough, and in over-
. 
coming the effects of too much rationalistic moralization 
it was doubtless justified. Nevertheless, we might recog-
nize that it is not without its dangers. Observe, for ex-
: ample, a quotation from the last chapter of the book: 
(Questions concerning} particular forms of legisla-
tion • • • are often of the most complicated sort, 
and commonly no irrelevance can be greater than an 
appeal to the moral law for their solution. • • • 
In practice a compromise has to be made between 
apriori ideas of justice or equality and the actual 
difficulties of the problem. The form of taxation 
which is theoretically perfect may be practically 
inadmissible because of its unproductiveness, or 
because of the opposition it arouses, owing to its 
inquisitqrial character or some other obnoxious 
feature. · 
A theoretical approach which ignores the facts of a 
particular situation is certainly not desirable, but too 
68 
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much insistence on dealing with the facts to the exclusion 
of a consideration of general principles may tend toward 
the elimination of all value from ethical theory. If it be 
true that "no irrelevance can be greater than an a ppeal to 
the moral law" for the solution of particular problems, 
wherein is the value of the moral law? In that case it would 
appear that the study of ethical theory might well be aban-
doned in favor of a more profitable occupation. Moreover, 
when Bowne declares that "the form of taxation which is 
theoretically perfect may be practically inadmissible," he 
seems clearly to have over-drawn the case. No tax is theo-
retically perfect which will not work. One of the first 
requirements of a perfect tax is that it be capable of se-
curing the needed revenue, and another requirement is that 
it lay not too heavy a burden on any one class of people, 
and a third is that it be easy to administer. If a theory 
will not work, it is not a good theory. Evidently .Bowne 
means that the theory, as applied, had failed to take into 
account all of the factors involved, but that is a fault 
of the particular application. It may serve to illustrate 
the difficulty in applying theories, but it should certainly 
not be a decisive argument against the attempt to use theo-
ries in specific situations. 
Perhaps this reveals a fundamental lack in Bowne's 
ethical theory. If the human ideal and the law of good will 
I] 
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and the obligation to calculate the consequences of an act 
were defined in more specific terms, they might be more us-
able in particular situations. Thus under such a system as 
tha t set forth in Brightman's Moral Laws we might determine 
our attitude toward a tax on the basis of the Law of Conse-
quences and the Law of the Best Possible. In forming such 
a system Bowne's empiricism may be an excellent guide, but 
when emphasized too much it may become an admission of the 
futility of ethical theory in general. In applying a sys-
tem of ethics it is better to remember that "ethics reserves 
the right to prescribe the aim and general principles of 
development in every field of life.n72 
5. Religion and ethics. 
It is not surprising to learn that Bowne's relig ion 
had a significant place in his ethics. For 'him all life 
was religious; his philosophy, which was an attempt to make 
life intelligible, was religious; and his ethics was li~e­
wise religious. He affirmed that "the formal principles of 
conduct are able to stand alone, at least as able as anything 
else in our life. 1173 But for the actual living of the moral 
life in the face of discouragements, indifference, and tedi-
ousness, he felt that there were great reservoirs of power 
72 Bowne, POE, 135. 
73 Ibid., 193. 
I 
I 
'I I. 
ji 
I 
! 
-======~============================================== 
105 
in Christianity. Its greatest significance for ethics he 
found in the field of moral and spiritual inspiration. Par-
ticularly the Christian hope in life and death, the moral 
nature of the moral law, the exalted estimate of human worth, 
and the ideal personality are effective aids toward the mor-
al idea1. 74 
At the conclusion of his theoretical discussion Bowne 
feels that the result has not been great, and he turns to 
illustrations of more definite applications, a field in 
which he believes ethical discussions are more profitable. 
Throughout these applications certaint things are evident. 
Human life in its notmal symetrical development is the g~al; 
good will is always essential as a disposition; but tbe 
action which is best in any given situation can be determined 
only by . an earnest consideration of the conditions existing 
in and peculiar to the given situation. 
6. The motive for altruism. 
What is the ground for altruism? First, it is the 
realization that £or the most part the interests o£ the in-
II 
I 
I 
dividual and society do not conflict but are parallel. Thus 
in serving society the individual is creating or contribuUng \1 
I 7' Bowne, POE, 201-203, I I 
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to values in which he shares. 
. 106 1, 
But there are other cases ~n 
which those interests cross. \Vhat then? One needs to re-
member that it is in such oases that the moral spirit of a 
l i fe is especially revealed. The great condition of the 
moral life is a devotion to the common good. 75 In order to 
make these considerations more effective, ''the sense of so-
cial responsibility needs to be immeasurably deepened ."76 
Men do recognize the priority of spiritual values and place 
the sense of duty above the dictates of visible prudence. 
There still remains something oracular in the moral 
nature, after prudence has exhausted all its resour-
ces and counsel. Moreover, out of this has come 
the bulk of what gives worth to hlli~an history. If 
we would subtract from t he l,atter all that is due 
to the conviction that it is 'perdition to be safe'' 
when for the truth or country one ought to ~~e, it 
would not be worth whi le to write the rest. 
This is the ohit'f reason for altruism. And finally it is 
~ 
necessary to remember that the individual cannot be expected 
to spend himself in the creation of values in which he will 
not share. "The individual may never be regarded as fuel 
for warming society.u 78 
75 
76 
77 
78 
7. Personalistic ethics. 
The distinctive feature of Bowne's ethics as of his 
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metaphysics was his thoroughgoing application of the prin-
ciple of personality as the basis of his system. Moral 
progress results from the deepening appreciation of the 
worth of persons and the extension of moral ideals to in-
elude more persons. The essential validity of this insight 
into ::. the significance of personality as the solvent of theo-
retical disagreements and the key to the solution of practi-
cal problems is not conditioned by Bowne's knowledge of 
penology and economics. His contribution here is valid and 
significant. 
Personalism throughout is the best description of 
the Bowne ethics. There are no abstract categories, 
no hard-and-fast codes, but living persons in the 
ascen1 toward the fullest and finest moral experi-
ence. 9 
D. His emphasis on the significance of freedom. 
1. Disadvantages of the ethical approach. 
The question of freedom is one of the persistent prob-
lems of philosophy, theology, ethics, and psychological 
theory. John Fiske, in an eloquent outbreak on the subject, 
declared that "verily the free-will question is a great 
opener of the flood-gates of rhetoric."80 The common method 
of approach to the question was through the study of ethics, 
?9 McConnell, BPB, 176. 80 ~ow~ Bowne, MET, rev. ed., 416; McConnell, BPB, 142. 
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reached in this way were valid. But that approach had 
certain disadvantages. Bowne pointed out that t here is in 
that point of view always t he possibilitj of referring to 
"the weight of motives, of the stronger impulse, etc.; and 
thus we fail to get the clear illustration of freedom in-
volved in the passionless operations of thought itself.u81 
Hence, he felt that t here was a distinct advantage in chang-
ing the venue to the court of reason--considering the prob-
lem from the point of view of epistemology rather than that 
of ethics. The purest illustrat ion of freedom is to be 
found in the operation of thought, for "here we have a self-
directing activity which pro:eeds~according to laws in-
herent in itself and to ideals generated by itself.u82 
2. Relation to earlier freedomist writers. 
Bowne's cont r ibution here did not lie in the orig ina-
tion of a totally new method but in giving that method a 
:I 
!J 
I, 
li more thorough a ppl i cation and more of the "emphasis whi ch he 
i! believed it deserved. Since he seldom acknowledged author-
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ities in his writings, it is difficult to determine to what 
degree he de pended on other men at any particular point. 
81 Bowne, IJThe Speculative Significance of Freedom, n 686. 
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His greatest debt in his thought about freedom was 
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to Berkeley, Lotze , (and especially) Ulrici_, and Renouvier , 
but in none of those men did freedom assume the central and 
regulating place which it held in Bowne's system. 83 Knudson 
lists t his as one of Bowne 's greatest contributions to the 
field of theology and declares tha t "no writer has brought 
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1: out so clearly the speculative significance of human free-
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3. Definition of freedo.m. 
Bowne defined freed om as follows: 
By freedom I mean the power of self-control and 
self-direction in an intelligent being . More spe-
cifically, it is the power to form plans, purposes, 
ideals and to work for their realization. Or it is 
the power to choo s e between competing or conflicting 
possi bil it iea and to realize the one chosen. ~11/her-8 ever t his power is present, we call the agent f ree. 5 
Again he insists that "we do not mean an abstract freedom 
existing by itself , but t his power of self-direction in 
living men and women. n86 
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At tempts to redefine free d om in such a way as to include 1i 
necessitarian ideas are futile, but such attempts have been 
made. There have been advocated, for example, types of psy-
chological "freedom." Certain external stimuli and other 
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activity, though dictated by the strongest motive, is called 
free volition because it is spontaneous or because it is 
I• 
. not dictated solely by external stimuli. 87 But the only 
I ,, 
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I• !i genuine freedom is the freedom of contrary choice. If there 1: 
i/ is no possibility of the self choosing an alternative course, 1: 
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I! there is no r eal freedom, whether the necessity comes from 1:
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within the individual, or from a pre-established harmony, 
such as that affirmed by Leibnitz. 
4. The testimony of common sense. 
The most obvious testimony on the subject of freedom li i 
,I 
is that of common sense. The unsophisticated mind would I 
not think of questioning whether it is endowed with free 
will. We assume it in every act we commit. The naive man 
believes that every day he meets alternatives and is forced 
to choose between them. Moreover, having made the choice, 
I! ·he feels responsibility for his action--pride or sha.."'le. 
I! 
If 
II 
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there is any necessity underlying all of our actions, it 
mimics f'reedom "to such an extent that any description of 
personal life in terms of mechanical necessity . would break 
87 Bowne, IPT, 224-225. 
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evidence is not conclusive, but such overwhelming testimony 
on the part of common sense should be accepted unless there 
are strong arguments against it. 
5. Chief objections to freedom. 
a. Impossibility of comprehending free action. 
The determinist delieves that such contradictory argu-
menta do exist • In fact, he becomes so confident in that 
belief that any affirmation of freedom soon comes to be re-
garded by hi m as an offense to reason. 
The chief objections to freedom rest on purely theo-
r~tical grounds. The first of these is the impossibility 
of comprehending free action. We have a great desire to 
j exptain all events in terms of general principles, or laws, 
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and it becomes difficult to remember that we cannot explain 
everything. There are facts and laws which provide the 
condi ti.ons of explanation, and these cannot be explained by 
the processes of which they are the basis. 
Since, then, the very nature of explanation refers 
us to facts and processes outside of itself as its 
own foundation, we need not be concerned at finding 
in freedom a fact which admits of no deduction or 
comprehension,--a fact to be recognized and admitted, 
not deduced or comprehended.89 
i 
' 88 Bowne, "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," 282. 
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This is all the more true when it becomes evident that the 
very rational activity in the interest of which explanation 
I. 
I 
·I 
is attempted is impossible without freedom. 
b. Freedom implies pure lawlessness. 
A second objection to freedom rests on ·the belief that 
freedom implies a pure lawlessness. A most dramatic state-
li ment of this belief came from John Fiske, who was well qual-
li ified to testify--as he did--that the question under con-
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aideration had been a fertile producer of rhetoric. He said 
that if we were to believe in freedom, we might expect mur-
der and suicide without motive and without cause. 
The countless empirical maxims of every-day life, 
the embodiment as they are of the inherited and or-
ganized sagacity of many generations, become wholly 
incompetent to guide us; and nothing whiSh any one 
may do ought ever to occasion surprise.9 
The mother may destroy her child, the miser discard his gold, 
i; and the sculptor demolish his statue for no other reason 
I. 
I~ than that the persons so acting are exercising free-will. 
j: 
,. But this objection clearly rests on a misunderstanding 
of the nature of freedom. Bowne replies to it in his char-
1~ acteristic manner by designating it as "closet logic" and 
'I 
Ill returning the argument to the empirical facts of life. Taken 
II 
jl in an absolute sense it may be conceivable that freedom 
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might imply such things as Fiske suggested, but that possi-
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bility has no relation to the problem with which we are con-
cerned. The fact t hat an individual is free does not impel 
him to act without regard to reason, circumstances, memory, 
and for esight. Such an individual woubd consider the events 
that had gone before and be influenced by his fundrunental 
1j motives, but his act would also grow out of self-determina-
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tion, and that is to be experienced but not explained~ "It 
can only be recognized as the central factor of personality, 
the condition of responsibility, and the basis of the moral 
c. Freedom eonfaicts wi th:: :law:-~ of,, eauaatiou. 
One other objection to the idea of freedom may be no-
ticed here; namely, tha t it conflicts with the law of caus-
tion. That there is a conflict here remains doubtful. The 
law of causation requires t hat for every effect we seek an 
adequate cause. Thus we may say that we have no violation 
of the law in a free act. We seek t _he cause and f ind it i n 
the free spirit. If we go back of this and ask~·:w!JY ~::.the self 
acted as it did, we may me an one o:t' two things. If we mean 
to ask what were the reasons which the mind considered in 
91 Bowne, MET, rev. ed., 415-116. 
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making its choice, they may be described; but if we mean to 
ask what caused the mind to so behave, we must reply that 
it was its own cause, and nothing more may be said. 
But this may be held to be unsatisfactory. Some would 
take the law of causation absolutely and insist that every 
event must have a cause which determines the direction of · 
the effect. The answer to such a statement of the case is 
that it sets up an i mpossible situation. "Such a conception 
would lead to an infinite regress, in which t he law of caus-
ation itself would be lost. 1192 The only escape is the intro-
duction into the series of an uncaused being or a series of 
them, and also an uncaused or unbegun motion. Then the ques-
tion arises, if such a&nissions could be made at one point, 
why should they not be recognized wherever thay seem to 
appear. The conclusion of the whole matter is that such u 
theoretical objections can lead to no more than "a drawn 
battle; and the practical postulates of life and conscience 
would turn the scale in favor of freedom.u 93 
6. Speculative significance of freedom. 
Bowne begins his development of the significance of 
99~ Bowne, IPT, 230. 
v Ibid., 231. 
freedom for epistemology by a study of the problem of truth 
and error. It is evident that all trustworthy thinking 
115 
rests on the possibility of discovering the truth. In deter-
minism there is no such possibility . we believe that some 
of our ideas are true, but obviously they cannot all be so, 
for there are many contradictions among them. How shall we 
distinguish the true from the erroneous? All t houghts arise 
with equal necessity; so that cannot be the criterion of 
their truth. Neither can we determine the truth by a major-
ity vote. If our actions were ruled by necessity, we could 
not have such a vote, and beside, the opinion of the majority 
changes from time to time. Anyway, this test would go hard 
with the necessitarian, for it seems probable that the de-
cision of a popular vote would go overwhelmingly to the 
freedomists. 
Perhaps it wi ll be said that true thoughts are those 
which correspond to reality, and false ones do not. Thi s 
is really only an attempt to escape ~rom the difficulty by 
a definition. There is still no way of learning which ideas 
do and which do not correspond with reality.94 Any standard 
that might be set up requirea free-will for its application. 
Necessitarianism implies an automatic reaction to stimuli 
or to intermal drives. The idea of a standard, on the other 
94 Bowne, THE, 14. 
1 16 
hand, implies the power to control our thought, to withhold 
judgment, to reconsider, to scrutinize from various points 
of view, to compare opinions, and reserve our decision until 
we behold the clear order of reason. Under a necessitarian 
system there is no such power as this. It is not because 
of a superior rationality that one thought replaces another, 
but merely because the causal conditions have altered. 
In a mind which is controlled by its states, in-
stead of controlling them, there is no reasoning, 
but only a succession of one state upon another. 
There is no deduction from grounds, but only pro-
duction by causes. No belief has any logical ad-
vantagS over any other, for logic is no longer pos-
sible • . 5 
b. Reason implies freedom. 
This, then, is the negative side of the problem. The 
problem of distinguishing truth and error, which lies at 
the heart of all rational processes become insoluble with-
out freedom, and without it "intelligence itself breaks 
down in hopeless confusion and scepticism."96 The only 
solution for the problem that saves reason is that we have 
free wills by which we consciously strive for the truth, 
our faculties are made for truth, but we fail in our search 
because of our carelessness and slothfulness; yet we may 
again seek and discover more of the truth than we knew before. 
95 Bowne, MET (l882), 123-124. 96 Bowne, POE, 167-168. 
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Thus all science comes to depend on freedom. Freedom 
does not make the categori-es of thought nor the laws of the 
physical universe, but it has the function of discovering 
and working through both. Obviously our choices are limited. 
we discover certain natural laws which v~ cannot violate, 
and in accordance with those laws we make plans and work 
toward the achievement of ideals. Among these ideals is 
truth, and in working toward it '"'e develop the various sci-
ences. "By the patient toil and devotion of free men the 
temple of science and knowledge is built up. 1197 As we in-
creasingly discover the laws of science, we learn more about 
how they may be made adaptable to our wills, and thus we 
become increasingly free. 
More than fifteen years after Bowne•s death R. D. Car-
michael of the University of Illinois came to the conclusion 
that science still carried no denial of freedom. He wrote: 
The present state of the laws of nature points ••• 
to a co•ception of such a law as gives room--with-
out suffering even a momentary eclipse--to a view 
of the universe in which the possibility of choice 
arises as frequently as the needs of ethics may 
suggest as desirable.98 
As a matter of fact everyone assumes practically the 
existence of freedom of thought. The determinist urges his 
opponent to think clearly and wonders that the opponent is 
~~ Bowne, TTK, 244. 
Carmichael, "Freedom in a Rational Universe," 127. 
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so slow to grasp such evident conclusions. All such exhor-
tations would be absurd on a necessitarian basis. We might 
as well urge the pan of a set of balances to follow the heav-
ier weight. Determi nism cannot be affirmed without in the 
very act of affirmation assuming freedom. We assume that 
we "have a self-directing activity which proceeds according 
to laws inherent in life itself and to ideals generated by 
itself.u99 
c. Freedom essential in search for causes. 
But determinism gets on no better in the outer world 
than in the human self. There, too, it is essential to a p-
proach the subject from a freedomist point of view. The 
search for causes and for unification can be rewarded on no 
other grounds. "Only phenomena are given in immediate per-
ception.nlOO We do not perceive the causes but we read them 
into the phenomena. Then all that we can do is to exPract 
from experience that which we have read into it. This may 
be satisfactory for practical purposes, but if we are seek-
ing ultimate causes or unity, it gets us nowhere. Then we 
fall into what Bowne was want to call the "fallacy of the 
class term." We group our experiences under certain class 
terms and fancy tha t we are approaching unity, but actually 
99 Bowne, I~T, rev. ed., 408. 
100 Bowne, "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," 689. 
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the experiences are no closer to unity than they were before. 
Merely to call things "force" or "matter" does not in the 
least alter the multiplicity of the things involved. 
Using such methods we may move backward from effects 
to the causes which we may infer from them, but we get no 
nearer to final causes or to unity. Only a positivist could 
be satisfied with such a situation. He might say that we 
have the content of our i mmediate perceptions, and that is 
all that we need seek. But that is not satisfactory for 
most men. Ve are continually seeking for explanations and 
causes. For t h e problems now under consideration we know 
of no other explanation than tha t of free intelligence di-
recting the events of t he universe in which we live. A 
rejection of determinism here does not imply lawless caprice 
any more than it did in our consideration of the freedom of 
selves. It means tha t through the rational plan (the signs 
of which we may see in the process of evolution and in nat-
ural law) a Creator is working toward an all comprehending 
purpose. 
Metaphysical necessity in the world must be re-
placed in our thought by the conception of uniform-
ity, ad.Ja inistered by freed om for the attainment of 
rational ends. Here in the unity of the free Creator, 
in the unity of his plan, and in his ever-working 
wi 11 is the only place '>here the rorld ha3 unity, 
completeness, and systematic connection.! 1 
101 Bowne, "The Specula~ive Signi fi cance of Freedom," 697. 
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This c oncludes our consideration of the speculative 
significance of freedom. It only remains to draw certain 
inferences from the conclusions reached. 
7. Freedom and individual responsibility. 
McConnell· rites of the'~nherent charitableness of the 
:Bowne system," arising from such ideas as that "the self is 
born into the world a candidate for humanity,u 102 Ye t the 
fact remains that Bowne was not always chari table. For 
example we shall notice below t hat he had little or no sym-
pathy for certain classes of criminals. More striking is 
his lack of sympathy when one of his friends worked to help 
give a confessed thief a new start. "A man who will steal 
like that ," he said, "is a thief at heart.ul03 It may 1ell 
be that a strong emphasis on freedom of the will caused him 
at times to over-look the great limitations on hQ~an free-
dom. It is not entirely without justice that such natural-
istic determinists as Clarence Darr ow lay claim to a greater 
sympathy vith the people who fail. They realize that many 
social and other factors enter in to help determine a man's 
attitudes and actions, and they are slaw to condemn him as 
essentially evil. 
ig~ McConnell, BPB, 167. 
Ibid., 174. 
In our emphasis on free will it is still well to remem-
ber that persons are influenced by the experiences they have 
met by t he way and that their failures may not be entirely 
the result of a fundamentally evil will. 
Perhaps it is difficult to reach the mean. On the on e 
hand it is neces sa ry to be sympathetic with the offender, 
but on the other ha nd i t is necess ary to preserve t he s ense 
of i nd ividual responsibility. In ancient Israel when it had 
become t he fashion to blame the sins of the children upon 
the f a thers, the prophet found it necessary to thunder back 
at t he people, "As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not 
have occasion any more to use t his proverb in Israel •••• 
The soul that sinneth, it shall die." 109 And again he cries, 
"The s oul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not 
bea r the iniquity of the father, neither shall t he father 
gear the iniquity of t he son: the righteousness of the right-
eous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked 
shall be upon him. 11105 That same sense of personal respon-
sibility was at the heart of Bowne's emphasis on freedom, 
and today when we have a tendency to blame our failures upon 
our heredity or the social ord er, perhaps we need to listen 
well to this message from the prophet and from the philosopher 
104 Ezekiel 18:2-4. 105 Exekiel 18:20~ 
8. Freedom and religion. 
Freedom of the will is an old debate in the field of 
relig ion. "In connec t ion with the religious ideal, free 
creation offers t he only soluti on of the problems of g ood 
and evil, foreknowledge, omniscience and omnipotence.nl06 
As for Bowne himself, the empr~sis on freedom led him to 
lay stress on the ethical side of religion.lO? 
9. Freedom and t=ethics. 
Although he approached the problem of freedom chiefly 
from the epistemolog ical point of view, Bowne still felt 
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tha t the most important field of freedom was certainly to be 
found in ethics.l09 In his estimate of t he relation of free-
dom to ethi cs Bowne contradicted both: .. the view Schleiermacher 
and that of F~nt. In opposition to the latter he pointed 
out that freedom should have no significance for ethics "as 
a system of moral judgments," but more fundamental was the 
insight that without freedom there can be no such things 
as "eth ics as a system of percepts where obedience is reck-
oned as duty and merit, and disobedience is sin and demerit."l I 
He declared that if man is an automaton, "a treatise on 
planetary motions is as truly the ethics of the solar system 
106 
107 
108 
109 
Hildebrand, "Bome r s Doc trine of Freedom," 109. 
YUludson, "Bowne as a Theologian." 
Bowne, "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," 68?. 
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as a treatise on human move ents is the ethics of ;nan."llO 
Knudson agrees tha t 11if the moral life is to be permanently 
retained in its full integrity, it can be only on the basis 
of metaphysical freedom or indeterminism, 11111 and Brightman 
also concurs. He finds the metaphysics of freedom to be the 
only field which impairs the autonomy of et·hical science,ll2 
and he writes as follows: 
All other sciences, then as ~ell as the s pecial 
science of ethics, must presuppose freedom. The 
other sciences use freedom in building up ideals 
of truth and method , observing facts, forming hy-
potheses and testing them; but ethics not only uses 
freedom in building its system, but also ap peals 
to freedom in every one of its laws. The claim 
that "all persons ought" to do so and so is logi-
cally and ethically futi!e unless all persons can 
do what they ought to.ll 
We conclude, then, that freedom is necessary for a 
tenable view of the world and of persona, that it ~akea a 
valuable contribution to relig ion, and that it is a pre -
supposition of the moral life. 
111 Knudson , DOR, 158. 
112 Bri ghtman , ML, 284. 
113 Ibid. , 283. 
CHAPTRR V 
BORDEN PA_B.KER BOVVNE: HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
A. Personalism as a basis for social philosophy. 
1. Bristol 's social-personalism. 
Twenty years ago James M. Cain, a newspaper man who 
had formerly been on the staff of The Baltimore Sun , wrote 
an article for The American Mercury on "The Pathology of 
Service ." In the course of this tirade against . those who 
were, as he saw it, obsess ed by the pathological desire to 
serve, he attempted to trade .the history of "the.·philosoph-
ical basis for service." The following was his conclusion: 
My guess is that it came about through the ~Titings 
and speakings of Borden P. Bowne, who, during the 
closing years of the last century was professor of 
philosophy at Boston University . Although forgotten 
now by the laity, Bowne enjoyed tremendous academic 
presti~e in his day, and his influence must have 
been considerable.l 
So Mr. Cain would appear to make Bowne the father of social 
philosophy or at least the social philosophy which is con-
cerned with service of men. Most scholars would feel that 
such a judgment was much too extravagant, but there are many 
1 Cain, "The Pathology of Service," 261. 
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who believe tha t in his system is to be found the soundest 
metaphysical basis for social philosophy. This is the posi-
tion taken by Luciu:s 1! . :Bristol. 
Bristol in his book entitled Social Adaptation reviews 
a number of the outstanding social theories and then describes 
the theory which appears on the basis of the study to be the 
most adequate. He calls the theory social-personalism. 
By t h is phrcase is meant that t he acme of cosmic ev-
olution is not the social group even in its col-
lective activity • • • btit the individual person, 
for personality alone has power ···over the cosmic 
process, the group .always acting on the initiative 
of persons,--but this persona~ity socially deter-
mined and with a social goal. · 
The highest forms of intellectual and emotional activ-
ity--reflective creation and affection--are produced by 
individuals, never by groups, however much the individuals 
may be determined by the gr oups. Not only must it be recog-
nized that individuals are determined to a degree by their 1! 
I 
environment, but also that their ideal can never be merely I 
self-development in a narrow sense. The goal of the indi-
vidual must be social adaptation. There alone can he · find 
true hanpiness, and the supreme happiness comes "only in 
t h e consciousness that the individual life is unfolding in 
harmony with the cosmic order or with the divine will, --i. j
1 
e., in religious adaptation. 113 ! 
2 
3 Bristol, SA, 320. Ibid., 321. (The italics are his.) 
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Each individual must adapt himself to many groups, and 
problems arise when the interests of various groups conflict. 
The solution for this difficul ty li e s in organizR.tion • . "The 
individual is able to organize his various interests,--often 
conflicting,--by making them al l tributary to the attainment 
of a life purpose."4 Social groups may attain a. "quasi-per-
sonali ty 11 and form themselves into groupings with increasi ng 
organization, integration, and specialization. Such a group, 
like individuals, should "seek to function as efficiently 
as possible in the more inclusive social organizations of 
whi,ch it forms an integrating part. 11 5 A social goal fer t he 
group is "exemplifaction ." By this Bristol means tha t every 
group should seek to incr eas e its influence by becoming so 
well organized and so helpful to its members that other 
groups wi ll imitate it and should seek to "find or make its 
plac e in a still l a r ger organization."6 
This social philos.ophy as worked out byBtistol is of 
sufficient i mportanc e for the present study to justify a 
quotation a t cons iderable length of his own concise state-
ment of its chief elements. They include: 
I. The supreme worth of the individual because 
he is the highest express ion of cosmic evolution as 
measured by his creat ive activity in the line of 
active material and spiritual adaptation, the former 
giving him poser to coerce nature in the line of 
4 Bristol, SA, 32?.. 
~ Ibid., 323. (The italics are his.) 
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ministering to his needs, the latter g1v1ng him 
uower (a) to react on society by imitative varia-
tion, innovation and suggestion: (b) to influence 
men in the interest of self-satisfaction; (c) to 
form ideals and conform or adapt his life progress-
ively to them: (d) to win his fellow- en by example 
and persuasion, to the acceptance of his ideals a nd 
so restore the social equilibrium disturbed by his 
creative variation from the standards of the group , 
and (e) in·:; conjunction dth others, to compel social 
adaptation on the part of social laggards and the 
anti-social. 
II. The individual goal of self-development and 
social efficiency ••• ~ It is not mere self-devel-
op ent that makes for individual well-being and 
social strength, but the kind of development that 
fits the individual for the place in social life 
t hat he can fill supremely ~ill according to his 
capacity •••• 
III. The res ponsibility of society for the char-
acter of every personality. Every member of a group 
is now very largely a social product. A society can 
have the kind of members it really wants. Social 
conscience, then, should be made to feel that it is 
responsible for the character of every individual. 
IV. The eneral ideal for ever social uasi- er-
sonality or unity of social exemplifaction: i. e.·, 
to work out such an organized life and one so fruit-
ful in securing the highest pos s ible well being of 
its members and of humanity as a whole, that it will 
s pread by reflective i mita tion on the part of other 
social unities. 
V~ The social goal of functioning in a more inclu-
sive unity •••• This goal ••• moves on in ever 
widening circles with the extension of eo-operation 
and the expansion of the self-r~garding sentiment 
until it embraces all humanity. 
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This discussion of Bristol's theory of social-personal-
ism falls naturally under t h e section on "Personalism a.s a. 
basis for social philosophy" because it represents a definite 
7 Br istol, SA, 3~5-326. (The italics are his.) 
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application of Bowne's personalism to social philosophy. 
Bristol definitely acknowledged his obligation to Bowne for 
the term, personalism, 8 and personalism is clearly the more 
fundamental of the two parts of the tit;J.e, "social" be ing 
added as a "aualifying word." 9 
Still, it is true that Bristol?s theory is more than 
Bowne's personal ism, The first of the elements which he 
enumerates, "the supreme worth of the individual," is fun-
damental in the Bownean thought, as we have observed above, 
but Bristol interprets more definitely the relat ion of the 
individual to his social .tQ. lli-i;. &Gci~ environment. "The 
individual goal of self-development and social efficiency" 
agrees well with Bowne's perfectionist ethics, and Bowne 
recognizes that this development must be in relation to the 
environment, but he does not emphasize the adaptive element 
so clearly as Bristol. "The responsibility of society for 
the character of every personality" was r ecognized by Bowne, 
at leas t by implication, but in his emphasis on the respon-
sibility of individuals he d id not allow sufficient impor-
tance to the responsibility of groups . The other two ele-
ments enumerate.d by Bristol as parts of his social-personal-
ism probably do not appear s pecifically in Bowne 's writings. 
~ Bristol, SA, 52ln~ .. 
Ibid., 321. 
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'.'fe may notice below that there are in Bristol 's system 
certain interesting parallels with some of Royce's concept s. 
2. Personalism as organic pluralism. 
In the dialectic of social thought organicism develops 
as the antithesis of atomism. Then comes a systhesis which 
should unite the truth of both views. Such a theory is t hat 
of organic pluralism. This theory affirms "that the indi-
vidual is an organic whole in an organic society and uni-
verse but tha t the ind ividual is not and ought not to be 
wholly determined by any whole to which he l>elongs."lO 
Bow·ne did not s peak of his social philos ophy in terms 
of organic pluralism, and yet tha t is the theory whi ch is 
most consistent with his metaphysics. According to Flewell-
ing's definition which we quoted above , "Personalism • • • 
asserts a system of selves related through a supr eme per-
sonality.ull Accordi ng to Knudson's definition , "Personal-
ism (i s) • • • t ha t form of idealism whi ch gives equal rec-
og nition to both the plural istic and monis~ic aspects of 
experience. . . . ul2 Thus both of t hes e definitions express 
in metaphys i cal terms the essential tenet of organic plural-
ism. They insist on t he r eality of persons or selves, but 
10 Supra , Chapter III, note ?.. 11 Flewelling, "Personalism, " 771. 
l ?. Knudson, POP, 87. (The italics are his . ) 
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they point out that these selves take their place .in a sy s-
tem or that experience has its monistic a s pects. As organic 
pluralism repre sents an a ttemp t at a synthesis embracing 
the truth of both atomism a nd organicism; so persona lism 
represents an attempt at a synthesis embracing the truth of 
both t he pluralism of ~cTaggart, Renouvier, and Howis on and 
the absolutism of Royce and Ca lkins. 
In politico-economic theory organic p luralism is con-
sistent with ne ither an individualistic or atomistic cap i-
talism nor an orga nicistic fascism, but is more ne arly con-
sistent with some form of socialism which sees the ind ivid-
ual as the chief end of t he proc e ss but recognizes tha t the 
individual must be saved in and through society if he is to 
be saved at all. 
In so far as Bowne's ethics is personalistic, it is in 
a ccord vri th organic plura lism. Yet, it mus t be noticed t h:'l. t 
in his application of his ethica l princi ~les to s pecific 
socia l problems he so emp hasized the i mportance of the spe-
ci f ic situation at t he expense of general ethical principles 
t ha t he ran the danger of g iving free p lay to persona l bias 
and t h a t h is o•r.'fl p ersonal bias was somewhat toward individ-
ualism. He d id not take sufficient account of t he signifi-
cance of group action . 
He decla red tha t the only way to i mprove institu-
tions is to imporve t he men who compose the insti-
t utions. For t he i d ea tha t ther e may be socially a 
I 
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v1.c1.ous 11 svstem" which men cannot escape unti l they 
act t ogeth~r socia lly he d i d not l e a ve much scope, 
a lth ough he was well enough aware of t he truth a nd 
regogn ized it a t lea st by i mpl ic a tion.l3 
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I n s eeking to disc over what soci a l t heory is mos t in harmony 
with t he Bownean philosophy ·we must recognize such facts a s 
t hi s i ndivi dua l ism, but it is not i n ha r mony with his system 
i n genera l, and si nce a t times he himself waraed against it, 
we ca n only cl assify it a s an inc on s istency in his own ap-
plicat i on of his pr inci p l e s as we not iced above t ha t 1 oy ce's 
endor s ement of war seemed t o be out of har mony with hi s 
philosophy of absolutism. 
Bowne's empha sis on t he signi f icance of free d om is con-
s i s t en t with orga nic plura lism. Both recognize the p ower 
of :nan to exerci s e a limited con trol over his envi r onment . 
Bmme def ine s freedom a s "the power to choose between com-
pe ti ng or conflicting pos s ibili t ies and to r eali ze t he one 
ch os en.nl4 These various possi b ilities are pr esented by the 
soci a l s itua tion. Hu_an f re edom is a necessary par t of any 
socia l theory which as serts, a s does social organici sm- -the 
p ower of the indivi dua l t o exercise a control over his so-
cia l environment . 
Yvhile Bowne's idea of God is not a necessary part of 
organic plura lism, the t wo doctrines are compatible, a nd 
13 McConnell , BPB , 173 . 1 4 Bowne, "The Specula tive Si gnificance of · reed om, u r_ 6 81 . 
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each may be strengthened by the a ssociation. 
In view of t hese considerations we may conclud e that 
Bowne 's social philosophy may be su~med up in the term, or-
ganic plural ism. Persona lism, so expressed, has certain 
more or less obvious advantages. 
The clarity of personalism, ••• its appeal to the 
forum of logic and common human experience, its view 
of the universe as a society of persons, its esti-
mate of morality and relig ion all fit it to serve 
• • • as an inspiring background for service in the 
world of today where social questions. are burning 
issues, and where insight and a true sense of values 
are s o imperatively needed .l5 
To t h is auotation from Bright~an may be added one from 
Duncan: 
A philosophy t ha t bases itself, as Bowne's does, 
upon the incontestable and immediately known facts 
of human selfhood, accurately analyzed, • • • fur-
nishes the soundest possib~e basis for ethics, ped-
agogy, and civil society.l 
3. Personalism and Christianity. 
a. Objections to personalism. 
Miss Calkins in her attempt to show that Royce's ab-
solutism is consistent with Christianity writes tha t "the 
pluralistic theist, who teaches that God s h ares human ex-
perience, must meet insistent difficulties.nl7 "How should 
15 
16 Brightman, "Philosophy and American Education," 28. Duncan , "Bowne vs. Determinism and Pantheism," 386. 
17 Calk ins, "The Foundati on in Royce's Phi losophy for Chris-
tian Theism," 57. 
God know me if I am separate from him?" The answer to that 
question may de pend on the kind of epistemological theory 
to which one adheres. This is not the place for a discussion 
of the relative merits of epistemological monism and dualism, 
but two or three answers to Miss Calkin 's problem may be 
suggested. For the dualist it is, indeed, hardly a problem~ 
God maY- know the finite person in the same way that one fi-
nite individual may know another . The adherent of ill iss 
Calkin's theories has equally difficult problems. The Ab-
solute is certainly more than the finite person. All of 
the Absolute except a very small portion are other than or 
separate from the individual. Yet Miss Calkins affirms a 
considerable knowledge of the Absolute and of other objects 
which may be parts of the Absolute but at least are other 
than the . individual. The fact is that we do have knowledge 
of things other than ourselves unless we resign ourselves 
to pure solipsism, and since that is true, we may hardly 
deny an equal knowledge to God. 
The second objection raised by Miss Calkins is stated 
thus: "How can he (God) share my experience when he is all-
wise and all-powerful and I run so palpably ignorant and so 
piteously ineffective?" An im.mediate reply might be that 
if he did not, he would not be all-wise and all-powerful, 
but that can hardly be called an answer. Historic Chris-
tianity has thought of God as sharing men 's experiences, 
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but not as one of whom the experiencer was metaphysically a 
:part. Rather it was a sharing on the basis of a sympathetic 
understanding as one person shares the experience of another. 
The subject of the experience need not necessarily have had 
the same experience himself. It is scarcely conceivable 
that God, whether or not he be completely other than the in-
dividual, should watch generations of men passing through joy 
and suffering wit hout being able to understand the meaning 
of those experiences. 
The truth is that this very otherness which personalism 
establishes is an essential part of any philosophy which 
would preserve a place for Christianity. Without it there 
is no sure safeguard against pantheism. "Undermine finite 
personality, as personalism conceives it, and you open the 
dyke that lets in the pantheistic flood that turns creation 
into 'a vast dead sea occupied by God alone.'"lB 
b. Pragmatic basis of relig ious belief. 
We observed that Royce attempted to preserve t he inter-
ests of religion "by supplement ing the category of ' Descrip-
tion• ,_with that of' 'Appreciation."' :Bowne sought the same 
end by an emphasis on the primacy of the practical reason. 
18 Duncan, "Bowne vs. Determinism and Pantheism," 385. 
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He believed that rationalism could provide the broad general 
ground-work of religious belief, but the more distinctive 
elements of faith could not be so established. 
Rationalism provides a sufficient basis ••• for 
the unity, intelli gence, and free causality of the 
world-ground. But the concepts of the love and 
goodness of God, prayer and immortality require some 
other ground for their affirmation. We can hold to 
them only because of our faith in the ideal, and 
our faith in the reality of the ideal is established 
alone by pray~ical considerations, by the energy of 
life itself. 
Accordingly, we find in Bowne 's thought a large element 
of pragmatism, and this does not come as a late development 
in his thought. As early as 1879 he wrote in his studies 
in Theism such statements as the following: "It is no ob-
jection to a belief that its grounds do not admit of satis-
factor y formal statement, provided always that it works 
well . 11 20 "In addition ••• to beliefs deduced from formal 
data..~ , t r1ere ar e other beliefs which are based on results ... ~n 
"Those thoughts and views -a r e true whi ch work well: and these 
are false which wor~ i ll. In a rational system such a test 
would be valid: but the materialist has no such system."~ ?. 
In a ma ga zine article published five years later he declares 
that 11 the driving and directing force of the mind lies in 
19 Ramsdel;I., "The Religious Pragmatism of Borden Parker 
Bowrie," 306. Cf. McConnell, BPB, 15~, and Strickland, 
"Pragmatism and the Personal Philosophy," 603. 
?.0 Bowne, SIT, 64-65. 
21 !bide;, 75. 
~? Ibid., 115. 
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its living interests, and not in the dis c oursive faculty . u23 
Again, he writes, 11 There is an element of faith and volition 
latent in all our theorizing . Where we cannot :prove, we 
b e lieve . Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides.":?.4 
And in the work which was published in the second year a fter 
his death there is t his same pragmatic attitude: "We are 
very little concerned at speculative inadequacy, provided 
a doc trine works well in practice and enriches and furthers 
life . n25 There are c ertain very important differences be-
t ween this doctrine and t he pragmatism advocated by James, 
Shiller , and Dewey. It is more nearly like what Hocking 
calls "critical pragmatism," a nd which has been character-
ized a s "the fruitful factor in modern pragmatism. u26 
We may notice in passing tha t this pragmatic attitude 
within certain limi ts may have a very wholesome influence 
on social philosophy in general . Just now we are more con-
cerned with its application to reli gious thought . The method 
is not unlike that of Kant in deducing relig ious beliefs from 
the moral a priori. "God is seen to be tha t without which 
our ideals collapse or are made unattainable , and the snrings 
of action are broken . "27 
23 
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Bowne , "The Log ic of Religi ous Belief , " 660 . 
Bowne, POT , iii . 
Bowne , KAS , :?.09 . 
Col l i er , "Personalism, a Vital Philosophy , " 37. 
Bowne , THE , 291 . 
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(Religious beliefs) -are the principles by which men 
live and without which they cannot live their best 
life : And the proof of such beliefs rests entirely 
on the energy of the life they express, and on their 
power to fur t her that life in practice . They meet 
our mental needs and they work well in life. This 
is the pragmatic test of truth, and for concrete 8 truth there is no deeper or surer test thR.n this.2 
In the light of his study of social theories and par-
ticularly of the theory of soc ial- personalism Bristol fav-
ors the "belief tha t the ultimate religi on will be along 
li nes suggested by Bowne and Bal<.iwin, wi th emphasis, how-
ever on its social aspects and its pragmatic warrant. 1129 
Bowne was much concerned about the "pragmatic warrant," but 
Bristol was thinking mor particularly in terms of its effects 
on large social gr oups. 
c. Personalism a nd the historic beliefs. 
Three facts may be briefly pointed out in connection 
with t he relat ion of personalism to t he historic Christian 
beliefs. First, it sh ould be observed t ha t personalism is 
out of accord with many of the beliefs which have been he ld 
by the Christian Chur ch. Most of the interpretations of 
the Trinity and the Atonem ent would not fit into a personal -
istic framework. But this difference wi th the ancient be- I 
I 
liefs can hardly be char ged to personalism. 'rhey were founded I 
28 Bowne , "Gains for Religi ous Thought in the Last Genera-
tion," 892. 99 . Br1stol, SA, 3?8. 
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on nee-platonism, and have been out of accord with the main 
philosophic movements of the last six centuries. Tha t they 
have already had much revision and may be in need of more 
is hardly open to que stion. 
Second, we may consider t he warning that no philosophy 
should be expected to correlate in detail with any inter-
pretation of Christianity whether ancient or modern. The 
power of Christ ianity has c ome not so much from its funda-
mental phi lo sophical foundations as from its complex of his -
torical b eliefs, especially certain beliefs about an hi stor-
ical personality--Jesus Chris t. The best . that can be asked 
of a philosophical system is tha t it make room for a signif-
icant part of t hese beliefs--not tha t it prove them to be 
true, but that it make possible a belief in them. This per-
sonalism does. Bowne, himself, adhered to most of the main 
tenets of living Christianity, and most of the later pe rson-
alists hav e agreed with him . There was a large strain of 
mys ticism in his own experience, and he looked to t his vital 
mysticism as we ll as to his pragma tism for a substantiation 
of t he distinctive Christian beliefs . 
our third observa t ion is tha t personalism is in accord 
with the fundaraental tenets of Christian theism. Wilson de-
clares t ha t Bmme' s personalism "flooded with light some of 
the most mysterious doctrines of Christianity ." 
'I 
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students of the New Testament know that the burden 
of Christ's teaching was man's divine sonsh ip. His 
own g eneration and many tha t came after were unable 
to bear this high Doctrine of t he divinity of man. 
But we are rediscovering it in s uch philosophy as 
Bowne 's. It is the hope of t he f uture of Christian-
ity and through Christianity for the human race. 
It justifies the most sp iritual, aggressive vital, 
relig ious a ctivity. It is t he ideal in the light 
of which every p~8blem tha t confronts the present 
day must be met. . 
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None of t he objections which we r a ised against absolu-
tism as a basis for Christian theism are valid against pe r -
sonalism. The relat ion between God · . and ~man described by 
Jesus in the symbol of f a therhood and in such parables as 
tha t of the Prodigal Son are under standable only on the 
assumption of distinct divine a nd human personalities. The 
case i s well summ.a r ·ized by Knudson as follows: 
That the personality of God .·andhsacredness of human 
personality express t he true genius of the Chris-
tian ·reli g ion, wha tever may be sa id of its theology, 
is hardly open to question: and that t hese beliefs 
have received t heir completest philosophical justi-
fica t ion in modern personalistic metaphysi cs, would 
seem ~qually c l ear. Personalism is ~ar excellance 
the Christian philosophy of our day . I 
4. The divine immanence and social motivation . 
The doctrine of t he divine i mmanence , a ccording to 
Bowne , s h ould function powerfully in ins piring men to moral 
and social activity . "We must • • • get a deeper sense of 
30 
31 Wilds on, "Bowne, a Quickening Spirit," 376-37?. Knu son, POP, 80 . 
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the divinity of life its elf and al l its notmal interests .u32 
In concrete situations such as the ques tion of wha t s hould 
be the at titude of t he Unit ed States toward t he Phi li pp ines 
or the du ty of a man to h is family men should be led by this 
insight to study t he facts of the situat i on and to a ct in-
tel l i gnetly and mora lly . 
Philosophy is for life; and the needs of the human 
spirit and the demands of a moral l life are factors 
of experience tha t philosophy mus t reckon with. And 
here the persona l philoBophy bri ngs wha t no other 
system of thought has g iven--inspiration, moral in-
centives, a broader ou tlo ok , a c herished hope for 
stil l l arger living . It does this by making a per-
s onal God--the Divi.ne :?at her of me n-- the s ource and 
c enter of al l, thus pav i ng the way for t hose warm 
assurances of love which revelati .on br ing s from ~-ge 
heart of Hi m whom we have not yet seen but love. 
The l ast sentence of this quo tati on from Strickland suggests 
the next topic whi ch we shall consider,. ·- The things which 
make the doctrine of the divine immanence a source of moti -
vation are also present in relig ion as Bowne saw it. In 
fact, the richest significance of t he doctrine a t this point 
is really t ha t it "paves the way for" a vital reli g ious 
fa ith. 
~~Bowne, "Aberrant 1\.:loralizers ," 261 . 
Str i ckland , "Pragmatism and t he Personal Philo s ophy ," 
604. 
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B . Bowne's conception of the kingdom of God. 
1. The function of reli g ion in social process . 
a. Source of moti vation . 
Bowne looks to relig ion as a great source of motiva t ion 
for ethical living and socia l ac tion~ He decla res t hat the 
primary "relig ious duty is to offe r up the daily life per-
vaded and sanctified by the filial spirit, a s our s piritua l 
service and worship of God . 11 34 Seeing tha t all of life is 
divine , men should reco~nize t he divine will in all the con-
cerns of life and be determined to make tha t will preva il. 
'l'h is is the very es s ence of Christianity . "Its concern 
must be not to make men abstractly g ood or pious, but make 
t hem concretely g ood in the complex relations and duties of 
a ctua l life." Thus it must function not only in 11 t he h idden 
life of t he spirit," but also "in f amily life, in socia l 
life, in political life, in trade, in art , in literature, in 
every field of human int erest and activi ty.n 35 
Certa in beliefs of t he Christian relig ion in particula r 
may make a social act seem mueh mor e worth while. The cup 
of cold water g iven unto"one of t he least of the se " may 
hardly be worth the trouble if it only serv es to prolong 
34 Bowne, CL, 106. 35 Q,uoted from Bowne, "Secularism and Christiani ty," 21eth. 
Quart . Rev., Rpr., l.S99, in 1.1cConnell, BPB, 1?7. 
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"a wretched existence by a few days," but for the Christian 
the words of Jesus that " 'ye have done it unto me 1 lift the 
act of mercy into quite a higher plane of significance.n36 
Bowne may have thought of these things too exclusive~ in 
individualistic terms, but that does not decrease the value 
of the concepts for us. 
If he did not apprehend the depth of the social 
factor in mind, morals, and religion, nevertheless 
his metapeysics of immanence and his own faith in a 
loving and lovable God--these two taken together 
make for hospitality to a thoroughgoing recognition 
of the social in its prtmordialness and its ulti-
mateness.37 
b. Source of optimism. 
Bowne finds in Christianity the only ground for a pro-
found optimism. He points out the distressing facts of his-
tory and sees the great masses of human! ty "buried in ignor-
ance, pursued by disease, persecuted by pain, and all the 
I while, like some tremendous Niagara, pouring over into the 
I . 
I abyss of death and darkness." But the hope of the Christian 
religion .is grounded on a confidence of the God revealed by 
Jesus Christ. 
If God be indeed such as Jesus reported, if he be 
our God and Father, if his name is Love, if he has 
36 McConnell, BPB, 220 
37 Coe "The ~irical Factor in Bowne 1s Thinking," 381. 
' ~.!:-' 
q 
made man for immortal life and blessedness with hi~ 
self, then, of course, all must be right with the 
world, and the end must be divine. But on any other 
view, the on~ preservative ~ainst ~9ep anxiety, if 
not despair, is simplY not to think. · 
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This source of confidence was effective for Bowne him-
self. He was sufficientlY sure of his faith that he once 
said to a student, "I am willing to gample my life on it, 
and I don't believe the future will cheat me.n39 He was 
like~ to have little patience with pessimist~ "As a 
rule," he said, "there is not enough man in the pessimist 
to believe in anything great and reverent."40 
c. Social dangers of religion. 
Bowne points out one danger in the popular view of 
religion. In the false distinction between the religious 
! and the profane or secular, religion is likelY to become so 
separated from life that it loses its meaning, except as a 
body of esoteric doctrine. ThiS danger should be met by a 
sense of the immanence of God. 
' 
There is another danger in religion which . Bowne did not 
emphasize so much. A certain amount of optimism is a whole-
j some thing for those interested in social action, but there 
I 
may easi~ be too much of it. Religious optimism has 
blirld.l.ed men's eyes to the brute facts of our social life. 
38 Bowne, nThe Supremacy of Christ," 888-889. 
!~For thi~ incident I am i~debted.the Bishop McDowell. 
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Bowne insists that if' we believe in the God of' Jesus "all 
I 
must be right with the world, and the end must be divine. 11 
1
1
. Such an attitude has led men to identify the status 
with the divine state, and to s~, "The powers that 
9\!Q 
be are 
ordained of' God." · Tlius religion becomes the bulwark of' con-
servatism and comes to oppose change as a matter of' principle. 
If' it does not do that, it may feel that work on the part of' 
finite persons is really useless because the future rests so 
secure~ in the hands of' God that no other help is needed. 
Such has actually been the effect of' religion at many ~imes 
in the past and at many places in the present. Along with 
our faith in God we need to remember that all is not right 
with the world. Pain, ignorance, immorality are very much 
with us, and their presence indicates that if man refused to 
cooperate with God, the end is not assured. We need hardly 
ask of religion that it guarantee more than the possibility 
of success to the enterprise of building the kingdom of God 
and of man and the assurance that God with man 1 s help is 
able to bring value even out of' disvalue. 
2 • The cburch. 
BOwne thought of the church as an important insti tu-
tion in the development of' the mor~l life. Some of' his lan-
guage in the discussion of the church suggests the concep-
tion later described by Royce as "the beloved community." 
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"Transcending all family, social, and nationaLlimits, it 
.. 
furnishes a community as wide as the race.n41 But the two 
men did not mean just the same thing when they spoke of the 
community. Bowne did rot have such an intimate organic union 
in mind, and he did not recognize the same sort of reaction 
of the co-mmunity on the individual. 
Here we may notice a very interesting contrast between 
Royce and Bowne. Royce expresses an exalted conception of the 
significance of the church as the body of all the fai th:f'ul., 
as the beloved community through which alone salvation is 
possible. It is true that he is here thinking more of what 
theologians have called the "church invisible," but it is 
still a striking fact that he remained so complete~ aloof 
from the "church visible". He admitted that his attitude 
G. Mitche11 was removed from the faculty of Boston University 
School of Theology because of the failure of the bishops to 
\ 41 Bowne , POE, 302. 
\42 Bowne, SIC, 323. 
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confirm his reappointment, Bowne would have. had the episcopacy 
utterly eliminated. He re:eerred to ecclesiastical councils 
as "unprofitable works of darkness." Nevertheless, he was 
always loyal to the church. His criticisms grew out of a 
deep concern for the church's welfare. He not only attended· 
church regularly: he went weekly to the prayer meetings in 
his church although an abundance of excuses would have seemed 
to justify his absence had he not really desired to attend.43 
3. The goal of social process. 
a. Subjective and objective. 
For Bowne the goal of' the entire social process is 
abundant life. This, of course, is an ambiguous or multigu-
ous term and needs further explanation. Such a life, as he 
conceived ·it, included both subjective and objective factors. 
This idea was expressed at least as long ago as Aristotle, 
but Bowne~s emphasis on the point is still significant. Well-
being includes not only outward fortune but also inner worth 
· and peace. 44 'The kingdom of God demands "not only the exor-
cism of the evil will, but also the exorcism of' ignorance, 
of superstition, of disease, of bondage to physical needs.n45 
It should hardly be necessary to insist at length here that 
!! McConnell, BPB, 228-239; especially 220 7 230 7231 7 235. 
Bowne , POE, 304. 
45 Bowne, SIT, 311. 
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both of these factors are important and essential. 
Emphasis on material progress may produce the sense 
of worth and peace which alone makes life worth 
living for the individual. Emphasis on the subjec• 
tive side may lead to such neglect of material wel-
fare as to result in individual and social stagna-
tion and decay. Both elements must have place in a 
social philosophy that shall satisfy life conditions 
and inspire to that individual and social acti~ty 
that shall attain ultimately the coveted goal. 
b. Individual and social. 
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Although Bowne's primary interest is in men as individuals 
he still recognized that the goal· of social process must be 
I social as well as individua1. Christianity, he believes, 
i 
aims not merely at an abstaact individual salvation, "but at 
the concrete salvation of the individual and of all ·that be-
longs to him. • • • The whole world is the subject of redemp-
tion. 1147 Thus the kingdom of GOd demands the salvation of 
society because the individual cannot be saved apart from 
society. We need the complete development of the individual 
and also "the development of social relations into their per-
fect form, f'or man comes to himself only in society.n48 
At times Bowne approached an appreciation of the organic 
nature of society, which C. H. Cooley was developing for 
sociology. Re wrote that men working together subordinate 
the indiviaual to law and government and thus become an 
,j 
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organized community which is more than an aggregate of indi-
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viduals and which has authority over each of its members. 
"This organism we call socfety.n49 The best of a man ts 
moral development comes only through . interaction with the 
group. 50 "The sociai order is the only thing which makes 
individual -development possible, n51 and "the prosperity of 
each individual is bound up in the well ... b.eing o:f the other.n52 
It is therefore evident that while Bowne in his assault 
on the fallacy of the class term appears at times to forget 
1 
I 
I 
the significance of the social fac t or or o:f the meaning of the ' 
group for the individual, he was aware that not only is society I 
an abstraction· apart from the individual, but a human indivj,d-
uaL_is also an abstraction apart from society. In the words 
of Cooley, "the individual and society are twin-born," and 
neither can exist apart from the other. "Without a developed 
social order, which makes possible and conserves the gains 
of the individual, man would never emerge from the savage 
state."53 Bowne summarizes the "Modern Conception of the 
Kingdom of God" and thus the goal of the social process in 
one ~ine paragraph as follows: 
I dream: of' a time when humanity shall come to its 
oWn., . wheri .physical nature shall be subdued to human 
service beyond all present conception, when want and 
disease shall have disappeared, when the social order 
248 
311. 
I 
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Shall be an expression of perfect justice, when the r ace 
r,ace shall be rich enough to afford all its members · · _ 
the opportunity of a truly human existence, when the 
bondage of physical drudgery shall have been taken 
off from human shoulders, when the treasures of 
knowledge shall be a universal possession, and when 
over against these external conditions there shall 
be a moral spirit wise enough to use them and strong 
enough to control them. Then the kingdom of man and 
of God will have come. ~d to turn this dream into 
a reality is the Christian programme, the true mean-
ing of the pr~er, so often uttered and so seldom 
understood, "Thy kingdom come; Thy will be done in 
th •t • . h n54 ear ,. as .J.: -.l..S .. J.n. .. .. eaven. . 
c. His attitude on current social proplems. 
· 1. The family. 
Bowne recognized the family as one of the most powerful 
forces in the moral development of man. 
It is there that we get the first and best lessons 
in love and patience and mutual forebearance. It is 
there also that we get our best lessons i n reverence, 
submission, self-control, and living toget her. Un-
selfish devotion also is generally un a b,y ~ami~ 
.limits. Unselfish living, which i s so nearly the 
sum of moral living, is almost exclusively confined 
to the family life. Here the unselfish life is al-
most a matter of course. It is this fact which 
g~ves5~he family its importance as a moral institu-tl.on. 
Bowne advocated the reduction of divorce by more strin-
gent laws on the subject. He believed that divorce should 
be allowed only in case of adultery, gross fraud and 
deception, and prolonged and groupdless desertion, and that 
k . . 4 ~ Bowne, SIT, 326 
55 Bowne, POE, 232-233. 
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then the right to re-marry should be granted on~ to the 
innocent party. Such a law, he believed, "would doubtless 
do a good deal to prevent unlike affinities from manifesting 
themselves to the extent customary when divorce is easy and 
· re-marriage possible. n56 In this belief he was probably 
' 
mistaken. There appears no clear correlation between the i 
stringency of divorce laws and divorce rates. Moreover, 
the "innocent party" is not always determinable in the 
divorce proceaings. 
2. The punishment of crime. 
In dealing with penology Bown~0ff&t reveal a very deep 
knowledge of the subject. Concerning the motive of punish-
ment he rejects the ideas of social security and deterrence 
of crime because for those same motives we would not punish 
an innocent person, and he concludes that "the root idea of 
· hm t i t ·b t · · n57 pums en. • • • s re rJ.. u J.on. But that argument is very 
difficult to follow. It is not at all clear that the fact 
that we would not punish an innocent person for the protec-
tion of society means that we would not punish a guilty per-
son for the same cause, particular~ when the former case 
would seldom arise. If the protection and ~eterrance mo-
tives do meet with inconsistencies, the retributive idea is 
56 
157 Bowne, POE, 340 Ibid., 274. 
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no better off, for it is not proposed that retribution be 
applied consistent~. It is impossible to tell how a pun-
ishment is to be matched to a particular crime--either on 
the basis of.the badness of the will revealed in the deed 
or of the amount of damage done. Therefore in practice we 
are thrown back upon the rejected motives. "Whatever is 
necessary to guard society against the criminal, and to make 
the criminal industry unprofitable, society may justly do. n58 
The rest of the retribution is left to God. 
While it is true that Bowne'"s discussion at this point 
does not reveal a very profound technical knowledge of penol-
ogy, it does reveal his characteristic interest in the hu-
man values involved and particularly · in the great mass of 
people who are striving to live hoaest, fruitful lives. His 
interest centers there more than in the individual criminal. 
"That is a very wearisome type of. philanthropy which is all 
b~wels for the criminal and none for the -honest man.n59 
In this opinion he is probably extreme, as Brightman suggests, 
in overlooking the fact that those who are whole are in less 
need of a physician than those who are sick. 
3. war. 
Bowne did not live to express his opinion of the World 
war, but it is very probable that if he had lived, he would 
58 Bowne, POE, 275. 59 . 
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have warmly applauded Royce's address at Tremont Temple on 
"The Destruction of the Lusitania." After the Boxer up-
rising in China, he declared that if the Chinese started 
''slaughtering Chinese Christians, the Christian powers might 
not be clear as to the international principles on which to 
proceed, but they would proceed nevertheless.n60 At the 
time of the Spanish-American Was he heartily praised McKinley 
for attempting to preserve the peace, but when the hostilities 
began, "he believed with the mass of Americans that it could 
be used to the advantage of mankind. nGl When the Armenian 
Christians were being slaughtered by the Turks, he was dis-
gusted with the impotence of tlie attempts of the European 
powers to deal with the situation and in a discussion of the 
problem in a class in ethics he cried out, ttAvenge, 0 Lord, 
thy slaughtered saints!" He thought it would probab~ be a 
good thing for mankind to have a war to set the Turks in 
order.62 
In .. discussions such as this Bowne vehemently attacked 
those naberrant moralizers'' who attempted to settle specific 
problems by merely stating some broad general principle. 
Concerning the war with Spain he wrote, 11 There has been a 
vast amound o:f irrelevant flourishing of principles, as if . 
they were really in question, or as if they alone could 
60 McConnell, BPB, 253. 
61 Ibid, 254. 
62 Ibid, 262. 
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settle the matter. n63 He insisted that it was not merely a I. 
question of whether war was desirable, but what course of 
action was best in the given situation. 
The horrors of war are undoubtedly great, but the 
horrors of peace may be greater. War,. would be very 
much out of place in heaven; g!;tt it is sometimes 
very much in order on earth. 11 · 
It has already been pointed out that an over-insistence 
on the necessity of-studying the circumstances of the given 
situation instead of looking to ethical principles for the 
solution of a problem may tend to invalidate the ethical 
principles entire~. The Law of Specification is only one 
of the moral laws. 65 
Bownets tolerance of war may have been stimulated also 
by his emphasis on the ''something oracular in the moral 
nature. He writes that if we should take from hUma.n history 
11all that is due to the conviction that it is 'perdition to 
be safe' when for the truth or country one ought to die, it 
would n~t be -worth while to write the rest. tt66 · We should 
not deny that there is "something oracular in the moral 
nature," but we should still insist that that something needs 
to be criticized by the vigilant use of the intelligence in 
the application of all the relevant moral principles. This 
g~ Bo~e, "Aberrant Moralizers," 251. 
Ibl.d, 259. - . 
65 Cf. Brightman ML 171-182. 
66 Bowne, POE, 266. ~The italics are mine.) · 
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fact is likely to be obscured in much discussion about the 
imperative demands of conscience. 
For the understanding of the attitude of both Royce and 
Bowne on war it should be remembered tha.t the peace moven:ent 
I had not assumed such large proportions in their day. 
·I 
They 
had not witnessed the conclusion and aftermaths of a world 
war, and the public conscience in general had scarcely be-
gun to realize what modern war might mean. r·f 'they were 
alive today, it is likely that both would be engaged as many 
of their students now are in farthering the movement to end 
war. 
4. The rights of women. 
His attitude toward the women's suffrage movement is 
an illustration of one social reform in which Bowne's posi-
tion was clearly defined and consistently maintained from 
the beginning. He declared himself in favor of extending 
the franchise to women as early as the publication of his 
Principles of Ethics--twenty-eight years before the adoption 
of the twentieth amendment. In an article on "Woman and 
Democracy" he released his powers of sarcasm on the "droll 
whimseys" of those who opposed women•s · suffrage. The ar-
gument that owmen whould not vote because they had been 
intended to be mothers he thought should be applied likewise 
to the men, who were intended to be fathers. 
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5. The social order. 
Bowne apparently had little conception of the meaning 
of modern industrialism--especially for the individual la-
lorer. It is true that he had once been a day laborer him-
self, but the conditions were quite different from the im-
personal sort of relations that exist in the modern factory 
life. He held to the old Puritan virtues of thrift and 
industry. He regarded a man's vocation as the symbol of 
his right to recognition as a moral being and wrote that 
"in whatever way we appraach the subject, we are led to con-
demn the drone, the trifler, the idle consumer in a world 
like ours, n67 but he had nothing to say of the right of a 
man to the opportunity to earn a living. Without suggesting 
the fact that men are robbed first of the possibility and 
then of the desire to labor as a result of the industrial 
system in which they find "themselves, he affirmed that "the 
stings and lashes of hunger and cold are the only things 
competent to stir the inertia of multitudes of human beings."6~ 
Today when industrialism and economic imperialism are 
held to be the leading causes of wars it seems strange indeed 
to read of Bowne's conviction that the diffusion of the in-
dustrial type of society "must tend more and more to make 
war in its traditional forms something which the conserva tive 
6678 Bowne, POE, 211. Th_i t'l 1<.:1&t 
and humane elements of society will not tolerate.n69 The 
work of governments he defined as follows: 
To guard the individual in his natural rights, to 
secure the impartial and passionless administration 
of justice, to restrain lawlessness and violence, 
and to conserve the public good--this is its fund-
amental fUnction.70 
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He ins:hsted that "society cannot afford to do anything which 
will relEve the healthy individual from the necessity of 
working out his own salvation,u71 and he bitterly attacked 
socialism. 72 His assertion that "particular forms of legis-
lation" are complicated, and that therefore "no irrelevance 
ban be greater than an appeal to the moral law for their 
solutionn73 might readily be used as a defense of capitalism. 
Apparently he never questioned the fundamental bases of the 
capitalistic system. 
In order to understand the points of view presented 
here it is necessary to realize that the world of 1892 was 
somewhat different from the world of 1935. It was a day of 
expanding markets, and the problem. of industry was to pro-
duce enough to satisfy the markets. Most of the issues 
current today had either not yet risen or were just rising 
at that time. Socialism had not gained a large following 
in any of the schools. 
68 Bowne, 
70 Ibid., 
71 Ib. ~ 72 · ~a.' 
Ibid., 
73 Ibid 
POE, 301. 
250. 
267. 
260-267. 
292 
II 
--·-- ==::::f+l, 
'I li 
'i ~ I 
II 
!I 
ii 
li 
In spite of what we may regard as mistaken judgments, 
ii Bowne 's interests were still in the human values. Although 
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he did not fully understand the nature of the class struggle, 
i, he did recognize that historically, 
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the social mechanism has been seized and worked in 
the interests of a few or of a class, and not in the 
interests of humanity. Privileged classes, monopo-
lies, robber tariff-s; class -legislation illustrate.74 
I' 
1 Moreover, he insisted that the clash of class interests can 
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i1 only be settled on the plane of justice. 75 "Society is 
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ignorance and rapacity of the individual·; and gradually is 
learning how to do it.n76 Finally, if the class in power 
cannot be brought to surrender its power by peaceful arbi-
tration, "there is no appeal but to force.n77 
6. His interest in social justice. 
McConnell writes that "Bowne had a passion for social 
righteousness which never waned."78 He felt that his own 
task was in the field of metaphysics, but this did not de-
crease his estimate of the importance of social issues. Al-
though he was not wide~ read in the social sciences, he was 
strongly moved by the injustices which he saw. During the 
11 
1!.·. 74 Bowne POE 254. 
7 5 Ib . d ' 253' 
:: 76 :roia::; 259: 
li 77 Ibid., 289. 
!l 78 McConnell, "Bowne and the bocial Questions , " 132. 
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trip around the world he was led to :feel more strongly than 
ever the possibilities and the needs of the masses--especially 
those of Asia. He was indignant at the treatment of the 
natives of India at the hands of the British and especially 
of the missionaries. "The connection between a thoroughly 
heathen belief and a wretched social condition became more 
evident to him in India than anywhere else.n79 His attitude 
toward the Chinese during the Boxer rebellion has already 
been mentioned, but after his trip through China in 1905, 
he realized that the atrocities of the Chinese were not to 
be compared with the inhuman treatment which they had received 
from the foreigners. "The dealing of foreign nations with 
China has been one sad, dreadful, atrocious, abominable 
history. nBO 
He was not sympathetic with all of the actions of the 
abolitionists, but he quoted with approval the statement of 
Theodore Parker that if Massachusetts should enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Act, he would "make the change of a word 
which would transform into a curse the time-honored81ourt-cry--God Save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts!" 
He blazed with rage at the injustices made public in 
Ida Tarbell 's His tory of the Standard Oil Company, 82 and 
79 McConnell, BPB, 258. 
~~ Ibid. , 2 57. 
Ibid., 176. 
82 McConnell, "Bowne and the Social Questions," 128. 
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he applauded Roosevelt's action in curbing t he power of the 
industrial giants in the name of the common welfare83 and 
in following up Sinclair's Chicago stockyard revelations. 84 
This interest in social justice is vividly reflected 
in the subsequent activities of a large number of Bowne's 
students, notable among whom is F. J. McConnell. 
83 McConnell, BPB, 169. 
84 McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," 35. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CffilPARISON OF THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES OF 
JOSIAH ROYCE AND BORDEN P.~KER BO~v.NE 
A. Human freedom in Royce and Bowne. 
It is scarcely neces s ary to present here a review of 
the facts which this study has disclosed. It has been 
pointed out that there is no adequate place in Royce's 
metaphysics for human freedom, for the individual is only 
an expression of the Absolute; whereas in Bowne's person-
alism there is a separateness between finite individuals 
and God which makes freedom conceivable, and Bowne shows 
at length that freedom is a necessary presupposition of 
reason as well as of ethics. 
For the same reason that ethics depends on freedom, 
social philosophy also depends on freedom. "The claim that 
'all persons ought' to do so and so is logically and ethi-
cally futile unless all persons can do what they ought to."l 
Royce and Bowne indicate certain goals toward which t he so-
cial process should move, and they suggest some of the in-
strQments which men may use in attaining those goals . But 
1 Brightman, ML , 283. 
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unless they have the freedom to choose, it is futile to ex-
hort men to seize the instruments and direct them toward a 
goal. In fact, progress toward a goal is itself an anomaly 
without freedom, for with a mechanistic interpretation of 
the world of consciousness and of matter there can be noth-
ing new: there is merely an inevitable succession of arrange-
ments of that which has been. Moreover, social philosophy 
involves the application of reason ~o the social . process, 
and since there can be no real application of reason without 
freedom \for the reasons indicated in Chapter IV above), 
neither can there be a social philosophy without freedom. 
Bristol strengthens this conclusion with a pragmatic refer-
ence to history: 
After thousands of years of inter-group conflict 
and cultural development, the common-sense philos-
ophy of the winning groups is essentially libertar-
ian. Historically, fatalism has led to stagnation 
and dec ay. If belief in freedom is necessary, and 
this belief is nevertheless a delusion, then t his 
is not a rational universe, but rests ultimately 
on falsity not truth.2 
It is therefore evident that in so far as Royce's abso-
lutism leaves no room for freedom, it destroys an essential 
basis of social philosophy, and this basis is more adequa te-
ly -naintained in Bowne's philosophy of personalism. 
2 Bristol, SA, 213-214. 
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B. Comparison of organicism and organic pluralism. 
Atomism may be said to represent the method of a nalysis. 
Organicism takes a wider view and represents the .method of 
synthesis. It takes into account many factors which atomism 
ov erlooks . Organic pluralism attempts to embody the truth 
of both of the former views. and its method may thus be 
called t he synopsis after synthesis. 
Atomism insists on the truth that individuals are the 
only existing beings in society. Society consists of them, 
and they ough t to respect each other as having individual 
ri ghts. The truth in organicism is that individuals a re 
not mere a toms but are parts of a larger organism, and no 
part can be understood without taking into considerat ion 
its rel a tion to the whole. Wholes have qualitie~ which none 
of the par ts have. The whole is greater t han the sum of 
all : its parts. Therefore, organicism may say, as did Aris-
totle, nyou are cr f: ated for t he sake of the whole and not 
the whole for the sake of you.n 3 Organic pluralism refuses 
to accept t hat deeision. It decl~es that t he whole is 
created t hat t he individual may develop normally in all of 
his capacities. It agrees with atomism that individuals 
Pbve qualities which wholes do not have, but it also 
3 Ar istotle, Law~, 903c. 
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recognizes that wholes have qualities which the parts do 
not have . In other words, it ins1sts that society is an 
abstraction apart from the individuals ~hich compose it. 
They are t h e real ities of whom and fo r whom the society 
exists. Ye t, it also insists t hat they cannot be understood 
apart from the groups in whi ch they live, and that they 
cannot reach t heir fullest development by themselves. They 
are organisms taking their p l ace in a larger organism, and 
neither can be satisfactorally altered without also c hang ing 
the other. If we are to make better individuals, we should 
change society, but we cannot reform society without reform-
ing some of the individual s of whi ch it is composed . 
It should therefore be evident th~t organic plural ism 
i ncludes a l ar ger vievv of the truth than organicism. 7/hile 
inc l uding the tru th of organicism, it also embraces the 
truths which organicism r ails to take into account. Hence, 
in so ~ar as Bo .~e's metaphysics is consistent with organic 
plural ism, a nd Royce's is consistent ~ith organicism, 
Bovme' s fund.a:nenta.l social philosophy inc ludes a larg er 
v iew of the truth than does the absolutistic social philos-
ophy of Royce. 
c. Bristol's so c ial - personalism as a synthesis of 
the social philosophies of Royce a nd Bowne. 
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In t he discussion of Bristol's social- personalism it 
was noticed that it includes many of the ins1gn~s of Bowne's 
personalism. It grows out of Bowne's fundamental metaphysics. 
It agre es with Bowne's 9erfectionist ethics in setting the 
goal of self-development for the ind ividuale Bristol also 
concurs in Bowne's h igh estimate of the significance of 
freedom. T'!e have now to notice tha t this social-personalism 
also includes a number of the. di stinctive contributions of 
Royce. oyce presents a deeper appreciation of the effect 
of the group on the ind ividual and therefore would agree 
t hat the goal of indiv i dua l self- development must include 
""!the kind of development tha t fits the individual for the 
pla ce in social life that he can fill supremely nell a ccord-
· t h . b·l·t 114 1ng o 1s a 1 1 y . While he does not state the po int in 
just that way, _ oyce's view of the relation of the individ-
ual to society and particularly the conception of salvation 
through the community would seem to lead inevitably to t he 
v i ew, which forms an important part of social- personalism, 
tha t society is responsible for the character of every per-
sonality. Bristol 's view of· social groups as being "quasi-
personalities" is a satisfactory substitute for Royce's 
idea of the personality of social groups , which we found it 
necessary to discard. The social g oal of exemplifaction is 
4 Bristol, SA, 325 . 
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consistent with Royce's social philosophy, but finds no def-
inite expression there and should be recognizei as one of 
Bristol's mos t distinct i ve contributions. mhe furt her so-
ci a l g oal of "functioning in a more inclusive unity" has 
certain important f eatures in( co.mmon with some of the views 
expres s ed in Royce's philosophy of loya l ty . Royce emphasi -
zes the belief tha t our causes should forma system. Our 
causes must be social, and at times he refers to them as 
communities. If these are to form a sy stem, they must rep-
resent smaller groups taking their places in a more inclusive 
unity. Thus the ideal a ssumes larger proportions, moving 
on "in ever widening circles with the extension of co-oper-
ation and the expansion of the self-regarding s entiment 
until it embraces all humanity." 5 For the individual this 
goal may represent a demand that he be loyal to loyalty, as 
Royce woula say; he must choose causes to serve whi c h increase 
loyalty among all mankind . The society which he serves 
must take its place .in a l arger society and that in a l a r ger 
until the whole world is included as the object--however 
indirect--of the individual's loyal service. 
It is t hus evident that Bristol's social-personalism 
includes a synthesis of a number of the valid features in 
t h e social philosophies of both Royce and Bowne. 
5 Bristol, SA, 326. 
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D. The contributions of Royce and Bowne to 
social philosophy. 
These contributions have been suggested throughout t he 
entire study and particularly in t he sections on social-
personalism. It now rema ins only to gather them together 
in a single concise statement. 
Bowne's philosophy of personalism provides an adequate 
me taphysical basis for social philosophy. Personalism 
assi gns supreme worth to persons, and t h ey must be t he be-
ginning and t he end of social philosophy. Persons are the 
realities of which society is composed, and they are the 
o~jects for which the social process exists. "One must 
finally ~onclude t hat t h is real and final end is the pro-
duction of human beings, personalities, souls •• • • So-
ciety grows out of the individual, his needs and attributes."6 
They a re the significant goals whi ch ma~e all social philos-
ophy, a l l social sciences, and all social action worth the 
effort. No metaphysica which compromises the value of per-
sons can be ultimately adequat e for social philosophy. "It 
remains for others to advance the boundaries of the philos-
ophy of which Professor Bowne was so successful a pdioneer 
and protagonist."? 
~ Hertzler, SF, 89. 
Buckham, "A Group of American Idealists," 31. 
........... 
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Bowne contributes a theoretical basis for freedom, 
which is an indispens able element of soci a l philosophy. 
~ocial philosophy involves t he problem of how intellig ence 
and deliberate effort may be applied to t he task of directing 
the social process toward valuable ends. All of tha t is 
imp oss ible without human freedom. 
Bowne's personalism provides a more adequate metaphys-
ical basis for Christianity, a nd thus it preserves t he dy-
namic of t h e Christian religion to be applied to the task 
of achieving social ends. 
Bowne places a wholesome emphasis on the truth t hat 
t he g oal of the social process must be subjective and ob-
jective, including outward fortune and 1nner worth and peace. 
Bowne's ethics contributes a criticism of all the im-
portant earlier schools and pr eserves their values in a 
synthesis of its mm, even though its empnasis may be too 
individualistic for the purposes of social philosophy . 
Royce contributes to social philosophy a deeper insight 
into t he social nature of all experience. He is constantly 
aware of the fact that individuals do not exist as atoms. 
Even if it were possible for an individua l to exist apart 
from society, he still would not be h~~an. The development 
of the individual implies the development of communities, 
and if he would achieve personal perfection, his g oal must 
include adjestment to the groups in which he lives. The 
co1rrmunity has numerous functions which no one as an individ-
ual can perform. Social philosophy must recognize as of 
central importance t he significance of t he group for the 
i ndiv i dual. 
One phase of this insight is Royce's view of the com-
muni t y nature of relig ion. There is no such t h ing a s soli-
t art Christianity. From its very beginning Christianity 
has been a social relig ion. This is an important fact if 
one w·oulct hav e relig ion function in t he social process. vre 
need to realize t hat religion itself cannot be separated 
from t he social process. 
Royce contributes a valuable impetus to t he study of 
the question of what is t he na t ure of co~~unities. His own 
solution--tha t coinmuni t d: es are persons and have a conscious 
existence apart from the individua ls which they include--
we h ave rejected, but h is eff ective presentation of the 
problem is still valuable. It is important to observe t ha t 
a t least in some respects t hey behave like persons. Perhaps 
t he roo st satisfactory answer to date is a recogniti on that 
they act like organisms and therefore t hat they may be 
studied as if they were persons--as " Quasi-personalities," 
to use Bristol's term. 
Royce's principle of loyalty to loyalty furnishes us 
with a valuable norm for criticism and a valuable source of 
-- -
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motivation, even though its exposition in the Philosophy 
of Loyalty suffers from over-simplification and formalism. 
Bowne recognized that the life of men is dominated by their 
ideals, which they receive from t he community in which they 
live,8 but the treatment by Royce is distinctive and impres-
sive. The philosophy of loyalty also contributes to the 
goal of the imdividual. "Most human beings are most fully 
themselves when they most fully give themselves to noble 
public causes." 9 
Royce makes an impressive contribution to our view of 
the goal of the social process. The goal for the individual 
or for society cannot be fully attained until mankind is a 
community in whichall s smaller communities function harmoni-
ously. This community exists only for its members, but out-
side of it the members cannot attain their highest develop-
ment. 
These various contributions from Royce and Bowne are 
consistent with each other. The hope of the great community 
may well be grounded in personalism. 
8 Cf. Bowne, PER , 311, and Collier, "Personalism: A Vital 
9 Philosophy," 39. Hertzler, SF, 92. 
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This paper aims to present a deseription, evaluation, 
and comparison of the social philosophies of Josiah Royce 
and Borden Parker Bowne. Social philosophy is a philosoph-
ical criti que of social process including evaluation and 
metaphysical interpretation. 
Josiah Royce (1855 t l916) graduated from the University 
of California and Johns Hopkins Uni versity and studied in 
Germany. During those years he was influenced by Joseph 
LeConte, Rowland Sill, Charles Peirce, and mos t of a ll by 
William James. 
Royce built his philosophy of absolutism on the funda-
tions l a id by Hegel. He insists on t he unity of reality. 
Finite individuals a nd all t ha t exists has its being by 
v i rtue of being an expression of the Absolute. This whole 
is a~iritual and rational unity and is a person. Such a 
philosophy has no adequate provision for t he disti nctness, 
the freedom, and hence the worth of t he individual. 
Believing in an eternal moral law, Royce pe~sents the 
philosophy of loyalty to indicate where that law is to be 
d iscovered. Loy•l ty is "the willing and ~actical and thor-
oughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." The cause must 
be social, uniting the loyalty of a number of persons. An 
171 
individual's causes should form a system in wb...ich conflict 
is reduced to a minimum. The h i ghest loyalty is called 
loyalty to loyalty because it furthers the cause of loyalty 
among all mankind. All of the common virtues are particu-
l ar forms of loyalty. The g oa l of the individual is the 
perfection of himself in order t hat he may present a worthy 
instrument for the service of his cause. Thus in loyalty 
we have the summation of the moral law. Men are trained 
in loyalty as they observe t he loyalty of others, as their 
causes become idealized, and a s they s pend themselves with 
l abor, sacrifice, and ~in in the service of their causes. 
Loyalty is the virtue uniting individuals in communities 
and ultimately in t he community of mankind. This great 
cause partakes of the na ture of t hat unity of all experience 
which is the Absolute. Hence, loyalty may be defined meta-
physica lly as "the will to manifest ••• the ."S ternal • • • 
in the form of the acts of an i ndividual Self." 
Royce's social philosophy may be described a s organi-
cism, the theory tha t society is a whole. This is consistent 
with absolutism, which insist s on the wholeness of reality; 
with the philo s ophy of loyalty, which emphasi zes the virtue 
tha t binds men together; and with the conception of the 
community as a person. Organicism fails to take account of 
the properties of individuals which groups lack and tends 
t o crush the individual. 
-- ---· ----
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Royce classes himself as a Christian theist, but his 
absolutism is not perfectly in accord with that view. Chris-
tianity ascribes to men a degree of independence and separate-
ness from God which absolutism must deny. 
Royce's applications of his philosophy of loyalty are 
characterized by formalism. He a ttempts to reduce the facts 
to simpler terms than will bear them. In dealing with such 
problems as family solidarity and class conflict he fails to 
g ive sufficient ~ttention to the problems peculiar to each 
situation. Still, it should be recognized that loyalty is 
a useful principle in dealing with particular situations. 
Loyalty is a force for social cohesion, but it leads so 
readily to exclusiveness and jealousy that it may easily be-
come a force for social division. This is well illustrated 
by t he use tha t is made of national loyalty in producing war. 
This is further evidence of the fact that it is necessary to 
g ive greater attention to the content of the ethical will 
instead of dealing only with the attitude of loyalty. 
Royce interprets t he Christian doctrines in terms of 
t he significance of the community for the individual. The 
individual can develop norma1£Y~~n the group. Yet he rebels 
against the group and desires freedom. Religion serves to 
solve this dile~~a by inspiring the individual wi~h a love 
for the community. This interpretation of Christianity is 
' not the Christianity of Jesus, Paul, or the modern church. 
J 
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Jesus has had a more significant place in the history of 
the faith than Royce assigns him. The idea of the community 
as a person is an unnecessary fiction. There is no social 
mind apart from individual minds. Nevertheless, Royce has 
done well to emphasize the social nature of religion. 
Royce acc epted the fundamental princi ples of the social 
sy stem of his day without serious question. He believed in 
fostering nationalism by provincialism and internationalism 
by nationalism. He believed in the World War as a necessary 
rebuke to the Central Powers, who, he believed, had demon-
strated themselves to be the enemies of mankind. 
Borden Parker Bowne (184?-1910) graduated from New York 
University and studied for two years in Europe, whe.re he was 
profoundly affected by the te achings of Lotze and Ulrici. 
He taught in Boston University from 18?6-1910. A trip around 
the world in 1905 deepened his sympathy for the masses of 
the Orient and stimul e" ted his social interests in general. 
Bowne's l philosophy of personalism is that form of ideal-
ism which sees reality as consisting of a system of finite 
selves related to each other through a supreme person. It 
finds the solution of the problems of philosophy in the ac-
tivity of conscious, self-identifying persons. Fintte per-
sons, while they are related to the supreme person and to 
each other, have a degree of otherness from God which guar-
antees their inde pendent worth and a relative freedom. 
I 
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Personalism views God as immanent in nature and in history. 
In his ethics Bowne belongs to the perfectionist school. 
He accepts Schleiermacher 's three moral ideas--the good, 
duty, and virtue--as expressing t the complete moral conscious-
ness of the race. His emphasis is individualistic, but he 
presents a criticism of all the·mportant earlier schools 
and preserves their values in a synthesis of his own. 
Bovme defends the belief in freedom as being not only 
consistent with his metaphysics and essential to ethics, 
but also a presupposition of all reason; 
Bristol presents a social philosophy based on Bowne's 
m~taphysics but g iving a larger place to the social factor 
in experience. Personalism finds expression in the social 
philosophy of organic pluralism, which asserts that "the 
individua l is an organ ic whole in an organic society and 
universe but t ha t t he individual is not and ought not be 
wholly determined by any who le to which he belongs." Per-
sonalism provides an adequate metaphysical ground for Chris-
tianity. The doctrine of the divine i mmanence is an inspir-
ation to social action because it implies the divineness of 
all of life and prepares the way for a vital relig ious faith. 
Bowne relied on religion in general and Christian be-
liefs in particular as a powerful sourc e of social motivation. 
It provides also a source of optimism, but that optimism may 
be a danger if it conceals the blunt facts of human life. 
c.:;.-
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Bowne thought of the church as an instrument for the develop-
ment of the reli gious and moral consciousness of the people. 
The goal toward which the church and in fact the whole social 
process should move includes objective well-being and sub-
jective worth and peace and also the full development of the 
individual in all his powers accompanied by a development of 
society which will make the individual growth possible. 
In his social attitudes Bowne manifested an interest 
in the large human values, measured all things in terms of 
human values, and display ed a confidnece ih the masses--
even though his~ecific judgments may be rejected by us. He 
did not display a profound knowledge of the social sciences. 
A belief in human freedom is necessary for social phil-
osophy because socia.l philosophy d emands the application of 
reason and effort for the attainment of social goals, and 
that is impossible without freedom. Organic pluralism in-
cludes a wider vi ew of the truth than does organicism. 
Bowne's personalism is consistent with a belief in freedom 
and with organic pluralism, it is more consistent with Chris-
tianity, and it provides a more sedure basis for believing 
in t he worth of individual pers ons. On all of these points 
it is superior to absolutism as a found a tion for social phil~ 
osophy. Bristol•s social-personalism is a personalistic 
social ph ilosophy including many of the values of Royce's 
thought. 
An adequate socia.l philosophy might well include a 
synthesis of Royce 1 s a ppreciation of the social factor, 
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his vision of the community of mankind, and s ome motivation 
from his philosophy of loyalty grou r1ded in Bowne's philos-
ophy of personalism. 
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